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Résumé de synthèse 
 
 
 
  ii 
L’archive erronée dans l’œuvre d’Anne Carson enquête sur les effets que peuvent entraîner 
l’archive classique sur la poésie d’Anne Carson et révèle que le travail de cette dernière est 
issu de l’espace situé entre la critique et la créativité, ce qui génère ce qu’on appellera une 
« poétique de l’erreur ». La poésie de Carson se démarque par sa prédilection pour les 
accidents, les imperfections et les impondérables de la transmission. La présente dissertation 
émerge des attitudes critiques ambivalentes face à la dualité de l’identité de Carson, autant 
poète qu’universitaire, et leur offrira une réponse. Alors que l’objectif traditionnel du 
philologue classique est de reconstruire le sens du texte « original », l’approche poétique de 
Carson sape en douce les prétentions universitaires d’exactitude, de précision et de totalisation. 
La rencontre de Carson avec l’archive classique embrasse plutôt les bourdes, les mauvaises 
lectures et les erreurs de traduction inhérentes à la transmission et à la réception de traductions 
classiques. 
La poésie de Carson est ludique, sexuée et politique. Sa manière de jouer avec l’épave 
du passé classique torpille la patri-archive, telle que critiquée par Derrida dans  Mal 
d’Archive ; c’est-à-dire cette archive considérée comme un point d’origine stable grâce auquel 
s’orienter. De plus, en remettant en question la notion de l’archive classique en tant qu’origine 
de la civilisation occidentale, Carson offre simultanément une critique de l’humanisme, en 
particulier au plan de la stabilité, du caractère mesurable et de l’autonomie de « l’homme ». 
L’archive, pour Carson, est ouverte, en cours et incomplète ; les manques linguistiques, 
chronologiques et affectifs de l’archive classique représentent ainsi des sources d’inspiration 
poétique. 
La présente dissertation étudie quatre dimensions de l’archive classique : la critique,   
la saphique, l’élégiaque et l’érotique. Grâce à ces coordonnées, on y établit le statut 
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fragmentaire et fissuré du passé classique, tel que conçu par Carson. Si le fondement classique 
sur lequel la culture occidentale a été conçue est fissuré, qu’en est-il de la stabilité, des 
frontières et des catégories que sont le genre, la langue et le texte ? L’ouverture de l’archive 
critique de manière implicite les désirs de totalité associés au corps du texte, à la narration, à la 
traduction et à l’érotisme.  
En offrant une recension exhaustive de sa poétique, L’archive erronée dans l’œuvre 
d’Anne Carson tente d’analyser l’accueil hostile qu’elle a subi, contribue à renforcer la 
documentation sans cesse croissante dont elle fait l’objet et anticipe sa transmutation actuelle 
de  médium et de genre, sa migration de la page à la scène. 
 
 
 
Mots-clés : Anne Carson, poésie contemporaine, critique féministe, archive, réception 
classique, Grèce antique, traduction, saphisme, psychanalyse, déconstruction 
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Abstract 
  
  v 
The Erring Archive in Anne Carson investigates the responsiveness of Anne Carson’s poetry 
to the classical archive and argues that Carson works from within the space between the 
critical and the creative, generating what I call a “poetics of error.” Carson’s poetics is 
distinguished by a predilection for accidents, imperfections, and the contingencies of 
transmission. My dissertation also responds to and emerges from the ambivalent critical 
attitudes to Carson’s dual identity as both a scholar and a poet. While the traditional aim of the 
classical philologist is to reconstruct the meaning of the “original” text, Carson’s poetic 
approach self-consciously undermines scholarly pretensions to accuracy, precision, and 
totalization. Rather, Carson’s encounter with the classical archive embraces the mistakes, 
misreadings, and mistranslation inherent in classical transmission and reception. 
 Carsonian poetics is ludic, gendered, and political. Her play with the wreckage of the 
classical past undermines the patri-archive, as critiqued by Derrida in Archive Fever; that is, 
an archive that is considered to be a stable, governing point of origin. Furthermore, by 
challenging the notion of the classical archive as the origin of Western civilization, Carson 
simultaneously offers a critique of Humanism, particularly the stability, measurability, and 
autonomy of “Man.” The archive, for Carson, is open, ongoing, and incomplete; the linguistic, 
temporal, and affective gaps of the classical archive are thus opportunities for poetic 
production.  
 My dissertation examines four dimensions of the classical archive: the critical, the 
sapphic, the elegiac, and the erotic. By means of these coordinates, I establish the fragmentary 
and ruptured status of the classical past, as conceived by Carson. If the classical bedrock upon 
which Western culture has been conceived is fractured, what does this mean for the stability, 
borders, and categories of genre, language, and the text? The openness of the archive 
  vi 
implicitly critiques related desires of totality associated with the textual body, narrative, 
translation, and Eros.  
The Erring Archive in Anne Carson is keen to analyze Carson’s own vexed reception 
and contributes to growing Carsonian scholarship, as it provides a comprehensive entry into 
her poetics and anticipates her current generic and media shift from the page to the stage. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Anne Carson, contemporary poetry, feminist criticism, archive, classical reception, 
Ancient Greek, translation, Sappho, psychoanalysis, deconstruction 
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Introduction 
 
 
“The beginning has as its purpose to set us on the road 
that leads to the end. 
It directs our attention 
 
to our feet 
and asks us to remember 
the art of stepping along. 
 
[…] 
 
Stories and roads have something in common, 
an important delusion: 
 
that this is the only way to get there.” 
 –Anne Carson (“Shoes: An Essay on How Plato’s Symposium Begins”) 
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“A Joke about the Metre” 
In 1913, Marcel Duchamp produced 3 Standard Stoppages. He took three pieces of thread 
(each measuring one metre long) and dropped them onto canvas strips. Next, he attached the 
threads, however they landed, to the canvas. Duchamp then took the canvas and cut along the 
curved profile of the threads, thus creating a new template of measure while still adhering to 
the length of one metre. Duchamp’s premise was that “if a straight horizontal thread one metre 
long falls from a height of one metre onto a horizontal plane distorting itself as it pleases, [it] 
creates a new shape of the measure of length” (Joselit 27).  
 By complicating our understanding of the metre as “a given,” Duchamp sought to 
undermine the ordered and rational basis of measure as a compositional procedure. 
Renouncing the linearity of the metre (and, by extension, its application for precise measure), 
he offers in its place an alternative model. Duchamp described 3 Standard Stoppages as “a 
joke about the metre” and referred to it as “du hasard en conserve” ([“a bit of chance in a 
can”]) (qtd. in Spieker 54). Crucial to the work is the play of chance and accident. 
 In an interview in The Paris Review, Anne Carson says: “I’m happy to do things by 
accident” (Aitken). Indeed, Carson has received notable attention for the surprising and odd 
pairings in her works: Simonides and Paul Celan (Economy of the Unlost); tango music and 
Keats (The Beauty of the Husband); Catullus and her brother’s death (Nox); Sappho and 
television (Decreation). Carson makes clear that these links are both “totally arbitrary” and 
“totally careful”: 
I have a sense of following, like a hound dog with my nose to the ground, but looking 
not for a track of scent, but a track of shapes. I think of ideas as having shapes and 
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when I sense that two different texts or writers have the same shapes in them, I know I 
can bring them together. (Aitken) 
Carson’s ideas come in a variety of sources: film, visual art, Japanese epigraphs, modernist 
texts, and psychoanalysis. Most prevalent in her growing body of work is a continual 
engagement with the classical archive. As a classicist, philologist, and translator, Carson has 
privileged access to antiquity, as one would expect of a well-trained scholar. Her comfort and 
proficiency with Latin and ancient Greek have led her to describe the classical world as “a 
home in [her] mind” (Aitken). 
 But Carson makes clear that her poetic deployment of classical material is in tension 
with the expectations of her scholarly training: “I was taught that objective reportage of 
academic questions is the ideal form for scholarship to take, but in pursuing scholarship 
myself I never found that possible” (Aitken). Carson’s teachers describe classical antiquity as 
an object that can be handed down without contamination (the word “tradition” comes from 
the Latin “tradere” meaning “to deliver, hand over”). Reception studies, however, tend now to 
contest “the idea that classics is something fixed, whose boundaries can be shown” 
(Martindale 2). Similarly for Carson, the classical past is not just “a given” or an object of 
“tradition”; rather, it is generated by a complex process of reception, translation, and 
sedimentation. How we understand the classical archive is dependent on, and differentiated at, 
each point of its reception.  
 While Duchamp manipulates the traditional shape of the metre stick, Carson engages 
with the classical archive in such a way so as to undermine its monolithic construction and 
venerable position as the font of Western intellectual culture. The current state of classical 
reception studies corresponds to Carson’s inability to acquiesce to an “objective” and “ideal 
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form” that is purely transmissible. Her poetry ironizes the philologist’s aim to reconstitute an 
integral, authoritative text from surviving fragments and instead responds to and embraces the 
mistakes, accidents, and loss that inevitably take place in transmission and translation.  
Duchamp, as Carson well knew, experienced directly the contingencies of transmission. 
In the opening poem of The Beauty of the Husband, Carson quotes him directly:  
‘Use delay instead of picture or painting –’1 
… 
So Duchamp 
of The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors 
 
which broke in eight pieces in transit from the Brooklyn Museum 
 
to Connecticut (1912). (5)  
 
Also called The Large Glass, Duchamp’s installation shattered on its way to the museum. 
Rather than replacing the glass, he repaired it in such a way that the glass retained evidence of 
the accident. In fact, Duchamp “claimed to like it better that way” (Rourke). The imperfect 
surface of the artwork defies and defers the expectation of perfection and unmediated transfer. 
Both Carson and Duchamp find a rich artistic resource in this “delay.”  
  
Doing Things by Accident 
“Incidental benefit of my imperfect method.” 
 –Anne Carson (Wachtel) 
 
 
Carson, who is “happy to do things by accident,” is also happy to do things with accidents. Her 
creative praxis counters classical philology’s concern with “recover[ing] the meanings that 
ancient texts had in their original contexts” (Kallendorf 2). Indeed, if the dream of the 
                                                
1 This quotation from Duchamp is one of the notes in his work, The Green Box, which is placed beside The Large Glass in the 
Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
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classicist is to access the past directly and reproduce an “original” text, Carson is more 
interested in the delay that prevents the fulfillment of this dream. These delays and deferrals 
come in the form of misreadings, mistranslations, errors in transcription – in short, the 
inevitable mistakes by means of which the classical archive comes down to us. Carsonian 
poetics is, to borrow Duchamp’s phrase, “du hasard en conserve,” or what I have termed a 
“poetics of error.”  
 Carson’s poetics of error thus works within the framework of accident, contingency, 
and play. Departing from the sombre image of the enlightened, humanistic scholar working in 
the dusty archives and libraries in order to reconstruct the Truth of the past, Carson delights in 
error. As the speaker in the poem, “Essay on what I Think About Most,” responds to the 
question of what preoccupies her: “Error / And its emotions” (MOH 30).  
What Duchamp calls “delay” is, in fact, a space and opportunity for productive 
accidents. An accident, as Carson shows us, doesn’t just shatter an artwork into pieces; it 
reveals that art is fragmentary. No doubt, the classical archive is received in a state of 
wreckage, consisting of papyrus fragments preserved by chance. But, more importantly for 
Carson, this fragmentary survival tells us much about its “original” state. The integral archive 
is the philologist’s fantasy. The archive is always already fragmented. For Duchamp, the 
accidental damage done to The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors was considered an 
improvement. Carson similarly asserts, “In surfaces, perfection is less interesting” (Aitken). 
 We can consider, for example, the section “Stops” in Decreation, which, as with 
Duchamp’s 3 Standard Stoppages, allows space for imperfection. In a series of fourteen short 
poems, Carson constructs a series of lyric moments that participate in an overarching narrative 
of the relationship between the speaker and her mother. Their relationship is marked by 
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distance (long-distance phone calls) and recurring images of sleep, light, and cold. The 
fleeting and ephemeral quality of their interactions is further punctuated with absence and 
emptiness. The poems conclude with phrases such as “hollow distances,” “stones go blank,” 
“Me, as ever, gone,” “Nothing for it just row” and “no sign of you” (D 4, 8, 12, 13, 16).
 Carson presents fourteen “temporal stoppages,” which provide reflection and 
expression, but resist a totalizing narrative, or perfect story. Between each poem, or “stop,” are 
gaps, hollows, blanks, and negations. Carson addresses the fragmentation of this chapter, and 
poses a question which aptly concerns the archive: “In the sum of the parts / where are the 
parts?” (7). 
In this dissertation, I investigate Carson’s engagement with the classical archive via 
her poetics of error in order to pursue a critical question: what does Carson’s predilection for 
imperfections, accidents, and error suggest with regard to the archive and classical reception? 
Carson’s responsiveness to Latin and Greek antiquity, I suggest, is a politically radical 
manoeuvre, not the mere self-indulgence of an expert classicist. Though, as we will see, 
Carson has been charged with useless erudition, her project involves destabilizing the mythical 
origin of Western Humanism. Humanism since the Renaissance has returned to the Greco-
Roman archive and revived classical learning in order to establish the elusive category of 
“Man.” The return to antiquity that constitutes the humanistic project is inevitably a gendered 
consolidation of masculine privilege. As Rosi Braidotti puts it:  
At the start of it all there is He: the classical ideal of “Man,” formulated first by 
Protagoras as “the measure of all things,” later renewed in the Italian Renaissance as a 
universal model and represented in Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man. (13; emphasis 
mine) 
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Just as Duchamp tampers with the measure of the metre, Carson undermines Man as the 
measure of all things – that is, “man” as founded by the classical patri-archive.  
Origins are particularly important to Derrida, a key figure for my interrogation of 
Carson’s deployment of the classical archive. In Archive Fever (which opens with, “Let us not 
begin at the beginning” [1]), Derrida’s critique of the traditional configuration of the archive 
as a point of “commencement” and “commandment” (derived from the Greek ἀρχή [arkhē]) is 
simultaneously a critique of Humanism. The archive, as Derrida argues, is not a self-enclosed 
entity, or what Spieker imagines as a “dream of total control and all-encompassing 
administrative discipline, a giant filing cabinet at the center of a reality founded on ordered 
rationality” (1). The past is not collected, ordered, filed neatly away, and guarded by a 
superior magistrate. “‘Archive’ is only a notion” (Derrida, AF 29) because the archive, in fact, 
is continually changing by what is added. Open to the future, the archive is always almost 
formed; “order is no longer assured” (5). Spieker concurs: “When an archive has to collect 
everything, because every object may become useful in the future, it will soon succumb to 
entropy and chaos” (xiii). 
Carson’s poetics reassesses the traditional paradigms of the classical archive and the 
humanistic measure of “Man,” and calls into question notions of origin, stability, and 
fulfillment. I have linked “delay” with her poetics of error, and, in the course of this 
dissertation, shall also describe her “errancy” in terms of spatial, temporal, and linguistic 
divides (such as “gaps” and “leaps”), boundary-crossings (“leakage,” “rupture,” “spillage”), 
and excess (“residue,” “trace,” “dirt”). “Madness,” too, is found, quite literally, in the 
recurring figure of the demented father. Indeed, the strong and healthy father is initially 
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aligned with concepts that oppose Carsonian poetics, such as order, conservation, and 
containment: 
To make up new stories, Celan’s father thought, is a waste of words. This father’s 
sentiments are not unusual. My own father was inclined to make skeptical comments 
when he saw me hunched at the kitchen table covering pages with small print. Perhaps 
poets are ones who waste what their fathers would save. But the question remains, 
What exactly is lost to us when words are wasted? And where is the human store to 
which such goods are gathered? (Economy 3) 
Here we see an explicit conflict between the father, who is dubious about Carson’s process, 
and the daughter, whose work as a poet seemingly “wastes” words. She does not collect, 
archive, or gather. Rather, she squanders and misuses language. Her query regarding the locale 
of where “such goods are gathered” echoes her earlier query in “Stops”: “In the sum of the 
parts / where are the parts?” (D 7; emphasis mine). Strikingly, this passage anticipates the 
“waste of words” issued from the father when he succumbs to dementia. By extension, the 
broken father is a useful trope when discussing the chaos and madness manifested in the 
archive, the text, and eros. Finally, if the stable point of origin is brought into question, the 
projected point of finish is equally as uncertain. Carson, I shall demonstrate, is concerned with 
pursuits of non-arrival, be they translational, elegiac, or erotic. 
 
Miswriting the Archive 
In an imagined interview with the ancient Greek poet, Mimnermos, Carson provides an 
arresting exchange about history that aptly consolidates her poetic concerns: 
M: … you can’t dismember everything 
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I:  Dismember 
M: Sorry I meant remember (PW 23) 
The dialogue demonstrates, firstly, the mistakes and slippages of language. In place of 
“remember,” Mimnermos erroneously uses “dismember,” immediately likening memory and 
history to a body that can be pulled apart. “Remember,” then, is not simply to recall, or 
commit to memory a past event, but to “re-member,” as in, to put a body back together. The 
past is no longer conceived as a single entity under the header, “History,” but is multiple, 
composed of building blocks that are disassembled as often as they are reassembled. History is 
not a “whole” made up of a sum of parts. This exchange enfolds error, history, and a resistance 
to totalization, motifs that are essential to my project.  
In order to elucidate Carsonian poetics, the following coordinates organize my reading 
of her work and its encounter with the classical past: the critical, the sapphic, the elegiac, and 
the erotic. 
 
The Critical 
Thus far, Carson’s reception has been generally bifurcated: some readers are thrilled by the 
experimentally donnish quality of her works, while others question the success of her use of 
scholarship. William Logan describes Carson as a poet who “moonlights as a classics 
professor (unless she’s a classics professor who moonlights as a poet)” (“Victoria’s Secret”). 
Logan, among others, expresses doubt as to whether Carson can indeed occupy both vocations 
equally, or if she is simply “moonlighting,” favouring one over the other. But critics who are 
uneasy about how Carson fits as both poet and classicist unknowingly play into the old 
Platonic divide between poetry and philosophy.  
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 My opening chapter investigates Carson’s reception and explores further the anxiety 
surrounding her dual vocations. I argue that Carson artfully and playfully confuses the two 
identities in a manoeuvre that is both aesthetic and political. Working between the writerly 
spaces of the critical and the creative is essential to her poetics. Furthermore, her process 
knowingly subverts this fundamental Platonic binary, while undermining the traditional 
standpoint of the classical past as the cradle of Western civilization. Crucial to my argument is 
an understanding of Carsonian poetics as contrasted to Virginia Woolf’s classicism in “On Not 
Knowing Greek.” While Woolf respects the temporal and linguistic gaps that separate her 
from antiquity, Carson locates her poetics within this space, appealing to the errors of classical 
transmission and reception. Carson engages with classical fragments not as a philologist who 
aims “to reduce all textual delight / to an accident of history” (MOH 34), but rather attends to 
and exalts such accidents as textual delight.  
I conclude the chapter with an analysis of an earlier poem by Carson, entitled “Now 
What?” which deliberately yokes the voice of the scholar and the voice of a poet. Carson’s 
translation of Sappho’s fragment 55 in this poem demonstrates the necessary co-existence of 
the poet and the scholar. The scholia section, traditionally a marginal text, assumes the central 
body of the poetic text. The poem, I argue, is an exemplary illustration of Carson’s work in 
general, as she situates herself within the liminal space between scholarship and poetry in a 
vital confusion of the distinctions between realms. 
 
The Sapphic 
In Nay Rather, Carson states, “As a classicist I was trained to strive for exactness and to 
believe that rigorous knowledge of the world without any residue is possible for us” (32). In 
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my second chapter, I continue to explore the linguistic and temporal gaps discussed in the 
previous chapter, but this time, I address Carson’s praxis in terms of “residue.” Starting with 
Carson’s gendered reading of Sappho’s fragment 31 in “Dirt and Desire” and “The Gender of 
Sound,” I adopt her analogies of the female body to “dirt,” “leakage,” and “rupture,” and 
understand her use of the sapphic fragment as textual “residue” that breaches the given 
boundaries of the body of the text and categories of genre.  
While Sappho has always been an important predecessor for female writers and artists, 
“Sappho,” I argue, indexes not only her (imagined) personage, but also a textual and affective 
system characterized by absence, fragmentation, incompletion, and chaos. As Carson states, “I 
think with Sappho, the main thing to do is to hold off giving a sense and let the sense emerge 
for the reader from what’s left there and from the spaces around it” (Fleming). The “spaces” 
surrounding Sappho are precisely where Carson works from, as they provide opportunity for 
continuous, experimental play. 
 In this chapter, I trace the sapphic afterlife in Carson’s poetry and demonstrate that the 
ancient poet’s fragments are essential in producing a poetics of error. Furthermore, I argue that 
the fragmentary and spectral state of the sapphic corpus threatens the traditional constitution 
of the classical as a point of origin. Carson’s engagement with Sappho resists the scholarly 
task of preserving and presenting a “world without any residue.”  
 
The Elegiac 
My discussion of Sappho addresses the poetics of absence, at once material and conceptual. 
With all but one of her poems received in fragments, “Sappho” gestures toward a perpetual 
lack. The textual residues, or traces, of the ancient poet and Carson’s preference for “imperfect 
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surfaces” anticipate her intriguing work, Nox. Shifting from the classical and the sapphic, 
Carson turns to the familial and explores the possibilities of mourning and memorializing her 
late brother, Michael. Appropriating the state of wreckage that is associated with the classical 
archive, Carson presents in Nox a more personal archive consisting of the collected fragments 
of her brother. 
 My third chapter focuses on Nox and its strange materiality. Interwoven between the 
scraps of a personal archive are translations, definitions, and meditations upon each Latin 
word in Catullus’s elegy 101. Carson’s exploration and expression of her grief for Michael is 
simultaneously a perfectly literal attempt to translate the thematics of a grief that is felt by 
Catullus for his own brother. The more recent history of the lost brother lies adjacent (spatially, 
temporally, textually, psychologically) to the more distant and classical past of Catullus, thus 
allowing Carson to position herself and the reader within this temporal and linguistic tension. 
In this chapter, I argue that the grief felt for the lost brother is also grief for what is lost in 
translation, as well as grief for what is lost in the process of archiving.  
While Nox is a more personal project, the book lends itself to a larger commentary on 
history, narrative, and memory. The private loss felt by Carson returns to the looming question 
of reconstruction: how do we reconstitute or re-member the past? The design of Nox, 
particularly its accordion pleat, suggests that the notion of a successful reconstruction (situated 
at some imaginary end point) is impossible. All that can occur is a folding and re-folding. 
“The prowl” supplies a remarkable metaphor for both Carson’s grief, her access to the past, 
and her writing. She prowls for the correct translation, just as she prowls for her brother. 
Prowling is, for Carson, a pursuit of non-arrival. We do not so much “translate,” “mourn,” and 
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“archive,” as prowl endlessly between languages, between losses, and between the 
untotalizable fragments of the past.  
 
The Erotic 
The prowl is most emphatically present in Carson’s love narratives. Carson’s preoccupation 
with eros (beginning with her own study of love in Eros the Bittersweet) recurs throughout her 
work. The experience of love is a pursuit of non-arrival in which the lover yearns to become 
one with the beloved. Love, as Lacan has famously argued, is an ongoing search spurred on by 
the fantasy that there is, indeed, a corresponding half that can fulfill us. 
 Carson’s approach to her love narratives entails a necessary and vital engagement with 
memory and history. Her “love-gone-wrong” poetry is where her lyric impulse turns firmly 
toward the narrative. To recount or to write love is to “confront the muck of language” 
(Barthes, LD 99). In my final chapter, I draw a connection between the erotic and the archival 
and argue that to write love is also to confront the muck of the archive. My preceding 
discussions of the fragmentary state of the classical past are further nuanced by my exploration 
of the erotic dimension of the archive. Eros does not only refer to sexual desire, with the hopes 
of total consummation between lover and beloved, but also to a desire for wholeness that 
extends to memory, narrative, and the archive. While Carson considers eros as residing in 
between lovers and preventing the perfect dissolve of their boundaries into One, eros, I argue, 
is also the liminal poetic, affective, and conceptual space for error and errancy.  
  At the nexus of love, the archive, language, and the text is the recurring figure of the 
demented father. The father’s madness is a useful trope when discussing the collapse of the 
love fantasy and the impossible self-enclosed text. The father’s failing grasp of language 
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signals a weakening of the “Law of the Father,” as well as the disabling of other phallocentric 
configurations. I conclude Chapter 4 with an analysis of The Beauty of the Husband. The 
narration of a failed marriage draws attention to the speaker’s struggle to navigate through a 
personal archive, as well as the Keatsian archive. A narrative of love, as Carson demonstrates, 
is always adjacent to other love narratives, be they literary or classical. A text is never a closed 
system, but is open to other texts. The archive is never complete, but reaches out to other 
archives. As Carson puts it, “Desire moves. Eros is a verb” (Eros 17). 
 
Some Notes on Writing Carson 
“… you leap off the building when you think poetically; you don’t amass your data and then move from point to 
point, you have to just know what you know in that moment. Something freeing about that.” 
 –Anne Carson (Wachtel) 
 
 
According to Carson, “the world is constantly giving things to you that you could be giving 
back” (D’Agata, “A___” 18). The writing of this dissertation closely investigates the “things” 
Carson has received and given back, primarily her scholarship, engagement with, and creative 
renderings of the ancients, among them Sappho, Catullus, Mimnermos, Alkman, and Longinus. 
In addition, she reaches out to other writers, such as Keats, Gertrude Stein, and Emily 
Dickinson, as well as to visual artists, filmmakers, and philosophers. To read Carson is to read 
what she has read; to write on Carson is inevitably to read alongside her.  
 Narrative – its errors, stumbles, and stutters – is central to Carson’s work. My own 
narrative impulses in this thesis are no doubt borrowed from Carson who, in the above 
epigraph, likens poetic thought to leaping off a building. While I organize my chapters in a 
conventionally scholarly way that enables me to move from “point to point,” Carson has her 
own way of “spilling,” so I cannot quite collect every drop. For this reason, my discussions of 
  15 
the critical, sapphic, elegiac, and erotic dimensions of the classical archive, as presented by 
Carson, are lengthy – as I pull (and continue to pull) on the many narrative threads she offers.  
This dissertation, in turn, is essentially a narrative of my attempts to trace the contours of 
several threads, or fils conducteurs, in her writing.2 
 Carson’s experimental play with the useable and fragmentary past is a continual 
negotiation with time. To use her analogy, time is a “transparent loop” in which the past is 
laminated with the present: “the videotape jerks to a halt” (GIG 8). Likewise, I was aware of 
my own process of reading and writing Carson as a complexly temporal process. Tucked 
within my time frame of writing is a shared involvement with Carson, her texts, and, of course, 
the intersecting texts. Kathy Acker provides a precise account of the multiple aspects of time 
in regard to writing narrative: 
… clock time and chaos in writing narrative are more complex. To begin, consider one 
aspect of time in the novel: the time it takes to write a novel. A novel’s a big thing. It 
usually takes at least a year, often many years. During that time the writer’s life 
changes. So there’s the time of all the actual changes the writer is going through – the 
time it takes to write the novel. 
It takes time to read a novel. A novel is very rarely something you read in one 
sitting. So, that time incorporates all the reader’s memories, all the interstices, the time 
lapses between readings, all the returns to earlier parts of the novel, etc. Finally: the 
                                                
2 My use of the word “fils” is deliberate. Spieker provides a wonderful analysis connecting Duchamp’s 3 Standard Stoppages 
with the configuration of the archive: “The French term fil (thread) is related to the English term ‘file,’ which in some 
Romance languages (such as Spanish and Portuguese) is translated as archivo. Its threads thus link 3 Standard Stoppages to 
the archive in a very concrete way. Whereas in the registry threads were used to stitch files together, in the archive proper, 
special ‘archive knots’ that only archivists knew how to tie properly kept file folders closed. As I mentioned above, the 
earliest known archives contained objects neatly strung up on suspended threads, ‘one thing after another.’ These archive 
strings functioned as navigational tools – a kind of cybernetic feedback – that allowed their users to keep their bearings in 
time and space, much like the thread that once helped Theseus navigate his way through Daedalus’s labyrinth” (54-5). 
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fictive tie. The time within the story or the narration … So in this sense a novel, 
structurally, is a time triad.3 (17) 
While I was mindful of Carson’s time as writer in conjunction with my time as reader 
(including “all the interstices, the time lapses between readings, all the returns to earlier 
parts”) – for a dissertation, too, adopts a parallel temporal model. The time it takes to write a 
dissertation encompasses “the time of all the actual changes the writer is going through” as 
well as the subject’s changes, developments, and evolution. 
Indeed, since I began work on this project in 2012, Carson has produced three more 
poetry collections, a booklet of two essays, and a modern translation of Euripides’s Iphigenia 
among the Taurians.4 Forthcoming publications include a collaborative collection that will 
accompany a group exhibition at the Aspen Art Museum.5 In addition, the first book of critical 
essays on Carson will also be published this spring.6 During this prolific period, she has 
received an honorary degree from the University of Toronto (2012) and was awarded the 2014 
Griffin Poetry Prize. Finally, to add to this swelling interest and attention surrounding Carson, 
in 2014, two more fragments of Sappho were discovered.7 I anticipate their appearance at 
some point in Carson’s work.  
 My project comes at an exciting time in Carson scholarship. The Erring Archive in 
Anne Carson provides, I hope, an almost-comprehensive entry into her growing corpus. I 
address directly Carson’s own reception, her long-standing (ir)reverence for the Greeks, and 
how the classical archive generates her poetics of error. Carson not only favours the ludic by 
                                                
3 A “time triad” is something that would appeal to Carson, as she herself is continually concerned with the triangular structure 
of eros (lover, beloved, and that which comes in between). 
4 Poetry titles include: Antigonick (2012), Red Doc> (2013), The Albertine Workout (2014), Nay Rather (2014). 
5 The Blue of Distance will be published in June 2015. 
6 Anne Carson: Ecstatic Lyre (Ed. Joshua Marie Wilkinson) will be published at the end of February 2015. 
7 See J. Romm (The Daily Beast): “Scholars Discover New Poems from Ancient Greek Poetess Sappho.” See also Daniel 
Mendelsohn (The New Yorker): “Girl, Interrupted: Who was Sappho?” 
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way of plain accident, but also encourages a shift away from a humanistic attitude to one that 
is post-human.  
 Finally, there is no way to read anything without subjugating oneself and one’s own 
time to the “clock time and chaos” of the narrative. To borrow Carson’s own words:  
dear shadow, I wrote this slowly. 
Her starts! 
My ends.  
… 
Watch me fold this page now so you think it is you. (BH 145) 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Reading Anne Carson: Scholia and Poetry 
 
 
“Poetry is the scholar’s art.” 
 –Wallace Stevens (NA 61) 
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It is a well-known and oft-reiterated fact that Anne Carson is both a poet and classics scholar. 
Her use of the Ancient Latin and Greek archive in her poetry has been a significant point of 
contention for critics. While Carson has been praised for her bookish references, some 
consider such esotericism inaccessible and rebarbative.1 It strikes me, however, that much of 
the tension arising from these two vocations results from traditional expectations of the 
philologist’s position toward history and language compared to that of the poet. The 
philologist’s task is one of restoration, or “resurrection,” in order to piece together the 
“original” text and establish its meaning. The precision and fidelity required in philology 
seemingly contrasts to Carson’s poetic approach, as she tells us: “I’m happy to do things by 
accident” (Aitken).2 
But this division amplifies a more general and traditional attitude toward ancient 
literature and raises the question: how can we understand Carson’s stance toward antiquity, 
both as a poet and scholar, and how are these differences reconciled or mediated? In this 
chapter, I shall explore Carson’s attitude toward this split in order to demonstrate that she, in 
fact, elides the scholarly and the poetic via a “poetics of error.” I shall begin with discussing 
Carson’s particular reception of the ancient past (in contrast to Virginia Woolf’s approach in 
“On Not Knowing Greek”). Their differing approaches signal Carson’s move toward a poetics 
of error, which jibes with how reception studies trouble and break down traditional notions of 
                                                
1 Poet David Solway, in an interview published in National Post, states: “Carson has two styles: She is either very plain 
spoken, that is to say she writes something between prose or speech, or she is very esoteric, so you don’t understand what the 
hell she’s saying. These are her two styles, and neither of them is especially compelling” (Heer). Countering Solway are 
women writers such as Susan Sontag and Alice Munro, the latter stating: “I haven’t discovered any writing in years that’s so 
marvelously disturbing” (Heer). 
2 Perhaps the best way to illustrate the distinction between “scholar” and “poet” made by a number of critics is found in Mary 
Gannon’s first impression upon meeting Carson: “When I saw her in person she looked every bit the classics scholar that she 
is. With crossed arms, glasses, and a cardigan sweater draped over her shoulders, she watched me from the landing of her 
second-story apartment while I fumbled to pay the cabbie in Canadian dollars. She looked serious, stately, and, I feared, 
humourless. Once we were inside she led me to one of her desks (she has three, each with a different purpose), where we sat 
by an open window. It was then that I noticed the vibrant pink of her lipstick, her unmatched earrings, and, pinned on the wall, 
her rendering in acrylic of a llama on wheels, details about her that conveyed an unexpected playfulness.” 
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the “classical” and the archive, and call into question what has been traditionally deemed 
“fixed” and “definite.” In fact, Carson’s use of the classical archive from the position of a 
scholar is itself part of and essential to her poetics of error. I shall finish the chapter by closely 
examining two texts: “Life of Towns,” in which Carson discusses the role of the scholar, and 
“Now What?” in which the voice of the poet is also at once the voice of the scholar. “Now 
What”, an early poem by Carson, takes a Greek fragment by Sappho and reproduces it twice: 
once as a word-for-word Greek-to-English translation, and again with the inserted 
commentary of the scholiast. The juxtaposition between the two versions creates a productive 
tension between the literal and the creative, the scholarly and the poetic. 
 
Reading Wrongly: Woolf, Carson, and the “Greek Original” 
“My craft as you call it would have gone nowhere without the study of Greek, Latin, and language in general as 
a formal procedure.” 
 –Anne Carson (King) 
 
 
In order to gain insight into Carson’s nuanced stance toward the Greeks, it is instructive to 
consider, by way of contrast, Woolf’s “On Not Knowing Greek,” in which she describes the 
lure of Greek, the limitation of translating Greek, and the impossibility of knowing Greek. In 
this section, I shall also distinguish Carson from Woolf by way of Carson’s poetics of error 
and elucidate how their attitudes to the Greeks are embedded in reception studies. 
In the case of the inherited intellectual archive, both Woolf and Carson are concerned 
with the Greek “original,” addressing Greece as an originary locus, an attitude that has 
dominated Western culture.3 Greece, according to Woolf, is the site at which Western customs 
                                                
3 While the “search for roots” has always preoccupied artists and thinkers, the nineteenth century demonstrated notable 
fascination and discoveries in all areas such as evolutionary biology and Darwinism, and psychoanalysis wherein Freudian 
theories are constantly tracing back to childhood in order to determine from what traumas adult neuroses stem. Such 
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and legends first began and thus provides the “originals,” or models, in their literature. 
Similarly, Carson describes the ancient language as “pure,” “older,” and “original” (D’Agata, 
“A___” 7). Greek is always at some point of origin that gives rise to something else.4 From 
both Woolf and Carson, we derive a sense that the Greeks are circumscribed in ancient history, 
marked as a point of commencement in language and literature. They are not just literary 
ancestors, but the first people to denominate their surroundings. It is no surprise that 
discovering and establishing meaning is a “Greek task” that situates the ancient people at the 
beginning of a Western intellectual archive. 
When it comes to the ancient language, meaning for Carson and Woolf is described in 
spatial (and figurative) terms. Meaning, for Woolf, is located at a distance, “just on the far side 
of language” (14). She defines this as “meaning which in moments of astonishing excitement 
and stress we perceive in our minds without words” (14). What inhabits the “far side” cannot 
be ensnared; rather, the Greek word (and its translation) “points at but cannot indicate” (14) 
the meaning. According to Carson, Greek is “at the roots of meaning.” The “compacting” 
effect of a Greek metaphor is “just on the edge of sense and on the edge of the way language 
should operate” (Brockes).5 For both women, Greek is on the “far side” of language, at an 
“edge,” and across a “chasm” (Woolf 11). When encountering Greek, there is a stretching of 
the mind and imagination across some void, a reach that crosses vast time and linguistic 
                                                                                                                                                    
discoveries added and significantly shaped modernity; as Angelique Richardson points out: “With the publication of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species in 1859 the quest to know what and why and how it was to be human, moved, with dramatic speed, to center 
stage” (50). Modernity, thus, can be understood, in part, as a growing sophistication about the hypothetical and constructed 
nature of “origins.”  
4 As Carson states: “But as far as we can take any language back there is always a thing called Greek. And you can feel a 
sense of beginning from these people who were stumbling around in the world saying, ‘The name for this is blank and it’s just 
the right name for it’” (D’Agata, “A___” 7). 
5 Both Carson and Woolf use the word “compact” to qualify the Greek language. Woolf states: “… there is the compactness 
of the expression. Shelley takes twenty-one words in English to translate thirteen words of Greek” (16). In an interview, 
Carson states: “There is something about the way that Greek poets, say Aeschylus, use metaphor that really attracts me … It’s 
a kind of compacting of metaphor, without a concern for making sense” (Brockes). 
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difference. The act of reading Greek is neatly embodied in Woolf’s use of the word “fling”: 
“We can never hope to get the whole fling of a sentence in Greek as we do in English” (16). 
For Woolf, our minds cannot fling out across the void and lasso in the full meaning of a Greek 
sentence; rather, the force with which one “flings” is not entirely recoverable. As a result, 
Greek comes out distorted, “a vague equivalent,” and Woolf poses a question that Carson 
takes up: “are we not reading wrongly?” (16). 
Despite their shared recognition of the “originality” of Greek words, there is an 
important difference in the way Woolf and Carson approach the language. Woolf regards the 
leap from English to Greek, from the present to the past, as an impossibility that may lead to 
“reading wrongly,” or error.6 The homage paid to the Greeks as a primordial font suggests the 
impossibility of penetrating the hermetic status of the language. Carson, on the other hand, 
undermines this privileged position. Unlike Woolf, who is cautious around Greek translation 
because it poses a “source of glamour and perhaps misunderstanding” (16), Carson derives her 
own poetics precisely from this gap. She once described Greek as a “home in [her] mind” 
(Aitken) and comfortably navigates between the two languages. In contrast to Woolf, whose 
concern is “losing our sharp sight in the haze” (16) of time and translation, Carson underlines 
the ludic interaction between English and ancient Greek.7 According to Carson, “words 
bounce” (AR 3). While the verb “fling” is a one-directional movement, “bounce” suggests that 
what moves up, will inevitably come down. Language offers, in Carson’s metaphor, a 
reciprocity. In contrast to Woolf’s “fling” of a Greek sentence, which suggests a difficulty in 
understanding, Carson’s own choice of verb – “bounce” – is far more playful. Greek is an 
                                                
6 Woolf makes it clear that “reading wrongly” arises from our inability to cross the temporal gap that separates us from the 
Greeks: “Those few hundred years that separate John Paston from Plato, Norwich from Athens, make a chasm which the vast 
tide of European chatter can never succeed in crossing” (11). 
7 As Carson states, “Greek is … the best experience in the world, there’s no reason to ever stop. It’s just some amazing 
combination of the kind of puzzle-solving that goes into crosswords and amazing literature” (Brockes). 
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endless play, a game of puzzle-solving which, in its fragmented state, provides an infinite 
number of readings, as evidenced in her translations and retellings of Stesichoros, Catullus, 
Sappho, and Mimnermos.8 Carson, herself, describes it as “translat[ing] badly” (McNeilly 12). 
Carson deems non-pejoratively the space between languages as a “place of error or 
mistakenness, of saying things less well than you like, or not being able to say them at all” 
(12).9 Thus, when Woolf questions if we are reading “wrongly,” we would assume that 
Carson’s response would be, “Yes, and we prefer it that way.” 
In addition to Carson’s great facility with the language, she recognizes, more 
importantly, the fertility of the gap (what Woolf terms “not knowing Greek”) and produces, 
renews, and rewrites from within its language, literature, and mythology. More importantly, 
what makes Carson’s poetic creations distinct and distinctive is that she never works alone. 
She thinks and writes through earlier texts, which is the point and resonance between the poet 
and the scholar. We should understand Carson, then, as a poet who dares to enter the gulf 
between present and past, English and Greek, and constructs meaning according to the 
parameters of error and misunderstanding.10  
                                                
8 Walter Benjamin notes that translation is also a mode that produces change within the original, thus accuracy and fidelity to 
the original can give way. See “The Task of the Translator” in which he writes:  
If the kinship of languages is to be demonstrated by translations, how else can this be done but by conveying the 
form and meanings of the original as accurately as possibly? To be sure, that theory would be hard put to define the 
nature of this accuracy and therefore could shed no light on what is important in translation … it can be 
demonstrated that no translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for likeness to the original. For 
in its afterlife – which could not be called that if it were not a transformation and a renewal of something living – 
the original undergoes a change. (I 72-3) 
See also Sherry Simon’s “Crossing Town: Montreal in Translation” where she includes Anne Carson in her discussion of 
translation and the multilinguistic city: “When translation takes place onsite, between neighbours, it does more than 
communicate meaning. The closer to the borders where communities meet, the more translation exceeds its conventional role, 
expands into mixed forms, becomes an active participant in cultural history” (21). 
9 According to Carson, the purpose of dwelling in this linguistic and temporal space is to open oneself to possibilities and play, 
or to “put [one]self off balance, to be dislodged from … complacency.” For Carson, Greek and its translation “continually 
does that dislodging” (McNeilly 12). 
10 D’Agata also uses the word “gulf” in his review of Men in the Off Hours and describes the book as “a very long lay-over in 
the gulf between scholarship and art” (“Review: Men in the Off Hours”). 
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What is this “space” for Carson, or what Woolf calls a “chasm”? Perhaps we can begin 
thinking about spaces and gaps by how they are conceived physically in Carson’s poetry. “In 
surfaces, perfection is less interesting” (Aitken), she states.11 The distance in time that Woolf 
describes manifests itself in the wreckage of ancient Greek texts. According to Carson, this 
quality, as seen in its long process of deterioration, re-assemblage, and finally archivization, 
“add[s] up to more life” (Aitken). Reminiscent of Sappho, whose work comes down to us in 
fragments, Carson, too, resists a perfect surface where “meaning is all padded, costumed in 
normalcy” (D’Agata, “A___” 14). We can better understand her approach to history and the 
Greeks via her attraction to ancient texts such as those of Sappho. She describes these broken 
texts as: “bits of papyrus with that enchanting white space around them, in which we can 
imagine all of the experience of antiquity floating but which we can’t quite reach. I like that 
kind of surface” (14). In the case of Sappho, the fragmented text is always accompanied with a 
void that is both textual and contextual, a loss that renders her work in, and as, a state of 
incompletion.12  
Carson’s own work embraces poetic surfaces pocked with absence. Indeed we 
encounter “imperfect” surfaces of varying typographical and aesthetic styles such as the 
strikethroughs found in “Appendix to Ordinary Time” (MOH 165), and the more obvious 
production of fragments in Nox, where the “enchanting white space” (D’Agata, “A___” 14) 
lends itself to the reader’s imaginative construction of Carson’s dead brother. In addition to 
physical imperfections, or gaps, in her poetry, absence is an important component of her 
poetics. When reading Carson, we continually encounter an absence of something, or the space 
                                                
11 Discussing the visual composition of Nox, Carson states: “A page with a poem on it is less attractive than a page with a 
poem on it and some tea stains. Because the tea stains add a bit of history” (Aitken). 
12 Carson is, in fact, seduced by this void: “[T]he space of not knowing has always been seductive to humans” (McNeilly 12). 
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that something once took up. For example, her first collection, Short Talks, begins: “Early one 
morning words were missing” (9). Carson’s narrator resides in this wordless world and takes 
up the “Greek” task of naming things and “beg[ins] filling in the parts” (ST 10). Absence also 
figures in her work as stolen or missing objects such as fascicles and notebooks, as well as 
those who have left, such as the faithless husband in The Beauty of the Husband, and those 
who have died, including Carson’s late mother and late brother. It is worth noting that for 
Carson, absence is something tangible, visible, and marked. Histories and memories also 
pervade the present as objects one can touch and hold. In “The Glass Essay,” for example, 
when the speaker’s mother tells her, “You remember too much…[w]hy hold onto all that?” 
(GIG 7), the speaker replies, “Where can I put it down?” In Men in the Off Hours, she 
describes death also as being like a “crossed-out line”: “by a simple stroke – all is lost, yet still 
there” (166). Death is even described in spatial terms: in Nox, Carson’s search for her dead 
brother is compared to “prowling” a room that does not end. Prowling absence, or the gaps in 
space and time, is endless. What accrues within this environment of lack or incompletion is a 
process of speculation that always and inevitably opens up to an embracing of error and its 
creative potentiality. Carson, unlike Woolf, finds comfort in this “aura of incompletion” 
(Steiner 27). 
 While Woolf searches for a linear and direct access to the past, Carson is more 
interested in leaps and jumps. What predominates this space are the various avenues her 
poetry takes. Considering herself a “messy writer” with “a basket of stuff that eventually looks 
like it has some informing idea,” Carson finds significance in the “connections between 
thoughts” (Brockes) which bring forth newness. Like the “enchanting white space” (D’Agata, 
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“A___” 14) that surrounds Sappho and serves as a tabula rasa for imaginative possibilities, a 
similar movement can be found in the jumps between thoughts, which Carson seeks out.  
To return to the analogy that Carson provides about Greek words as being within “the 
roots of meaning,” we can initially connect Carson’s use of “root” with its connotation of 
origin, cause, or source. However, considering her deliberation within the space between 
English and Greek, the word “roots” also suggests a network of plurality and variety, a matrix 
of infinite and rhizomatic possibilities and direction.  
Carson’s diversion from Woolf’s philosophy of reception participates in a larger 
discourse on classical reception and touches on a question that has long preoccupied scholars 
of the classical age: how do we engage with the past – more specifically, an ancient past – that 
has been endowed with an  “inherent superiority” (Hardwick and Stray 3)? Carson, a North 
American poet writing in a later time, has a historical and cultural distance not afforded to 
Woolf.13 Woolf’s position toward the Greeks is rooted in a long history of the use of words 
such as “classical” and “canon.”14 “Classical” texts – a term that strictly refers to ancient texts 
written by Greek or Latin authors – bring with them a sense of authority and value. In the 
same period when Woolf was writing “On Not Knowing Greek,” a series of forty-four books 
entitled Our Debt to Greece and Rome was published. These books were dedicated to the 
influence of “virtually all the great forces … of the Greek and Roman civilizations upon 
subsequent life and thought and the extent to which these are interwoven into the fabric of our 
life today” (qtd. in Schein 75). Needless to say, Woolf and her contemporaries were following 
                                                
13 Woolf studied Greek under Clara Pater, sister of Walter Pater. Walter Pater had a major impact on the development of the 
Aesthetic Movement. He is also the author of a number of Greek related texts such as Plato and Platonism (1893) and Greek 
Studies (1895). 
14 See Seth L. Schein’s “‘Our Debt to Greece and Rome’: Canons, Class and Ideology” (CCR) on the etymological history of 
“kanon” and “classicus.” 
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in the footsteps of their predecessors who also owed “a debt” to Greece and Rome, directly 
inheriting a Victorian veneration of the classical past.15 
Classical texts have set a standard for what scholars have deemed valuable and 
authoritative and have served as models of literary excellence. Classicism’s early instalment 
into educational institutions (such as the highly influential work of Virgil and Ovid during the 
middle ages) reified its elite status and, as Seth Schein points out:  
the “classical” … came to be seen as a commodity, the consumption and conspicuous 
display of which could help students fulfil their desires for upward social mobility. It 
was as if classical works had an “aura,” to use Walter Benjamin’s term. (83) 
Classicism implied influence and inheritance, or “a ‘meaning’ which could be grasped and 
passed on” (Hardwick and Stray 5). It is no surprise that even the word “tradition” suggests 
something that can be “grasped” and “passed on.”16 This determination of the classical 
tradition as being already-made, already-available to be handed over from generation to 
generation, seals it off from the present. To establish something as a standard or measure of 
excellence (what Woolf calls the “stable,” “permanent,” and “original”) is also to prohibit 
revision and dialogue.  
Reception studies, however, have turned our understanding of “tradition” (and 
“classicism”) on its head; how we regard the past is no longer so rigid.17 Tradition, as 
explained in The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), is not something 
                                                
15 See Budelmann and Haubold (CCR 17): “Renaissance or modern engagements with antiquity are shaped by many centuries 
of cumulative earlier engagements, starting in antiquity itself.” 
16 As Kellendorf makes clear, “The idea that the classics could be ‘handed down’ derives from the etymology of the word 
‘tradition,’ which comes from the Latin tradere, meaning ‘hand down, bequeath’” (1).  
17 See Budelmann and Haubold (CCR 24): “[T]he concept of ‘tradition’ is both epistemologically and politically problematic. 
Traditions, as Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger influentially put it, are often invented, individually or collectively, 
consciously or unconsciously (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). There are few traditions whose existence cannot somehow be 
questioned, and there is no objective way of establishing whether something is a tradition, or what is and what is not part of a 
particular tradition.” 
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merely passed down and passively received, but is constantly undergoing change, making and 
re-making itself. Transmission of classical texts is accompanied by their reception and 
“dialogical reconstruction” (Hardwick and Stray 4). The fixed tradition of the classics opens 
up to the future and is no longer inherently “superior,” but is also governed by the present.18 
Reception, if anything, closes the temporal distance between antiquity and modernity.19 The 
closing distance between the present and antiquity shifts the interface of meaning from 
between text and author (the moment of composition), to text and reader. The text opens up 
and extends from the author to include the reader, who becomes an active agent in its 
reception and meaning.20 Roland Barthes also makes a similar point in his distinction of the 
work from the text: “the work is held in the hand, the text is held in language … the Text is 
experienced only in an activity, in a production” (RL 57-8). While this is the case for all texts, 
it is more of a matter of degree when we confront ancient texts where there are other processes 
at play: historical transmission, translation, and material reproduction. A text written in our 
own time and in our idiom is less culturally and linguistically remote than a poem written by, 
for example, Sappho. As a result, the chain of reception affects a work and operates across 
history in varied and interesting ways.21 The primary question, thus, is not necessarily what 
the text meant then, but what it means now.22 
                                                
18 See Hardwick and Stray: “Once value is decoupled from one-directional transmission through time, then the cultural 
authority of the ancient work and hence of concepts such as ‘authenticity’ and ‘faithfulness’ is bound to be changed in some 
degree, although the question of how the reception relates to its Greek and/or Roman springboard is still vital” (5). 
19 See Martindale and Thomas’s “Thinking Through Reception” (Classics and the Uses of Reception 5-6): “Antiquity and 
modernity, present and past, are always implicated in each other, always in dialogue – to understand either one, you need to 
think in terms of the other.” 
20 See Roland Barthe’s S/Z in which he distinguishes the “writerly text” from the “readerly text.” The “readerly text” has a 
unitary meaning that is accessible by the reader. The “writerly text” requires the participation of the reader. 
21 See Martindale and Thomas’s “Thinking Through Reception” (Classics and the Uses of Reception 3) 
22 See Kenneth Haynes’s “Text, Theory, and Reception”: “[T]he question of what a classical text meant – either to members 
of its original audience or to readers in subsequent periods in history – is not in principle unrecoverable, though we may 
happen to lack evidence to treat it persuasively. The question of what a text means now, however, is another matter” (45). 
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The reciprocal exchange between past and present, transmission and reception, is 
something that should be kept in mind when we consider the archive, as conceptualized by 
Derrida. The question of the archive, for Derrida, is one that begins with its etymology: the 
Greek ἀρχή [arkhē]. The word, arkhē, “names at once the commencement and the 
commandment” (AF 1), that is, the pure origin in which the archive is retrospectively imagined 
to have begun as well as the commandment of the law installed “as” and “at” such origin. 
Already, we can understand arkhē in its relation to Woolf’s perception of the Greeks as a 
“stable,” “permanent,” and “original” point in history. The “original human being,” according 
to Woolf, is to be found among the Greeks, and it is from that that we derive our models as 
they now appear.  
While any given culture may strive for an archive that is singular, unified, authoritative, 
and original, Derrida troubles this “patriarchal” operation by arguing that the archive is not a 
neutral assemblage of historical traces, but rather is a techné of legitimation, oriented toward 
the preservation of the status quo. Recalling my earlier discussion of the interlinearity of 
tradition and classicism, we should observe the implication of the archive in this pairing. Just 
as Derrida argues that the archive’s legitimation is crafted, and is a politically-motivated 
construction of the past for conservative purposes, Schein argues that “the ‘classical’ is an 
ideological construct” (76). In response to both concepts of the archive and tradition, we must 
question their “neutral,” already-given status and “resist the institutional construction of a self-
serving literary canon and classical tradition” (Schein 84). While there has been a historical 
tendency to isolate the “origin” and regard it as a starting point distanced from us in the past, 
“the archive should call into question the coming of the future” (Derrida, AF 33-4). It is 
always future-directed: in the same way that an utterance can repeat itself, the normative 
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subject will be endlessly reproduced by the ritualistic “event” of the archive. Similar to 
tradition, which is made and re-made and not simply inherited, “archivization produces as 
much as it records the event” (AF 17).23  
The interrogation of an assumed superiority of ancient works (what Hardwick and 
Stray call “the democratic turn” in classical reception [3]), Derrida’s conceptualization of the 
archive, and the dissociating of value from the one-directional transmission of “Tradition” all 
contribute to a possible reading of Carson. Prying the ancient text from its lofty position as an 
original or standard “classic” suddenly opens it up to other creative possibilities. The 
development of reception theory draws attention to the “active participation of readers … in a 
two-way process, backward as well as forward, in which the present and past are in dialogue 
with each other” (Martindale 298). While the reader participates with the text at hand actively 
and in an infinite number of ways, the writer, too, engages with ancient texts in a manner that 
is varied and plural. Carson’s own engagement with classical texts is best illustrated in 
Barthes’s analogy of the onion:  
if hithero we have seen the text as a fruit with its pit (an apricot, for instance), the flesh 
being the form and the pit the content, it would be better to see it as an onion, a 
superimposed construction of skins (of layers, of levels, of systems) whose volume 
contains, finally, no heart, no core, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing but the 
very infinity of its envelopes – which envelop nothing other than the totality of its 
surfaces. (RL 99) 
                                                
23 As Derrida states: “the logic and the semantics of the archive, of memory and of the memorial, of conservative and of 
inscription which put into reserve (“store”), accumulate, capitalize, stock a quasi-infinity of layers, of archival strata … are at 
once superimposed, overprinted and enveloped in each other” (AF 22). 
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As Barthes indicates, reading for absolute and univocal meaning is to imagine literature as an 
apricot, where meaning can be found waiting in the centre. However, the pit is an illusion. 
Reading otherwise, as Carson does, is like peeling an onion: there are layers and layers, but 
nothing at the centre. There is no end point, or ultimate “truth” to a text, just a continual 
peeling, or “playing.” Indeed, many factors come into effect, such as the text’s history, its 
importance in its present socio-political milieu, earlier creative collaborations, and the writer’s 
own subjective response to the text. As Budelmann states, “there is no one single kind of 
relationship between tradition and reception; different texts require us to define this 
relationship in different ways, depending on the value they place on continuity, cultural 
authority and political relevance” (CCR 23). Carson’s analogy of Greek as being at “the roots 
of meaning” takes on a more etymological and archival register than strictly cultural or 
literary.24 Her fascination with Greek and translation is reminiscent of what Emerson once 
said: “The etymologist finds the deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture. Language 
is fossil poetry” (26). The archive, as Carson demonstrates, is the word.  
In Eros the Bittersweet, for instance, Carson peels back the layers surrounding the 
Greek word γλυκυπικρον [glukupikron] (“sweetbitter”) to reveal an endless play of meaning, 
intentions, and phenomena: 
It is hard to translate. “Sweetbitter” sounds wrong, and yet our standard English 
rendering “bittersweet” inverts the actual terms of Sappho’s compound glukupikron. 
Should that concern us? If her ordering has a descriptive intention, eros is here being 
said to bring sweetness, then bitterness in sequence: she is sorting the possibilities 
                                                
24 Carson’s use of “roots” does not quite fit with Deleuze’s conceptualization of the root as that which “plots a point, fixes an 
order” (A Thousand Plateaus 7), but is better compared to Deleuze’s rhizome: nonlinear and anti-genealogical, the rhizome 
splits off in unpredictable directions, and thus frustrates the imposition of order or arkhē. 
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chronologically. Many a lover’s experience would validate such a chronology, 
especially in poetry, where most love ends badly. (3-4) 
Carson’s interpretation and understanding of the word, glukupikron, sets the stage for her 
study of eros in classical literature, returning to etymological roots and inverting our notion of 
“bittersweet.”  
Carson’s ease with translating “badly” and with occupying the space between thoughts, 
languages, and literatures dovetails with the inherent “wrongness” or error in classical 
tradition. As Kallendorf argues, “If interpretation is not simply grounded in original meaning, 
the different readings of a classical text over time become not misreadings, but the only 
readings we have, ours being simply the last in a chain of receptions” (2). The active 
participation of readers, translators, and writers engaging with a given ancient text invariably 
tampers with the full recovery of the “original” meaning, if such a thing can even be posited. 
What results in Carson’s poetry is what I wish to call a poetics of error. 
Carson complicates and disrupts the traditional approach to the past as she provides an 
alternative way of engaging with history. The useable past, for Carson, is one that is absent, 
and, at most, incomplete. I use the word “useable” to give the sense that what is useable, or 
useful, is what remains. For Carson, a useable past is that which comes to us in shards or 
fragments and which catches our curiosity. The nature of this curiosity is not simply to 
reconstruct something that is believed to have existed, but to replicate that which was once 
present. Curiosity is not totalizing in its effort – rather, the shards and fragments become a 
point of departure for speculation, meditation, and resonance.25 Carson’s sense of the classical 
                                                
25 Lydia Davis puts it best when she writes: “We can’t think of fragment without thinking of whole. The word fragment 
implies the word whole. A fragment would seem to be part of a whole, a broken-off part of a whole. Does it also imply, as 
with other broken-off pieces, that enough of them would make a whole, or remake some original whole, some ideal whole?” 
(36). 
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archive begins with the scholarly, academic, and archaeological, but parts company with its 
goal to become the poetic and the inventive.  
Carson’s particular engagement with Greek fragments suggests a mode of reception 
that does not coincide with Woolf’s reception of the classical archive. The Greeks are not used 
as stable models; rather they are in flux, giving rise to alternative narratives. Classical texts, as 
Julia Gaisser notes, are “not only moving but changing targets” (qtd. in Martindale and 
Thomas 4). This continual existence of difference is exemplified in Autobiography of Red 
when Carson discusses the variety found in the corpus of Stesichoros’s fragments, which have 
been published thirteen times by different editors since 1882: “No edition is exactly the same 
as any other in its contents or its ordering of the contents” (AR 6). In fact, one reads the 
fragments of Geryoneis as if Stesichoros had “ripped [the poem] to pieces and buried the 
pieces in a box” (7). What results is a number of ways and combinations of re-composing and 
reading the text. While Carson has provided one way in her collection, she is aware that “you 
can of course keep shaking the box” (7).  
Carson’s deployment of Greek fragments not only counters the philological approach 
to the ancient archive but also undermines its accuracy and authority. We can get a sense of 
Carson’s praxis in a reading of her poem, “Essay on what I Think About Most,” which begins:  
Error.  
And its emotions.  
On the brink of error is a condition of fear. 
In the midst of error is a state of folly and defeat.  
Realizing you’ve made an error brings shame and remorse. 
Or does it? (MOH 30) 
In the first stanza of this poem, which is (incorrectly?) labelled as an “essay,” Carson 
considers error and its associated, affective states: fear, folly, defeat, shame, and remorse. 
While we find evidence of these consequences in Woolf’s essay as she describes the ineptness 
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of our translations, our inadequate understanding and recovery of the Greeks, Carson takes a 
“democratic turn” and questions our conventional approach toward error, thus opening up an 
alternative and revisionist dialogue: “Or does it?” The following stanza proceeds to 
investigate: “Let’s look into this.”  
Going back to Aristotle and his discussion of metaphor in the Rhetoric, Carson regards 
error as “an interesting and valuable mental event” (MOH 30): 
Aristotle says that metaphor causes the mind to experience itself 
in the act of making a mistake. 
He pictures the mind moving along a plane surface 
of ordinary language 
when suddenly  
that surface breaks or complicates. 
Unexpectedness emerges. (30) 
 
Error (what she also calls “metaphor”) is essential in the creation of poetry and “making it 
new.” The experience of error is essential in allowing the mind to deviate from its regular path 
(“a plane surface / of ordinary language”) to unexplored territory. The deviation in which the 
“surface breaks or complicates” allows for newness. What at first looks “odd, contradictory or 
wrong,” may eventually make sense: “How true, and yet I mistook it!” (31). Thus, what is 
worthwhile is not reaching “the thing itself” but the process of mistaking it: “such 
mistakenness is valuable” (31).  
For Carson, mistakes and metaphors go hand in hand in poetry. In line with Stevens’s 
description of the poem as “the act of the mind” (The Collected Poems 240), metaphors not 
only cause the mind to “experience itself / in the act of making a mistake,” but they also 
“teach the mind / to enjoy error” (MOH 30, 31; emphasis mine).26 While Woolf steers clear of 
                                                
26 Carson’s description of metaphor as the mind “experience[ing] itself / in the act of making a mistake” is reminiscent of the 
first line in Wallace Stevens’s “Of Modern Poetry”: “The poem of the mind in the act of finding / What will suffice” (The 
Collected Poems 239). Stevens’s poem itself contains a long extended metaphor of poetry as a stage. 
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translations and the unachievable recovery of the original meaning of a Greek sentence, 
Carson embraces the “unexpectedness” that emerges from mistakes. The example she provides 
in her poem is the fragment from Alkman’s Greek lyric, in which the speaker notes three 
seasons, but lists four.  
[?] made three seasons, summer 
and winter and autumn third 
and fourth spring when 
there is blooming but to eat enough 
is not. (MOH 32) 
 
According to Carson, Alkman’s “computational error” in counting the seasons is a way of 
expressing hunger. More than that, however, is the form of the fragment that Carson praises. 
In her reading, Carson elucidates not only the mathematical error found in the poem but the 
formalistic and grammatical imperfections that are transmitted in the poem as it is presented to 
us: 
You notice the verb “made” in the first verse 
has no subject: [?] 
 
It is very unusual in Greek 
for a verb to have no subject, in fact 
it is a grammatical mistake. (MOH 32) 
The division between poet and scholar extends also to the difference between poet and 
philologist. As we shall see, Carson delights in the error found in Alkman’s fragment, unlike 
the philologist whose work stops at “the threshold of technical detail” (Gurd 5). The scholar, 
described by Gannon as “serious, stately … humourless,” also shares these qualities with the 
philologist and her respective field: 
[W]hat have come to be seen as the most characteristic hallmarks of “serious” 
philological scholarship [are]: the dutiful 
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the compilation and responsible reporting of bibliographical references, and, in critical 
editions, the presentation of textual variants.27 (Gurd 10; emphasis mine) 
Counter to the usual approach that a philologist undertakes in her claims that “this mistake is 
just an accident of transmission” and that this is “surely a fragment broken off / some longer 
text” (MOH 33, 34), Carson dwells on this error. The speaker states:  
Well that may be so. 
 
But as you know the chief aim of philology 
is to reduce all textual delight 
to an accident of history. 
And I am uneasy with any claim to know exactly 
what a poet means to say. 
So let’s leave the question mark there 
 
at the beginning of the poem 
and admire Alkman’s courage 
in confronting what it brackets. (MOH 34) 
What we have here is not only a cutting commentary on the work of those philologists who 
minimize “all textual delight,” but praise for error. Carson’s engagement with Alkman is a 
unique point of contact in the long chain of reception, and rather than considering the 
fragment’s form as a deficient or accidental product of its transmission (the original longer 
text being better or more “complete”), Carson regards the text as is and praises the courage of 
the poet in committing an error. Alkman “sidesteps fear, anxiety, shame, remorse” (MOH 35) 
and does what a poet is expected to do: imitate. 
                                                
27 I should note that Sean Gurd’s Philology and Its Histories (2010) is an important work in reconsidering the philological 
field; philology is “no longer just a mode of scholarship, but has become one of its objects” (5). Just as the “democratic turn” 
in classical reception questions the inherent authority of ancient texts, Gurd also investigates the dynamics of philology:  
What the history of philology has the potential to reveal is that the choices made in adjudicating the mutually 
informing paradigms of history and philology constitute a crucial element in the poetics of culture generally, and 
can influence not only how modern conversations about the past are conducted, but also the very nature of that past 
and the specific dynamics of its reconstruction and appropriation. This means more than that philology and history 
are generative of historical consciousness. It means in addition, and more worryingly, that the relationship between 
past and present, between the means of study and its object, are much more convoluted and interpenetrating than is 
often assumed. (7) 
I offer Gurd’s definition as it illustrates the presumed “seriousness” of philology – something that Carson illuminates in this 
poem. 
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 he is a master contriver – 
 or what Aristotle would call an “imitator” 
of reality. 
Imitation (mimesis in Greek) 
is Aristotle’s collective term for the true mistakes of poetry. 
What I like about this term 
 
is the ease with which it accepts 
that what we are engaged in when we do poetry is error,  
the willful [sic] creation of error,  
the deliberate break and complication of mistakes (MOH 35) 
Metaphor, then, comes into play in similar ways for Woolf and Carson in considering meaning 
and poetry, both of which find their nexus in Greek. Woolf compares the Greek language to 
metaphor, where “meaning is just on the far side of language … and points at but cannot 
indicate” (14). Aeschylus, whom Woolf uses as an example, deploys metaphor to “amplify 
and give us, not the thing itself, but the reverberation and reflection which, taken into his mind, 
the thing has made; close enough to the original to illustrate it, remote enough to heighten, 
enlarge, and make splendid” (14). For Carson, her understanding of poetry derives from 
Aristotle’s consideration of metaphor and its role in mistakes, mimesis, and the 
“unexpectedness” that emerges. 
However, there is some anxiety on Woolf’s part about the figurative distance that is 
intrinsic to metaphor (“close enough … remote enough”) that translates into the distance 
between the Greeks and us. There is great difference “between this foreign people and 
ourselves” in “race and tongue” (10), Woolf points out, and that quoting and extracting does 
damage to the Greeks (15). Woolf’s inclination toward seeking out “the original,” maintaining 
wholeness and completion of the Greek inheritance, is a long-established mode of thinking 
about the classical past and archive (as is philology). Carson, on the other hand, welcomes the 
loss, absence, and gaps of Greek culture and incorporates such imperfections within her own 
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poetics. “Consider incompleteness as a verb” (PW 16), she states. Her use of the Greek past 
forces us to reconsider our understanding of tradition, inheritance, and the archive by troubling 
their assumed inherent superiority and wholeness. By drawing attention to the errors of 
reception and taking a critical distance from the illusion of perfection, Carson destabilizes the 
Greek’s authoritative position. For Carson, the importance of error is one that is prevalent in 
poetry and, more importantly, basic to the human condition: “The fact of the matter for 
humans is imperfection” (MOH 35). Imperfection is universal and “incompleteness” is 
something we are continually doing, confronting, and exploring. There is no pit to be reached, 
just endless peeling of layers and layers.  
 Woolf begins “On Not Knowing Greek” by drawing attention to the space between the 
Greeks and ourselves: there is “a tremendous breach of tradition” (10). Woolf describes the 
temporal and linguistic breach, or gap, that separates them from us. The Greeks endure in their 
idyllic place in history while “we are of a ruthless fate” (17). Carson, I would argue, 
demonstrates another sense of “breach.” “Breach” is also a breaking of a law or agreement. So 
while Woolf reinforces both the law and authority of the Greeks, Carson works against this 
authority. Her departure from Woolf’s traditional stance toward the classical past is itself a 
break from the conventional understanding of tradition, and is thus more open to innovative 
and playful engagements with the archive. The “tremendous breach of tradition” is also a 
linguistic gap that Carson dwells in, where reaching the Greeks is secondary to the experience 
of productive errors that arise in our readings. Woolf describes the Greeks as “drawing us 
back,” but Carson resists this passive movement and actively participates in creating 
something alternative and new. Instead of seeking out a linear current, Carson attempts to 
“find the line and go someplace else” (D’Agata, “A___” 15). The importance of error in her 
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poetics is not simply to mean a mistake, but error as in to err, to wander, and go astray. What 
we see in Carson is more precisely the “errant” error.  
 
Carson’s Reception: Scholar vs. Poet  
A number of critics have drawn attention to Carson’s biography – particularly the lack of 
available personal information.28 Carson has been known to withhold details in her author 
biographies providing, at most, a quick sentence, as seen in Antigonick, for instance: “Anne 
Carson was born in Canada and teaches ancient Greek for a living.”29 These slivers of personal 
detail make her appear mysterious and elusive. In Closer to Home, a book of author portraits 
by Terence Byrnes, Carson “placed a surprising restriction on [their] shoot” and told Byrnes: 
“You can only take one picture of my face” (28). Her avoidance of such attention has given 
her the reputation of being somewhat of an enigma, and a recent interview in The New York 
Times, aptly titled, “The Inscrutable Brilliance of Anne Carson,” encourages this impression. 
The interview, conducted by Sam Anderson, opens with the fact that “Carson is a private 
person.” Anderson even attempts to answer the question, “Where does Anne Carson come 
from?” and supplies three possible answers: Canada (where she was born), Michigan (where 
she lives), or ancient Greece (where “she has spent a large percentage of her mental life 
inhabiting that distant world”). The final possibility is interesting in that it situates Carson 
alongside poets of antiquity who have also been studied in the hope of reconstructing a 
biography. The desire to know Carson (or know more from what little is collected) is 
                                                
28 To name a few, see Burt (2000), Stanton (2003), Rae (2003), Ward (2001). Perhaps the most notorious criticism of the lack 
of Carson’s biographical information comes from David Solway who states sarcastically in his article, “The Trouble with 
Annie: David Solway Unmakes Anne Carson”: “we learn that ‘Anne Carson lives in Canada.’ That's it! No more information 
is needed for so illustrious a personage. The implication is that Canada is fortunate for being put on the map by virtue of its 
association with Anne Carson” (26). 
29 When asked to tell readers more about herself, Carson responds: “I am tallish with brown hair. I am not very interested in 
biographical data. ‘Today is most of the time,’ as Gertrude Stein said” (di Michele 7). 
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comparable with the desire to know the lives of ancient poets from their fragments of poetry, 
mainly because that’s all that remains. But the study of poetry becomes problematic when 
biography becomes a primary issue.30 Ellen Greene points out that with regard to women poets 
in ancient Greece, “Early twentieth-century scholars often focused on women’s biographies” 
(Women Poets xii). Sappho, for instance, has been cast in a number of roles such as 
schoolmistress, lesbian, musician, lover, among others.31 Her fragments have been used by 
scholars to glean details of a personal life. As Holt Parker writes, “We have always 
approached Sappho looking for traces of her private life” (5).  
In her own translation of Sappho’s fragments, If Not, Winter, Carson draws attention to 
this preoccupation with the ancient poet’s biography and states, “Controversies about her 
personal ethics and way of life have taken up a lot of people’s time throughout the history of 
Sapphic scholarship. It seems that she knew and loved women as deeply as she did music. Can 
we leave the matter there?” (INW x). While Carson, in this case, is speaking for Sappho, 
perhaps the matter of “personal ethics and way of life” can also be applied to Carson herself, 
who actively resists autobiographical revelation the presence of her own personhood. In 
“Stanzas, Sexes, Seduction,” she writes: 
I want to have meaningless legs. 
[…] 
I do not want to be a person. (D 72) 
 
The opening sentence of Economy of the Unlost, too, suggests that the “failure” in her poetry 
is that “[t]here is too much self in [her] writing” (vii). Indeed, in an interview in Publishers 
                                                
30 See Mary R. Lefkowitz’s “Critical Stereotypes and the Poetry of Sappho” in Reading Sappho (Ed. Ellen Greene), which 
begins: “Criticism of creative art seems curiously dependent on biography” (27). Lefkowitz compares criticism of Sappho to 
criticism of Emily Dickinson (another poet who also figures in Carson’s work). Her argument that “biographical criticism, in 
the case of the women poets Dickinson and Sappho, may keep us from seeing what the poets say” (35) also pertains to my 
comparison of Carson to Sappho. 
31 See Margaret Reynolds’s The Sappho Companion (2001). 
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Weekly, she expresses an aversion to blurbs on the back of her books: “I want to have a blank 
book. This is my aim. Nothing. No biography, no author’s photos, no quotes from whoever, 
just the book … [Reviews] take up space, they become a process of manufacturing a persona, 
which I want to avoid” (Burt 56). Nevertheless, persona and biography still creep into how 
readers approach Carson’s work. As in the case with Sappho, the matter of biography also 
hounds Carson. What is known (and frequently mentioned) about Carson is that she is a poet 
as well as a classics scholar. She herself does not pay much heed to these titles, calling herself 
a “visiting [whatever]” when she appears at a university.32 However, her work as a poet and 
her position as an academic become a point of interest for critics, some of whom struggle to 
reconcile the two vocations.33 David Ward, for instance, makes the distinction between a 
classicist and a poet: “Classicists work from texts, post-modern poets from within their heads, 
and Carson’s unstable attempt at marrying the two disciplines continually jars” (14). Robert 
Stanton, too, asks, “Can Carson bring the two sides of her own work – her scholarly accuracy, 
her poetic ‘mistakes’ – into a similar congruence?” (28). Most notably, David Solway, who 
criticizes Carson’s “celebrity” status, bluntly states: “Carson may be our newest pedestalized 
inamorata but the fact is, and I say this unabashedly, she is a phony, all sleight-of-hand, both 
as a scholar and a poet” (24). The division between classicism/scholar and 
postmodernism/poet is reminiscent of the dialectic that exists between “tradition” and 
“reception,” as well as the opposing views of antiquity held by Woolf and Carson.34  
                                                
32 See Carson’s interview with Anderson (“The Inscrutable Brilliance of Anne Carson”) in which he states: “In her day job, 
Carson, who is 62, is a professor of erratic subjects (ancient Greek, attention, artistic collaboration) at various universities 
around North America, where she appears for a semester at a time as — as she often puts it — “a visiting [whatever].” (Even 
when she says this out loud, she makes the bracket sign with her hands.) This, I think, is the best catchall description of 
Carson. Wherever she goes, whatever she does, she is always a “visiting [whatever].” 
33 Neil Corcoran also touches on something similar here: “The imaginative and the critical or philosophical impulses in this 
writer form a single creative urge or push. This has made for some controversy regarding [Carson’s] status as ‘poet’” (373). 
34 See Martindale: “‘[R]eception’ was adopted precisely to underline the dynamic and dialogic character of reading … 
‘Tradition,’ by contrast, might imply that the process of transmission is comfortably uncontested” (300). 
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While poetry is imagined to be unstable and even frivolous, the scholarly pursuit is 
decidedly in an opposite camp and involves restorative processes that aim for wholeness, as 
elucidated by Page duBois:  
Classical scholarship and biblical scholarship have always been in part efforts of 
restoration. Philologists have tried to make whole what was broken – to imagine and 
guess at the missing parts, to repair what was transmitted inaccurately, to change, 
excise, add, to return to the original and perfect text that we can never know.35 (37-8; 
emphasis mine) 
Setting the philologist against the poet is evocative of the ancient quarrel between poetry and 
philosophy, which goes back as far as Plato’s Republic. Poets, the harmful imitators of truth, 
are considered dangerous, and we are warned that “poetry is not something to be taken 
seriously, as something important, with some bearing on the truth” (608a7-b1, 329-330). On 
the other hand, philosophers, like scholars, are not “makers” but discoverers of truth on 
account of their capability of recognizing it. As asserted in the Republic, to be one or the other 
is important: a philosopher is worthy to rule as king. A poet, however, would be expelled. 
Carson, no doubt familiar with this opposition, finds herself in the middle. The platonic 
division slips in and affects Carson’s own reception.36 
It is worth speculating that Carson’s aim at “a blank book” is really an attempt to 
remove herself from these discourses on personal detail (recall her coming to Sappho’s 
defense: “Can we leave the matter there?”) as Ward, Stanton, and other critics place 
                                                
35 Page duBois goes on to expresses the importance of this type of scholarship, and inquires into our desires for wholeness: 
“Their efforts at restoration must continue, as labour over textual mysteries, as supplementation of our ignorance. But until the 
day of glorious resurrection, when all the bodies of ancient poems are miraculously restored in their integrity, what are we to 
do with the fragments of such a poet as Sappho? Are we to leave them aside until they are miraculously restored? Are we to 
continue to long for wholeness, to imagine, for example, what the whole poem that surrounds a two-line fragment must be?” 
(38). 
36 Ward insists on the division between scholar and poet and struggles to decide where Carson fits. He describes The Beauty of 
the Husband as “a conditional breakthrough for Carson as a poet, instead of a scholar writing as a poet” (16; emphasis mine).  
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importance on Carson’s life outside of poetry over the work itself. Just as Sappho has been 
reductively summarized as “poet,” or “lesbian,” or “schoolmistress,” Carson has been titled as 
“poet” and/or “classicist,” and the attendant qualities of each moniker are, as critics quickly 
point out, incongruous.37 Reactions to her work, thus, are split. Is Carson too scholarly for 
poetry? Logan states, “Carson is a classicist with avant-garde longings … [she] is a great 
believer in blather” (“The way of all flesh”). He describes Decreation as having “the burnt-
toast reek of academic air” (“Victoria’s Secret”). But by pitting the poet against the scholar, 
these criticisms drive a wedge between the two crafts. How does Carson reconcile or respond 
to this? Just as she is mindful of the distance between herself and the Greeks (which I’ve 
argued is a source of play and creative accident), Carson is also mindful of the platonic 
dichotomy between Truth and poetry. As a classics scholar, she is well-acquainted with this 
ancient opposition; what critics have highlighted is not Carson’s “unstable attempt at marrying 
the two disciplines” (Ward 14) but their participation in this age-old struggle between the two 
disciplines, which marks and limits their readings of her work. Ultimately, Carson’s scholarly 
“(in)accuracies” are intrinsic to her poetics, as we have seen in her reading of Alkman’s 
fragment.  
Preceding the poet and scholar divide, however, is Carson’s orientation toward 
language. Carson’s poetry and scholarship are intertwined and driven by her fascination, not 
only with poetic forms, but, primarily, with words. Working among multiple languages, she is 
always dipping into etymology, philology, translation, and grammar. Carson is interested in 
                                                
37 Not only is Carson both a poet and a scholar, but perhaps also at play in her reception is the fact that Carson is a female 
classicist. See Barbara McManus (Classics and Feminism) in which she provides the first book-length study of gender and 
classic scholarship, including statistical studies of various aspects of the profession. There has been, as she notes, anxiety “to 
preserve the masculinity of the category ‘classicist’” (39). 
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how language works, how it connects, whether poetically or academically. Language is, as 
Carson makes clear in Plainwater, a route to the strange: 
Language is what eases the pain of living with other people, language is what makes 
the wounds come open again. I have heard that anthropologists prize those moments 
when a word or a bit of language opens like a keyhole into another person, a whole 
alien world roars past in some unarranged phrase … The research comes alive in 
unexpected ways. (232) 
More importantly, the work of language (“work” as in the language-creation, as well as its 
labour) is inexhaustible. Carson’s primary concern, which she highlights in her first collection, 
has always been words:  
I emphasize this. I will do anything to avoid boredom. It is the task of a lifetime. You 
can never know enough, never work enough, never use the infinitives and participles 
oddly enough, never impede the movement harshly enough, never leave the mind 
quickly enough. (ST 9) 
 
Towns: Painting the Lines of Position 
For Carson, both the poet and the scholar operate on the same level. By undermining the 
authority of the classics, she is also undermining the clichéd role of the scholar. In the 
introduction to “Life of Towns,” Carson turns the figure of the academic on her head: 
A scholar is someone who takes a position. From which position, certain lines become 
visible. You will at first think I am painting the lines myself; it’s not so. I merely know 
where to stand to see the lines that are there. And the mysterious thing, it is a very 
mysterious thing, is how these lines do paint themselves. Before there were any edges 
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or angles or virtue – who was there to ask the questions? Well, let’s not get carried 
away with exegesis. A scholar is someone who knows how to limit himself to the 
matter at hand. (PW 93) 
Indeed, this description ties in closely with the scholar who works within the limits and 
boundaries of reconstruction. The mode of scholarship Carson describes as “limited” is 
specific to her context of classical studies, specifically the hermeneutics of a text. However, 
Carson speaks about the critical task of the scholar in creative terms. The speaker here is “a 
scholar of towns” – a curious vocation – but what is that exactly? Carson defines a town as 
“matter which has painted itself within lines” (PW 93). A clearer definition, I propose, is that a 
“town” is any point (a quotation or an argument) within a given discourse. Just as Carson 
speaks of the Greeks in spatial terms, academia is also presented in terms of space and locality. 
In this metaphor, a scholar is one who, by postulating, chooses and resides in a town.  
However, Carson makes clear that the painted lines of a “town,” or a given position, 
are not fixed. “But what about variant readings?” (PW 93) the speaker wonders. Variety, or the 
multiple readings and interpretations of a text, suggests instability. Thus, “Towns are the 
illusion that things hang together” (93; emphasis mine). To illustrate the variety of “towns,” 
Carson quotes a passage, translated from the Chinese, from Chapter 23 of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te 
Ching.  
A man of the way conforms to the way; a man of virtue conforms to virtue; a man of 
loss conforms to loss. He who conforms to the way is gladly accepted by the way; he 
who conforms to virtue is gladly accepted by virtue; he who conforms to loss is gladly 
accepted by loss. (PW 93) 
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The passage is what she terms the “Town of Lao Tzu.” However, a scholar by the name of 
Kao contests the translation of a word found in the quoted passage: “The word translated ‘loss’ 
throughout this section does not make much sense … It is possible that it is a graphic error for 
‘heaven’” (94). Indeed, re-reading the passage again by replacing the word “loss” with 
“heaven” alters the whole meaning entirely. By taking a different position than Lao Tzu, Kao 
makes up his own “town,” which Carson calls “Town of Kao.” Resulting from this mistake, or 
“graphic error,” are two distinct “towns.” Whichever scholar the reader sides (or resides) with 
may differ from Carson’s speaker: “The position you take on this may pull you separate from 
me. Hence, towns. And then, scholars” (94). This separation, or distance, that arises plays 
right into Carson’s preference for leaps and jumps. What Carson is interested in is the 
“between-ness” that separates towns, or the space that exists and disunites Lao Tzu’s “loss” 
with Kao’s “heaven.” But this error also unites “loss” and “heaven” – while they are separate 
“towns,” they participate within the same discourse, or, to continue with this metaphor of 
place, the same “district.”  
Considering this example, we begin to understand what is meant by “my pear, your 
winter” in the first line of the introduction: “Towns are the illusion that things hang together 
somehow, my pear, your winter” (PW 93).38 Things “hang together” neatly, but the illusion is 
that adherence is brought about by error. In the Lao Tzu and Kao example, “loss” and “heaven” 
are separate towns, but as a result of error, each is also a replacement of – and for – the other, 
                                                
38 A good question to ask is, “Why these two nouns?” I have understood Carson’s use of “pear” and “winter,” or “loss” and 
“heaven” as linked via “graphic error” and “illusion” of coherence. While it is difficult to say for certain, some insight into 
this can be found in Plainwater where Carson also discusses language in reference to “towns” and “districts”: “I have heard 
that anthropologists prize those moments when a word or bit of language opens up like a keyhole into another person, a whole 
alien world roars past in some unarranged phrase … you hear a Berliner say ‘squat town’ – and suddenly, see sunset, winter, 
lovers coking eggs in a grimy kitchen with the windows steaming up, river runs coldly by, little cats go clicking over the snow. 
You can fill your district notebook with these jottings, exciting as the unwary use of a kinship term … The research comes 
alive in unexpected ways” (232). 
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creating polysemic results. At the end of her introduction, Carson inquires into this “in-
between” space between “loss” and “heaven,” and “my pear” and “your winter”: 
What if you get stranded in the town where pears and winter are variants for one 
another? Can you eat winter? No. Can you live six months inside a frozen pear? No. 
But there is a place, I know the place, where you will stand and see pear and winter 
side by side as walls stand by silence. Can you punctuate yourself as silence? You will 
see the edges cut away from you, back into a world of another kind – back into real 
emptiness, some would say. (PW 94) 
In the introduction to “Life of Towns,” Carson’s speaker has established herself as someone 
who seeks out the midpoint between words and semantics. If a town is “matter which has 
painted itself between lines,” then Carson stands at a point where the view is indistinct, 
illusory, a point where “pear” and “winter” are interchangeable. This “illusion,” as she calls it, 
is reminiscent of St. Peter’s Square where Bernini marked two spots, halfway between the 
fountains and the obelisk, so that if someone were to stand on one of these spots and view the 
four-column-deep colonnade, the columns would precisely line up and create the illusion of a 
single column. Language, too, is not tautological, but dialogic and dynamic. The “place” the 
speaker occupies can be considered the “poetic,” where, via metaphor, we can meditate upon 
language’s possibilities, limits, and slip from the literal to the hypothetical. Carson’s speaker 
seeks this place where “winter” and “pear” overlay and become “variants for one another.” 
One can indeed “eat winter” and “live six months inside a frozen pear.” 
To demonstrate the task of “a scholar of towns,” Carson provides in this section of 
Plainwater a series of towns named after individuals (“Lear Town,” “Freud Town,” “Sylvia 
Town,” “Emily Town”), popular themes (memory, luck, death, love) and obscure phrases 
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(“Finding Out About the Love of God,” “Man in the Mind at Night,” “the Sound of a Twig 
Breaking”). What is striking is not only the random juxtaposition of these poems (there do not 
appear to be any clear links, just that they are all under the header of “towns”), but how 
Carson plays with punctuation.  
Each line appears to be a complete sentence, with each line ending with a period and 
the next line beginning with a capital. However, it becomes apparent that Carson has broken 
up her sentences (arbitrarily?), giving the illusion that each line is complete and coherent, or 
“hanging together.” Below is the first poem of the section, “Apostle Town”: 
After your death. 
It was windy every day. 
Every day. 
Opposed us like a wall. 
We went. 
Shouting sideways at one another. 
Along the road it was useless. 
The spaces between. 
Us got hard they are.  
Empty space and yet they. 
Are solid and black. 
And grievous as gaps. 
Between the teeth. 
Of an old woman you. 
Knew years ago. 
When she was. 
Beautiful the nerves pouring around in her like palace fire. (PW 95) 
The reading of the poem is clumsy, as we have been conditioned to pause at the periods, to 
take a breath at the line breaks. The period, or “telia” from the Greek τέλος (“end”), marks the 
end of a complete thought.39 But what Carson has done with the period is mark the middle, 
thus, stuttering our reading and creating a difficult experience. We can read this poem using 
                                                
39 Teleology (from telos), or an account of a given thing’s end, may be of particular interest for Carson. The “end,” much like 
the “beginning,” is a concept that she complicates. Her use of the period in these poems denies both a conventional end and a 
conventional beginning. 
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Deleuze’s concept of the stutter. For Deleuze, the stutter puts the majoritarian language on a 
line of flight. The stutter is created when the writer defamiliarizes his or her own language, 
making the familiar language strange and thereby becoming a stranger in that language. It 
marks an unprecedented deviation.40 Language becomes more than a vehicle that delivers a 
message; rather, language “trembles” and becomes “an affective and intensive language” 
(Deleuze, CC 107) – in short, the poetic: 
Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what 
makes language a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual 
disequilibrium … Being well spoken has never been either the distinctive feature or the 
concern of great writers. (Deleuze, CC 111) 
As we can see, Carson’s “towns” quite literally put language in “disequilibrium” by placing 
the period in the middle. Our reading becomes strained and the end of each line forces us to 
confront a definitive pause. The limit of language, or the limit reached at the end of each line, 
is silence. For Deleuze, the stutter, too, creates a silence. Silence is not necessarily the absence 
of language, but occurs when language is no longer message-vehicles:  
When a language is so strained that it starts to stutter, or to murmur or stammer … then 
language in its entirety reaches the limit that marks its outside and makes it confront 
silence. When a language is strained in this way, language in its entirety is submitted to 
a pressure that makes it fall silent. (CC 113) 
What Deleuze notes as the “limit” in language which demarcates it from silence is a similar 
limit discussed by Carson in her analogy of the boundaries, lines, or limits of a town. The limit 
where “pear” meets “winter,” for example, is where “walls stand by silence” (PW 94). 
                                                
40 We can also consider Carson’s use of the archive as another demonstration of the “stutter.”  
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Stuttering and silence, as Deleuze makes clear, are implicated in each other. In her 
introduction, Carson’s speaker asks, “Can you punctuate yourself as silence?” (94). This can 
also be understood as a question of stuttering. The poems stutter and make language strange, 
but also force silence into each line by means of Carson’s unconventional use of punctuation 
and line breaks.  
Reading is made new again as our eyes scan each line, reverting back to the previous 
lines and skipping ahead to figure out the breaths and pauses necessary for extracting sense 
from Carson’s “sentences.” This alienating process of reading is reminiscent of Claire Huot 
and Robert Majzels’s 85 Project in which the English translation of Chinese poems are 
presented in the same form as the Chinese: each character runs vertically and is read from top 
to bottom and right to left.41 The visual poem, thus, forces the viewer to make out the 
translation by reading in a way that is culturally different. These readings, which are 
videotaped, are as such:  
These readings are marked by stuttering, echoes, reversals and repetitions. The eye 
hesitates over the continual enjambment; meaning slips, stumbles, multiplies. The 
reader is implicated in the work as she or he is forced to slow down, to recognize and 
enact the value of individual letters and relations between them. The performer seems 
to be learning to read all over again; in fact, the reader is writing. (Huot and Majzels 8) 
Huot and Majzels’s project is another example in which the Deleuzian stutter (defined as “a 
repetition, a proliferation, a bifurcation, a deviation” [CC 55]) is at play. I bring up the 85s 
                                                
41 See the project’s website (http://www.85bawu.com): “The “85” project is a poetic multi-media investigation into the 
reception of the Chinese language and culture into English. The operation involves several transfers: from the original 
Chinese text into a literal character-for-word translation, then into 85 English letters, and into a visual poem. The visual poem 
is subsequently read aloud, and that reading is videotaped. Readers struggle to assemble words and phrases, creating if only 
for a moment the strange experience of speaking another culture. Concomitantly, the potential of reading English is unlocked 
by the permutation of letters. The reader of an 85 becomes a writer who manipulates language in its materiality.” 
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poetry project because its description befits our reading of Carson’s town poems. The process 
is also characterized by “stuttering, echoes, reversals and repetitions.” The 85s aim to 
reinvigorate language, challenge or frustrate expectation, and break from the norm – the 
“norm,” in this case, is the usual mode of reading in English. Here we witness a 
defamiliarization and re-invention of reading, as Carson’s “towns” also have this faltering 
quality (in Huot and Majzel’s words, “continual enjambment”). Though they are poems, the 
“Life of Towns” section is also a way for Carson to talk about scholarship. The creative work 
of the scholar (the establishment of new towns and the reassessing of older ones) is like that of 
poetry. Both endeavour to discover lines, “edges or angles or virtue,” and work between and 
within them: “You will see the edges cut away from you, back into a world of another kind – 
back into real emptiness, some would say” (PW 93, 94).  
The limits and “between-ness” of language give rise to silence and emptiness, but also 
novelty and error. Carson describes a similar experience of accident and creative mistake in 
Economy of the Unlost, a study that brings together two surprising figures: Simonides and 
Paul Celan. In the “Note on Method,” Carson writes: 
I have struggled since the beginning to drive my thought out into the landscape of 
science and fact where other people converse logically and exchange judgments – but I 
go blind out there. So writing involves some dashing back and forth between that 
darkening landscape where facticity is strewn and a windowless room cleared of 
everything I do not know. It is the clearing that takes time. It is the clearing that is a 
mystery. (Economy vii) 
In an early interview, Carson describes her workspace as consisting of two desks: one for her 
poetic work and the other for her scholarly work (D’Agata, “A___” 9). But the “dashing back 
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and forth” between the two desks, “that darkening landscape,” is a rich opportunity for 
surprise, creativity, and, most of all, accidents. When asked how she thought to connect Paul 
Celan with Simonides, Carson reveals that it ultimately came down to accident. 
The things you think of to link are not in your own control. It’s just who you are, 
bumping into the world. But how you link them is what shows the nature of your mind. 
Individuality resides in the way links are made … You know, I could list things I saw 
but that’s not why I put them together, that would be an afterthought. I put them 
together by accident. And that’s fine, I’m happy to do things by accident. But what’s 
interesting to me is once the accident has happened, once I happen to have Simonides 
and Paul Celan on my desk together, what do I then do with the link? What I do with it 
depends on all the thoughts I’ve had in my life up to that point and who I am at that 
point. It could be Simonides and celery, it doesn’t matter; it just matters in so far as 
I’m going to make a work of art out of it. It seems totally arbitrary on the one hand and 
on the other, totally careful about who I am as a thinker. (Aitken) 
Here Carson describes an apt experience of classical reception, underlining “the dynamic and 
dialogic character of reading” (Martindale 300). How she reads Simonides has everything to 
do with chance, her life up to that point, and accident. The link she has drawn between Celan 
and Simonides is as arbitrary and potential as a hypothetical link between the ancient poet and 
celery. Furthermore, the playful leaps that inform her creative work are also evident in her 
scholarly interests, and, more importantly, are the vital links within her poetic praxis as a 
whole. Though Carson has two separate desks for these endeavours, I wouldn’t consider them 
so neatly distinct. Ward states that Carson, in her poetry, “cannot resist showing off her 
erudition” (16), but there is something more than just spectacle. Carson’s use of ancient 
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Greece within her parameters of accident and error is at once “totally arbitrary” and “totally 
careful.”  
Despite the ancient division between poet and philosopher set up in the Republic, 
Carson’s techniques of “accident,” “error,” and “arbitrariness” collapse her scholar and poet 
personas. Critics express uneasiness with such a joining and insist on “divided selves”: “It will 
be intriguing to see where Carson goes from here, especially if she continues to wrestle with 
her divided selves: scholar/poet, transgressive/submissive, wife/woman, dancer/danced. 
Scholars live by rules and Carson has to break them now” (Ward 16). Just as the archive and 
tradition are assumed to fall under stable Law, Ward also places scholars under this header as 
one who “live[s] by rules” and whose work is marked by precision. However, this is a 
misguided way of reading Carson. This notion of “wrestling with her divided selves” suggests 
that Carson experiences difficulty when it comes to her identity, exclusively as poet or as 
scholar. It also suggests that poetry must fit into a clear and defined category, when, in fact, 
this apparent struggle between scholar and poet is so productive. 
 
Now What? 
A poem that demonstrates the mutual and necessary co-existence of the poet and scholar in 
Carson’s work is one that was published before her first collection, Glass, Irony and God 
(1992). Appearing in the Spring 1990 issue of Grand Street Journal, the poem “Now What?” 
is typical of Carson’s play with the Greek fragment, translation, and Sappho. While Ward 
remarks upon Carson’s “wrestle with her divided selves,” “Now What?” makes clear that 
scholarship is part of her poetic play and creation. Though I would not say that this poem 
serves as an early model for her later work (Carson is too generically diverse to be pinned 
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down to just one thing), I will argue that the poem establishes her as someone composing from 
within “that darkening landscape” (Economy vii) that exists between the work of a poet and 
the work of a classicist and anticipates the donnish yet ludic manner of works such as The 
Autobiography of Red (Stesichorus) and Antigonick (Sophocles). 
“Now What?” is divided into three parts. The first part, titled “Sappho,” is the ancient 
poet’s fragment 55, which Carson labels and provides in its entirety. The second part, 
“Translation,” is Carson’s translation of this fragment. Up until now, everything is fairly 
straightforward. The reader, likely unable to read the difficult Aeolic Greek, will skip over it 
and move on to part II of the poem.  
One thing worth noting is that part I of the poem is devoid of punctuation. In fact, such 
is the case with all ancient Greek texts. Though Modern Greek uses such punctuation as the 
full stop, comma, colon, and semicolon (which functions as a question mark), the ancient 
Greeks would not have recognized these conventions. Furthermore, there are no gaps between 
words, making the reading even more difficult.42 The presentation of ancient Greek brings to 
mind Majzels’s project, which complicates reading as it, too, is free of punctuation and spaces 
between words, thus, creating the halting and stuttering effect. 
Carson points out in her introduction to If Not, Winter this precise difficulty and 
challenge of reading ancient Greek: “On a papyrus roll the text is written in columns, without 
word division, punctuation or lineation. To read such a text is hard even when it comes to us in 
its entirety and most papyri don’t” (ix). The translation in part II of the poem, consequently, is 
                                                
42 The difficulty of reading ancient Greek is pointed out in a reference grammar book: “Consequently the act of reading for an 
ancient Greek must have required a high level of intelligence and concentration, especially since the endings of the words are 
so crucial for meaning. It is bad enough in English: here is a translated extract from Plato’s Republic: 
FARLESSIAGREESOWECANTHAVEHOMERSAYINGOFTHEGODSANDAFITOFHELPLESSLAUGHTERSE
IZEDTHEHAPPYGODSASTHEYWATCHEDHEPHAESTUSBUSTLINGUPANDDOWNTHEHALL[…]” (Joint 
Association of Classical Teachers 373)    
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striking in that Carson takes it upon herself to include full stops at the end of her lines and 
even italicization. Similar to the poems in “Life of Towns,” the punctuation appears before the 
break, and marks the interruption of a complete thought. Her decision to do this, in turn, 
reproduces the difficult experience of reading Greek texts, which requires a higher level of 
concentration or density when translated into English. 
Dead and you will lie dead. 
And there will be no memory of you none. 
No desire none. 
Not ever. 
For you. 
Have no share in the roses. 
Of Pieria I tell you no. 
Invisible. 
Too. 
In the house of Hades you will. 
Go your way among the blotted dead. 
Like something. 
Breathed.43 (“Now What” 43) 
As the fragment and its translation stand, a few basic questions immediately spring up: whom 
is the speaker addressing? What is this fragment part of? What is often unanswerable in 
ancient scholarship is clarified when Carson settles these matters by way of a carefully placed 
epigraph (the first of two) at the beginning of the poem. William Saroyan, five days before his 
death, said: 
Everybody has got to die but I have always believed that an exception would be made 
in my case. Now what? 
His final query is borrowed as the title of this poem and Sappho’s fragment provides an 
answer. Thus, the ancient poet is brought into dialogic proximity with Saroyan. The inherent 
                                                
43 For the purpose of this chapter, I focus on how this fragment responds to the epigraph by William Saroyan and in the 
context of this poem. For more discussion of this fragment, see Denys Page, Sappho and Alcaeus: An Introduction to the 
Study of Ancient Lesbian Poetry (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1955) 137; R. Jenkyns, Three Classical Poets: Sappho, Catullus and 
Juvenal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1982) 76–77; T. Compton, “The Barbed Rose: Sappho as Satirist” Favonius 1 (1987); 
and Calame, “Sappho’s Group” 117. 
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ambiguity that surrounds the ancient fragment is resolved by the more recent paratext, which 
Carson supplies, allowing Sappho to participate in a new dialogue. Another translation of this 
fragment that Carson offers is found in If Not, Winter. Though similar in diction and general 
meaning, the second translation follows more closely the four-line construction of the Greek 
fragment. I provide it, as it is useful in smoothing out the sense of Carson’s earlier translation: 
Dead you will lie and never memory of you  
will there be nor desire into the aftertime – for you do not share in the roses  
of Pieria, but invisible too in Hades’ house  
you will go your way among dim shapes. Having been breathed out. (INW 115) 
How do we understand Sappho’s response to Saroyan, a reply that though logically follows 
the question, was written in antiquity, long before Saroyan’s death? The strange temporality is 
part of the pleasure in the poem, and is reminiscent of how Carson’s speaker in “The Glass 
Essay” visualizes time as “an old videotape” running beneath the present: “Time in its 
transparent loops as it passes beneath me now / … / the videotape jerks to a halt / like a glass 
slide under a drop of blood” (GIG 8). The past, or Sappho, loops back and “jerks to a halt” at 
Saroyan.  
The work of interpreting Sappho’s fragment in relation to Saroyan is done for us: in 
the final section, Carson’s speaker provides her own notes on the Sapphic fragment. That is to 
say, a close reading is supplied as part of the poem. In a gesture that is self-aware and 
generically playful, the third section, aptly titled “Scholia,” makes up the bulk of the entire 
poem and is a thorough and careful examination of the original Greek.  
Unlike hypomnema, which refers to an ancient self-standing commentary, and gloss, 
which generally refers to a short definition found between the lines of a literary text, the 
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scholium consists of “commentary or notes written in the margins of a text” (Dickey 11).44 Its 
basic elements include: 
i. the lemma (i.e. the verbatim quotation of the passage under discussion);  
ii. a translation of (part of) the passage;  
iii. a paraphrase of (part of) the passage; 
iv. quotation(s) (e.g. of parallel passages);  
v. the commentator’s own words (e.g. explanations). (Nünlist 8) 
For Carson, who is captivated by gaps and omissions in ancient Greek, the “heterogeneous 
‘genre’” (Nünlist 10) of scholia is attractive to incorporate into a poem, as it too is vulnerable 
to loss: “even when they were copied, the scholia suffered many kinds of corruption. They 
were frequently abbreviated, displaced, miscopied, or inappropriately run together” (Dickey 
14). These sorts of jumps and errors in transmission are poetically rich and Carson’s use of 
punctuation (similar to part II) highlights this irregularity. While there is extensive literature 
on scholia and its distinctions from hypomnema, glosses, treatises, and other categories of 
secondary material in ancient scholarship, for now I want to focus on two characteristics of 
scholia: 1) the location of the margins and 2) the external voice provided by the scholiast, 
scholar, or philologist.  
 Much of Carson’s oeuvre involves not only the use of ancient fragments, but also other 
textual materials such as letters, drafts, and diaries of scholars and writers. These marginal 
                                                
44 There is much work on the historicity and treatment of scholia in ancient Greek scholarship and its different meanings when 
used by various groups of scholars. See The Ancient Critic at Work (René Nünlist), Ancient Greek Scholarship (Eleanor 
Dickey) and From Scholars to Scholia (Ed. Franco Montanari and Lara Pagani). My definition of “scholia,” is based on the 
original meaning of the Greek, σχόλια, meaning “notes.” My emphasis is on its secondary nature, its placement in the margins, 
and its addition of an external voice (usually that of a scholar) to a primary text.   
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paratexts find their way into Carson’s work as paramount. 45  For example, the poem 
“Sumptuous Destitution” (MOH 13) is composed by alternating Carson’s lines with snippets 
of letters culled from the correspondence between Emily Dickinson and Thomas Higginson. 
Margins, too, are a visual element in Red Doc> in which “text runs like a racing stripe down 
the centre of the page, with a couple of inches of empty space on either side” (Anderson, 
“Inscrutable”). This effect, as it turns out, was created by accident in a very Carsonian fashion: 
“Carson hit a wrong button, and it made the margins go crazy. She found this instantly 
liberating. The sentences, with one click, went from prosaic to strange” (Anderson). 
 There is also the marginalized position of the woman to consider, and that dimension is 
undeniably present as Carson is handling the fragment of one of women poets’ earliest 
ancestors. Furthermore, her methods of interpreting Sappho can be considered a feminist 
response to the patriarchal archive as she gives way to intertextuality and generic free play. 
The focus on scholia in this poem is a feminist play with textual inversion. As 
Theodorakopoulos states, “The probing and the collapse of the categories of public and private, 
inside and outside, center and margin, have been of considerable importance to feminist 
thought and to women’s writing” (156). But for the purpose of this chapter, I would argue that 
the use of scholia demonstrates, more generically, the convergence of Carson’s scholarly and 
poetic practices and how they are undifferentiated. The marginalized secondary notes become 
                                                
45 I should note that margins are part of the process of reading and serve as a kind of ongoing archive as the readers’ imprints 
are left in the space. Craig Dworkin provides a beautiful passage about the physical engagement with the book: “The margins 
of the page have always been a fundamental part of the phenomenology of the codex, since they are the primary site of the 
reader’s physical interaction with the book. Readers typically manipulate a book at the margin, holding it open, adjusting its 
position, keeping a place with the index finger turning pages, thumbing through. Reserved for the activities of the reader’s 
body, the frame around the text further encourages the reader’s active participation by providing an uninked space ideal for 
writing entries keyed to particular printed passages. The margin of the page invites a written record of the ongoing dialogue 
that constitutes all reading” (39-40).   
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the centred primary text.46 The division between scholia (which happens to be written in the 
same faltering style as part II) and poetry becomes blurred. 
Carson’s scholia introduce a voice that, like the translator in part II, is not Sappho, but 
someone else who comments upon the primary text itself. Part III of “Now What?” examines 
the semantics of Sappho’s fragment and provides an interpretation in order to clarify the 
linguistic and temporal meaning of her response to Saroyan: “It is a poem about how the 
present imprints the future” (44).47  
 Scholia, which typically reside in the margins, become significant as part of the poem. 
Unlike typical scholia, Carson includes marginal notes that, in fact, drive the poem forward. 
By following the commentator’s meditative exploration of Sappho’s fragment, facilitated by 
her expertise in the Greek language, we also follow the “you,” or Saroyan, and his movement 
from the “aorist instant of death” (“Now What” 44) to afterlife.48 The scholiast’s close reading 
of Sappho’s tense use and negations contains in itself its own poetic conceit: death and 
entrance into the afterlife, as the third part demonstrates, map onto the linguistic structure of 
the Greek fragment (or “your act and your afterword”).  
Like part II, the scholia section is written in the same style, with each line punctuated 
with a period thereby interrupting the natural flow of thought: 
                                                
46 Indeed, this switch in “importance” recalls Derrida’s definition of parergon in The Truth in Painting as something that at 
first glance appears to be an external supplement to the work: “A parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon, 
the work done [fait], the fact [1e fait], the work, but it does not fall to one side, it touches and cooperates within the operation, 
from a certain outside. Neither simply outside nor simply inside. Like an accessory that one is obliged to welcome on the 
border, on board [au bard, a bard]. It is first of all the on (the) bo(a)rd(er) [Il est d'abord l'a-bard]” (54). 
47 See “Characteristics of Scholia” in Nünlist in which he states: “Linguistic questions also play a very important role in the 
scholia. Thus, critics regularly discuss topics such as spelling, breathings, accents, prosody (sometimes in connection with 
meter), morphology (incl. conjugations, principal parts, declensions, word formation, etc.), dialects, parts of speech, 
syntactical questions of all kinds, word order, punctuation (i.e. the determination of ‘intonation units’ in the oral delivery of 
the text), etc.” (15). 
48 A note on “aorist” – it is a tense that does not exist in English. Typically, the aorist implies that the speaker or writer 
conceives the action as a completed whole. There is no emphasis on the progress of the action; rather, it shows a simple 
occurrence, or “happenedness.” Carson’s own definition is, unsurprisingly, more cryptic: “The Greek verb system includes a 
tense called aorist (which means ‘unbounded’ or ‘timeless’) to capture the aspect of action in which, for example, a man at 
noon runs directly on top of his own shadow” (PW 16). 
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You go quickly. 
From an aorist instant of death. 
(Dead) to a verb in the future. 
(Will lie) unfolding your afterlife. 
In two negations. 
(No. 
No). 
That reach like two arms. 
Toward memory and toward. 
Desire. 
A single verb yokes them. 
(There will be) they never arrive: why? 
 
A cause explains. 
(For I tell you no) the reason now. 
The dark corridors. 
Then. 
Unfolding your afterlife. 
In two negations. 
Of which the first locates you firmly. 
In the present tense. 
 
(Have no share) but the second. 
Flips you rather fast ahead. 
(Will go your way) too fast? 
Look at the crasis.49 
It is after all a time-saving device. 
A point of contact. 
Between present and future. 
It syncopates. 
Your posthumous nonentity. 
(Invisible) upon its counterpart in present life 
One too so quick. 
That by the time you know it. 
You’ve already floated. 
On to Hades. 
And the future. (43-44) 
As the scholiast points out, Sappho’s fragment moves back and forth between the present 
tense and the future, between “dead” and “will lie dead.” The temporal shift is also aligned 
                                                
49 At the end of the poem, Carson provides a note on “crasis” and its function in the fragment: 
Crasis: a mixture or convergence. It is a prosodic tactic allowing two vowels, contiguous at the end of one word and 
the start of the next, to merge as a single sound for the sake of metrical economy. Here, the words for “too” (kai) 
and “in” (en) come together to form a spacious nonword (kan) at the junction of present and future. It is a gliding 
motion, untranslatable, almost invisible. (“Now What” 45) 
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with the physical movement from earth to “the house of Hades.” This intermediate space that 
the scholiast focuses on is founded on the Greek word, κάν (kan). “Look at the crasis,” the 
speaker points out so as not to be missed. 
The crasis (kan, which is formed from the merging of kai and en) is, as the footnote 
states, “at the junction of the present and future” (45). In part II, kan is translated as italicized 
“Too,” indicative of the middle point and the intersection from which “it syncopates” (45). 
Kan, as the scholiast describes, is a “time-saving device. / A point of contact” (44) between 
the space of life and the house of Hades, and between kai and en. The crasis is a fitting 
metaphor for the event of death itself as Carson suggests in the footnote: “It is a gliding 
motion, untranslatable, almost invisible” (45). The quickness of death is evident in the 
contraction of kai (and) and en (in), as the vowels between the two words merge into a 
“spacious nonword” (45). 
The scholiast notes the frequent use of negation by Sappho (ούδέ, ού), which is 
translated in part II as “no memory,” “no desire,” “not ever,” “no share in the roses,” “I tell 
you no.” Negation itself is implied by words harbouring absence such as “dead” and “invisible” 
and “breath(ed).” Sappho, by way of Carson, highlights the “no” in death.50 The temporal and 
spatial junction that hinges on the word kan is characterized by negation. The shift from “dead” 
to “will lie” unfolds in two negations: 
(No. 
No). 
That reach like two arms. 
Toward memory and toward. 
Desire. (44) 
                                                
50 In Chapter 3, I will argue something similar, but in that case, we will see the “no” in Nox. 
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Memory and desire represent two ends of a spectrum, the first reaching out to the past, the 
second reaching out to the future. But in death, “you” will have neither of both. The arms 
reach out but “never arrive” (44). “Too” is used as a way of demonstrating shared negation, as 
if to say: “There will no memory of you, and there, too, will be no desire.” But the crasis, 
“Too,” as I suggested earlier, also stands in for the event of death itself and its swift and 
sudden appearance, as seen in the fourth stanza of part III:  
Your posthumous nonentity. 
(Invisible) upon its counterpart in present life –  
One too so quick. 
That by the time you know it. 
You’ve already floated. 
On to Hades. (45) 
“One too so quick” can be understood as “One dies so quick.” The moment from present to 
future, or life to afterlife, is so nearly imperceptible that when one finally realizes what has 
happened, one is already a “posthumous nonentity.” Given the play of tenses and negations of 
this fragment, Carson’s use of these lines by Sappho is a clever and fitting reply to Saroyan 
who thought that he would “be an exception with death” (to which Sappho would say: No.). 
His question, “Now what?” creates a perfect opening to consider the “now” of death, which, as 
the scholiast emphasizes, is quick and almost invisible. 
 Part III of the poem is highly metatextual in that the scholiast remarks upon the 
fragment but also addresses it as an object that can be viewed from a temporal and physical 
distance. It begins:  
 It is a poem about how the present imprints the future. 
 Looking back from here the effect is clear. 
 For. 
 The text that lies open. 
Holds you nameless to this day. 
Yet the cause of this connexion. 
Between your act and your afterword. 
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Is hard for you to see. 
From your dark apostrophe. 
Watch: and keep watching. 
What tense you want to be. (44) 
According to the scholiast, the fragment is better understood when “you” step out “from your 
dark apostrophe” and look back. The phrase “looking back” is layered and ambiguous: does 
one look back and flip to the previous page of the fragment and its translation in order to 
follow the scholiast’s commentary? Are we looking back to the time it was composed by 
Sappho? Is Saroyan looking back after entering the house of Hades to better see “the cause of 
this connexion. / Between [his] act and [his] afterword”? As we can see, the apostrophe as a 
vantage point is both spatial and temporal. In addition, “your dark apostrophe” is a slippery 
example of prosopopoeia: who is addressing whom? Is it the poet’s address to the absent and 
dead? Is it the dead’s address to the living? Is it “dark” because the speaker is already dead? 
Or is it a foreshadowing of the death to come? The temporal and spatial ambiguity is 
highlighted in these lines as Sappho and Saroyan are joined together in this “dialogue” 
between the dead. The final two lines in this section serve to anchor the ambivalence of the 
preceding lines. From a distance, “the effect is clear,” and the scholiast continues for three 
stanzas to demonstrate how the Greek fragment reflects the temporal and physical movement 
of death: “Watch: and keep watching. / What tense you want to be.” The mingling of desire 
and identity (“want to be”) and their position in time, suggested by the tenses in the 
penultimate line (“watch … watching”), contributes to the discourse of death between Sappho 
and Saroyan. The poem is “about how the present imprints the future” – or at least desires to 
imprint.  
Tense and distance become particularly tricky at the end of the poem. After 
documenting the movement of “you,” the scholiast poses a question in the final lines: 
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 Tense leaving. 
Behind you. 
That whole deathbox.51 
Of your life without roses. 
Now tell me. 
Is it. 
Because you are not even visible. 
That you can slip so eerily back. 
Even deeper in time. 
To end the verse. 
The poem. 
Your life. 
As a participle. 
Perfect: never. 
Flown. 
Yet already. 
(Breathed) gone? (45) 
Indeed, once the subject enters Hades and moves from present to future, he leaves behind him 
“That whole deathbox. / Of [his] life without roses.” It is suggested that he also leaves behind 
time – at least time that can be measured in the grammar of language (“Tense leaving,” i.e. 
leaving all tenses). However, troubling to the scholiast is that the dead returns at the end of the 
poem, indicated by the final word of the fragment, εκπεποταµένα. The word is a perfect 
participle and suggests that the action comes from “[e]ven deeper in time,” as evidenced in 
both of Carson’s translations: 
“Now What?” (Grand Street Review): 
In the house of Hades you will. 
Go your way among the blotted dead. 
Like something. 
Breathed. (43) 
Fragment 55 (If Not, Winter): 
you will go your way among dim shapes. Having been breathed out. (115) 
                                                
51 Later, we will see the “deathbox,” or “archival box,” in Nox. 
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This surprising use of the pluperfect (“having been breathed out”), to which Carson draws 
attention, might have been clarified if we had received these lines from Sappho in their 
entirety and not as a fragment. However, like Alkman’s lyric, Carson delights in this accident 
of history and looks no further than what is already there. A possible justification for this use 
of participle, which implies an action that precedes the main action of the poem, is that the 
dead is “invisible,” thus, allowing “you” to “slip so eerily back” and finish the poem.52  
 Carson emphasizes the importance of the gaze in these two stanzas, as indicated by the 
imperative, “Watch,” and the invisible re-appearance of the dead. The second epigraph of the 
poem, a quotation from German author and film director Alexander Klüge, provides some 
insight into the relevance of the gaze and its ties to language: 
Je näher man ein Wort ansieht desto ferner sieht es zurück. 
[The closer you look at a word the more distantly it looks back at you.]53 
We return, once again, to distance – not only distance in death, but also distance in language 
and in translation. Carson could have written a poem devoid of ancient influence, but it is 
deliberate on her part to incorporate Sappho and a fragment that comes to us incomplete and 
written in a dead language. Why the use of ancient Greek? While this poem can be read as a 
response to Saroyan about his imminent death, it is also a response to textual loss: the loss of 
meaning in translation and the physical loss of papyrus. Klüge’s epigraph introduces the “non-
arrival” of meaning and its interplay with the ungraspable desire and memory experienced by 
the death of “you.” The closer we look at a word, the more difficult and distant its meaning, 
which is precisely where the poetic and the scholarly are conjoined for Carson as she returns 
to the word. The struggles of loss offered by Klüge’s and Saroyan’s epigraphs are similar and 
                                                
52 αφάνησ is also defined as “unseen, especially of the nether world.”  
53 In another discussion of Sappho, Carson finishes “Dirt and Desire,” with Dorothy Parker’s famous epitaph: “If you can read 
this, you’ve come too close” (MOH 152). It appears that both the Greek language and the poet Sappho have an interesting role 
in distance and appearances. I will discuss this further in the following chapter. 
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both muddle our sense of time. The “you” slips “eerily back” (as the unusual grammar of 
Sappho’s fragment indicates) in the same way that the Greek language for Carson is also an 
experience of strangeness in time. In an interview, she discusses the meanings of the word kai 
and returns to distance and the gaze: 
When you’re in Greek you can somehow dig down to the very earliest morning of the 
words, which gives you a different sense of validity when you’re messing around with 
those meanings … That’s one aspect of Greekness that’s fixed in their language that 
we can’t get. We have to decide between and and either/or [for the meaning of kai]. 
For them they’re just two sides of one coin—as soon as you think into that fact you 
realize that the world could be completely other than it seems. There are a lot of those 
little things in Greek. I wouldn’t feel confident saying there are quantitatively more, 
but there are a lot of those moments where you enter a fact but then you just think, “Oh, 
there’s a whole other way to look at this element of reality,” and then you think of the 
world through that lens for a while and everything is slightly different. (Gannon) 
The scholia section in this poem is a lens through which Carson invites us to look at Sappho’s 
fragment. The scholarly task of commenting upon the Greek is simultaneously a poetic task of 
moving the “you” through the sudden act of death. The scholium is no longer a marginal note 
situated on the side of academia; rather, it is the central vehicle for the poet to accommodate 
this movement from life to death. This poem is “about how the present imprints the future” but 
it is also how the “past-ness” of Sappho imprints the present and, subsequently, the future. As 
classical reception anticipates, we read Sappho through Carson and her inclusion of Saroyan 
and Klüge. Sappho takes new life when juxtaposed with the later texts. The Greek language 
slips eerily back into the poem as a way to view the reality of loss. 
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Conclusion 
In a later chapter, we shall see again the eerie reappearance, or haunting, of the dead in other 
works by Carson, such as Nox. Nox is a larger and more recent work that ties in the death of 
her brother, Michael, with the textual and semantic struggle that Carson experiences with 
Catullus. Presented as an elegy, Nox is better understood as a collection of archival notes 
toward an elegy. The ongoing status of the book is also indicative of Carson’s processes of 
grief and translation.  
 Carson’s engagement with Catullus in Nox is in line with what I have discussed here – 
that is, integral to Carson’s poetry is her continual borrowings and response to other texts, be 
they ancient or modern. What makes Carson distinct and different from other poets is that she 
is never working alone; rather, her creative work is deliberately coupled with her scholarly 
training. The complex intersections between academic connoisseurship and creative flights of 
meditative writing (which frequently uses classicism as a point of departure), has posed an 
interesting problematic when it comes to Carson’s own reception, resulting in critics puzzled 
as to how to interpret her experimental and erudite works. Is she a scholar “moonlighting” 
(Logan, “Victoria’s Secret”) as a poet, or vice versa? More importantly, is it necessary to 
uphold one over the other?  
I have linked the apparent separation between scholar and poet back to an ancient 
division between philosophy and poetry, as well as a long held acceptance of the classics as an 
authoritative and originary locus of the Western intellectual archive. Ultimately, I attempt to 
demonstrate how Carson’s use of the archive, in both her capacity as scholar and poet, 
  68 
participates in what I call her poetics of error. The past and its errors, misreadings, translations, 
and transmissions are all sources of creativity and irreverent play.  
 Carson’s “Life of Towns” troubles the notion of scholarship as she draws attention to 
the instability and error that accompany thought. To take up a position is, as she analogizes, to 
situate oneself as a “town.” What is ironic about this comparison is that a town does not, in 
fact, suggest any sort of permanent or stable residence. There are, as Carson makes clear, 
numerous and various towns to be found:  
There are regular towns and irregular towns, there are wounded towns and sober towns 
and fiercely remembered towns, there are useless but passionate towns that battle on, 
there are towns where the snow slides from the roofs of the houses with such force that 
victims are killed, but there are no empty towns (just empty scholars) and there is no 
regret. (PW 94) 
The spaces and limits found in language and thought (“towns”) are also the spaces and limits 
in translation and time from which Carson works. Her appreciation for the temporal and 
linguistic gaps between English and Greek, the present and antiquity, is central to her poetic 
creations. Scholia, as seen in “Now What?”, is a vital and critical metaphor for Carson’s work 
in general. The scholium of a text possesses its own genealogy of corrections, corruptions, 
transmissions, and interpretations. They participate with the original text from, literally, a 
marginal position. Indeed, Carson’s translation and exegesis of Sappho’s fragment 55 finds 
and plays within the liminal space between scholarship and poetry, the critical and the creative, 
as she transforms the marginal secondary text to the central primary text. 
 In the next chapter, I will continue with Sappho and examine how the ancient poet fits 
into Carson’s poetics of error. Sappho, often adapted to represent the creative foremother, has 
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been an important figure for women writers and artists who view themselves as partaking in a 
lineage that descends directly from the Lesbian poet. The most important fact about Sappho is 
that she exists today in fragments. Her ambiguous biography adds to her allure. To engage 
with Sappho, thus, is not to reach the poet herself, but to reach the limit of what is speculated 
and survived. While the “Sapphic” has come to refer to lesbian desire, in Chapter 2, I will, 
more generally, investigate how Sappho appears and reappears in Carson’s oeuvre and, in the 
end, narrow in on another definition of the “Sapphic” as it relates to Carsonian poetics. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Sapphic Poetics: Carson, Reception, and Error 
 
 
“If it begins, a trickle, this thin slow falling of the mind. 
If you want to know why the sliding affects your nerves. 
If you want to know why you cannot reach your own beautiful ideas. 
If you reach instead the edge of the thinkable, which leaks.” 
 –Anne Carson (D 99) 
 
  
  71 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Anne Carson’s use of the archive, in both her 
capacity as scholar and poet, generates what I call a poetics of error. I want to begin this 
chapter by drawing attention to a passage that describes how Carson’s vocation as a scholar 
gives rise to a desire for and delight in what she terms “residue”: 
As a classicist I was trained to strive for exactness and to believe that rigorous 
knowledge of the world without any residue is possible for us. This residue, which 
does not exist – just to think of it refreshes me. To think of its position, how it shares 
its position with drenched layers of nothing, to think of its motion, how it can never 
stop moving because I am in motion with it … to think of these things gives me a 
sensation of getting free. (Nay 32) 
The “exactness” and rigour for which Carson has been trained to strive in her scholarship 
maps on to precisely what Page duBois notes in her description of the philologist as one who 
“makes whole,” “original,” and “perfect” (37-8). The scholar wants to return – or believes she 
can return – to what Carson calls “the world without any residue.” 
I have understood Carson’s working within the parameters of error and 
misunderstanding as a poetic aesthetic, and would argue that “residue,” too, is positioned 
within these same parameters. Indeed, it is the traditional role of the scholar that gives rise to 
and abuts Carson’s creative production. If the scholar’s aim is for totality, or a perfect sum, 
then residue points to the remainder, the leftover, the “something else” for which cannot be 
accounted. Residue refers to not only the unknown, or “layers of nothing,” but also to a 
mistake. Residue allows Carson to err and experience the “sensation of getting free.” The 
attendant margin of error in scholarship becomes, for Carson, a desired margin for error.  
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The necessity of error structures Carson’s response to classical antiquity. Her 
consideration of residue, which takes form in misreadings, translations, and loss in 
transmission, is often a beginning point for her work. Carson’s predilection for the temporal 
and linguistic gap found in Greek and Roman texts destabilizes the classical past as a point of 
origin (residue, as Carson points out, is “in motion”), and undermines the traditional role of 
the philologist as one who strives for “exactness.”  
  Sappho is a seductive point of departure for Carson as much of what we have gathered 
of the ancient poet – her ambiguous biography, the long, complex transmission and survival of 
her poetry – adamantly resists a “world without residue.”1 Sappho is mentioned a number of 
times as a paradigm of Carson’s own fondness for “imperfect surfaces,” much like the papyrus 
on which we read Sappho. As Margaret Williamson notes, Sappho’s texts “are all damaged … 
with a multitude of editorial markings to show gaps and reconstructions” (xii).  
 Sappho, the personage, has also undergone a long chain of reception in which each 
scholar’s interpretation of and dialogue with the ancient poet forms a link that reflects the 
scholar’s own time, circumstances, and preoccupations. This chain, Williamson makes clear, 
will continue, for the reason that “other generations will recreate Sappho in their own image” 
(x) and connect their own links to the chain.2 The number of ways in which Sappho is “re-
incarnated, revived, resuscitated, recalled, remembered, reinvented” (Reynolds 8), keeps the 
                                                
1 In line with Carson’s description of the classicist as striving for “exactness,” Williamson elucidates the scholar’s approach to 
Sappho’s work: “Faced with these collections of tattered fragments, scholars have continually laid optimistic claim to the truth 
each time they manage to sketch in a missing letter or piece together a new hypothesis” (ix; emphasis mine). 
2 See Williamson in which she notes her own position in relation to her predecessors: G. Merula, a scholar studying Sappho in 
1485, and Henry Wharton in the late nineteenth century: “At the same time, it struck me how much a product of our own 
circumstances each of us was: the early humanist with his competitive polemics against other scholars, the Victorian amateur 
with a classical education, and enough leisure from his profession to become an expert on Sappho; and me, a feminist 
academic writing in the late twentieth century. And each of us was engaging Sappho in a dialogue that reflected the 
preoccupations of our own lives no less than hers” (x). We can, of course, include Carson in this chain.  
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ancient poet in constant flux.3 Indeed, the continual reinvention of “Sappho” from generation 
to generation recalls what Carson says of residue: that which “can never stop moving” (Nay 
32).  
More basic to my description of residue as being the excess that makes impossible the 
“original,” the “perfect,” and the “whole,” residue also refers to the trace of something left 
behind. While the fragments and biographical details of Sappho all contribute to the mystery 
surrounding the poet, “these Sapphic details can rub off on other writings like bits of red dye” 
(Kenner 59). The residue we discover in “Sappho” – the persistent mystery of her biography, 
the missing text in her poetry, and the intertextual resonance in other works – makes her a 
suitable candidate for embodying a Carsonian poetics of error, which is characterized by 
obscurity, omission, and polysemy.  
We have already seen Sappho in “Now What?” revealing the importance of scholia in 
Carson’s poetry. In that poem, Carson’s translation deconstructs the opposition between the 
philological and the poetic. In this chapter, I want to return to Carson’s poetics of error and to 
examine how it operates in relation to Sappho. While the ancient poet has been commonly 
regarded as the classical representative of lesbian desire, I shall open up the definition of 
“Sapphic” to connote not only transgressive female desires, but also other ruptures of a more 
textual and archival register. The Sapphic suggests an inherent “wrongness” as it strays, or errs, 
from dominant modes of desire, and we will see other how this “wrongness” plays out in 
Carson’s poetry. 
In this chapter, I examine the presence of Sappho in Carson’s work and provide 
another definition of Sappho that goes beyond same-sex desire. “Sappho,” I argue, does not 
                                                
3 As Snyder puts it: “[I]n effect, all readings of Sappho are really fictions of Sappho” (3). 
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only refer to Sappho-the-ancient-poet, or Sappho-the-lesbian, but “Sappho” as a creative 
praxis that encompasses rupture, incompletion, and chaos. It is not Sappho-of-Lesbos, but, as 
Carson’s poetry demonstrates, a catachrestic, self-referential “Sappho” that contorts language 
and repeatedly calls attention to its own wrongness.4 When Carson alludes to Sappho and her 
fragments, we are immediately alerted to a poetics that is non-linear, non-cohesive, and 
elemental of continuous, experimental play.  
I shall begin by providing some background on Sappho in the context of antiquity and 
modernity by examining “Dirt and Desire” and “The Gender of Sound,” two essays in which 
Carson portrays the “Sapphic” as “rupture” in the social realm. I will then adopt the terms 
Carson uses in her social critique regarding “boundaries” and “leakage” and join them to the 
material “unboundedness” of the fragment, as well as to her poetic consideration of the 
sublime as “spillage.” I shall conclude the chapter by closely analyzing four poems by Carson 
in which Sappho (and fragment 31) appears. Carson’s use and reuse of this fragment is multi-
stratified: each successive emergence of Sappho adds a further dimension to what the ancient 
poet codifies: feminine elusion, textual rupture, and poetic “madness.”  
 
Sappho: Discourse and Desire 
“[S]he may write in Greek but she is really not speaking in a foreign tongue.” 
–Jane McIntosh Snyder (Lesbian Desire in the Lyrics of Sappho 2) 
 
 
Sappho has been an important figure for feminist approaches to antiquity. She is often set 
against the “masculine,” “epic,” and “Homeric” poetic tradition of ancient Greece and forms 
                                                
4 There are a number of instances where Carson refers to “poetic failure.” To name a couple: “My personal poetry is a failure 
… fragment of foil” (D 72-3) in “Stanzas, Sexes, Seduction,” and “I am writing this to be as wrong as possible to you” (PW 
45) in “On Shelter”. 
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the basis for feminine experience.5 As Marilyn Skinner asserts, Sappho’s writing establishes 
“the missing half of the Greco-Roman gender dialectic” (“Women” 138).6 While this may be 
an overly binaristic formulation, Page duBois points out the more important factor of the 
ancient poet: Sappho is an anomaly. She offers something different. The subjects in her poems 
are uncommon, intimate, and oppose the familiar conception of Western tradition: 
Sappho … sings not of democracy and philosophy, not even of work and war, not of 
the instrumentalizing of the eroticized body, but of the individual and her subjective 
body, of “the most beautiful,” of erotic desire and yearning. Sappho writes of 
Aphrodite the goddess of sexuality, of soft beds, roses, groves sacred to the goddess, of 
jealousy, desire, and the absence of one’s beloved. Setting themselves against the 
warrior culture of the epic poet Homer, against the values of labour and reproduction 
emerging in the nascent city-states of the Greek world, Sappho’s fragmentary, broken 
lines celebrate pleasure and women’s bodies. (duBois 24) 
Constructed as a representative of “otherness,” Sappho occupies a position outside the 
dominant tradition. Her celebration of women and her own femininity was attractive for 
women throughout time; her long historical shadow has provided a strong alternative 
identificatory position for women with same-sex desires. 
The adaptability and appropriation of Sappho have intensified since the nineteenth 
century when there was a marked increase of “lesbian visibility.”7 Sappho, regarded as the 
“original lesbian” (Blanshard 155), came to dominate the historical field of female same-sex 
                                                
5 The gendered opposition between Sappho and Homer as well as their status as “chief” writers have been long established. 
As Williamson notes: “the medical writer Galen tells us in the second century CE that you have only to say the Poet and the 
Poetess, and everyone knows you mean Homer and Sappho” (22). 
6 Marilyn A. Katz also notes the importance of and immense pressure on the poet we know as Sappho – “Greek antiquity’s 
‘leading literary lady’” (520) – to make up for what Skinner calls “the missing half”: “As the principal female voice to survive 
from Greek antiquity, Sappho is pressed into service to speak for all women” (520).   
7 See Alastair Blanshard (2010) and the section on “Sapphic Love” (149). 
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desire. Since then, her name has become a brand, or a “queer signifier to mark out lesbian 
clubs, bookshops, reading groups” (159). Margaret Reynolds, in The Sappho Companion, 
explores the numerous incarnations of Sappho, which a scan of the contents quickly illustrates: 
“The Tenth Muse,” “The Learned Lady,” “The Lady with the Lyre,” “The New Woman,” and 
“Swingers and Sisters.” What is striking about Sappho is not so much the ancient poet as such, 
but how she has come to stand in for heterodox female desire and behaviour. 
In the twentieth century, as the sapphic was brought into relation to the modern, a more 
nuanced understanding of “Sappho” emerged. Desire was not limited to the sexual realm, but 
came to have a bearing on poetic practice and modernist experimentation. Joanne Winning 
states that literary women such as Sylvia Beach, Gertrude Stein, Marianne Moore, and H.D., 
are key figures of literary lesbianism from the modernist period: “This is not surprising since 
the movements of modernist art and literature are notable for the unprecedented number of 
women who were both engaged in aesthetic experimentation and at the same time either living 
out or representing same-sex desire” (56). But “Sappho” and its cognates have come to refer to 
more than just “homosexual relations between women,” as is pointed out by Laura Doan and 
Jane Garrity (3). Diana Collecott, too, recognizes the “multiple meanings” in the word 
“sapphic” as pertaining to “aesthetics and intersubjectivity as well as sexual practice” (2; 
emphasis mine). Susan Stanford Friedman (1990), in her reading of H.D., draws a connection 
between erotics and poetics, and sexuality and textuality, thus, “structurally binding these 
together so that the figure of writing becomes a coterminous destination with lesbian identity” 
(Winning 58).8 H.D.’s admiration for and reception of Sappho has been well established, and 
Friedman’s reading of the modern poet parallels Skinner’s argument of Sappho: both poets 
                                                
8 Indeed, H.D. states: “There is no great art period without great lovers” (Notes 21). 
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“invest Aphrodite with the functions of a Muse, endowing her with a simultaneous command 
of both desire and discourse” (Skinner, “Eros” 64).9 
The link between desire and discourse did not begin in the twentieth century, but was 
always already present in our understanding of “Sappho.” Indeed, what we encounter foremost 
in reading Sappho is not desire of a sexual nature, but one that pertains to textual wholeness. 
As duBois points out, Sappho’s corpus, which exists only in fragments and quotations, forces 
the reader to confront “her desires for wholeness, for more, for coherence, for linear, narrative 
familiarity” (53). The desire for wholeness and textual restitution is at once a poetic, an 
editorial, a feminist, a lesbian, and a historical desire. The correlation between the fragmentary 
and the lesbian that is perceived in the figure of Sappho is unsurprising: her fragments trouble 
our conception of a “homogeneous, coherent” (duBois 163) culture in a similar way that the 
lesbian troubles a hetero-normative society. Sappho, thus, makes room for complexity and 
multiplicity, disturbing any universal or shared ideology.10  
I believe that a potent concept to describe this disturbance is “rupture,” as used by 
Shari Benstock in her understanding of sapphic modernism. Needless to say, the correlation 
between modernism and lesbian sexuality has resulted in various labels used by critics, such as 
“lesbian modernism,” “sapphic modernism,” or “queer modernism.” A broader definition is 
put forward by Benstock who describes it as a movement that “constitutes itself through 
moments of rupture in the social and cultural fabric” (198; emphasis mine).11 The sapphic, 
here regarded as a disruption in the modern social context, is unsurprising as Sappho and her 
                                                
9 See Diana Collecott’s H.D. and Sapphic Modernity (1999). 
10 Perhaps most interesting about Sappho’s reception is how synecdoche, a trope literalized in the fragment, becomes 
metonymy (“Sappho” for Queer, Dyke, the Non-normative). 
11 Rupture is also of great import for Friedman, as it is at the crux of modernism. See Susan Stanford Friedman (2001): 
“‘What was modernism’ to a graduate student in English and American literature in the heady days of the 1960s? Modernism 
was rebellion. Modernism was ‘make it new.’ Modernism was resistance, rupture. To its progenitors. To its students. 
Modernism was the antidote to the poison of tradition, obligation” (493). 
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verse also rupture what is known about the past: they “disrupt various paradigms of Western 
civilization” (duBois 25).12  
I introduce the term “rupture” because it allows us to consider also the material rupture 
that is constituted by Sappho’s literary remains, which itself is exciting as we become 
conscious of “the possibility of dismemberment, of the fragility of wholeness” (duBois 21). 
Rupture refers not only to the ragged edges of the fragment, but also to the instance of 
breakage, that is to say, not rupture as after the moment of eruption, but in the act of eruption. 
Thus, we shift from regarding the fragment as a stationary artifact, to something in the midst 
of kinesis. It is continually at work with the movement of the text in which it is embedded, the 
writer’s intention, and the coherence of narrative. The fragment is acted upon, but also acts on. 
This dynamism is seen more clearly in Carson’s statement, “Consider incompleteness as a 
verb” (PW 16). “Incompleteness,” intrinsic to the fragment, is not simply a noun, but becomes 
a verb (as in “to incomplete”). Rupture gives way to movement. Rupture, resulting in what 
Carson describes as “imperfect surfaces,” may then be studied in more “active” terms of 
border crossing, such as “polluting,” “leaking,” and “spilling.” More importantly, the presence 
of Sappho and Carson’s undertakings of rupture destabilize the “stationary” point of origin 
and calls into question the stability and coherence of social laws, the archive, and logic. 
 
Social Leakage in Sappho’s Fragment 31 
Rupture is a matter of boundaries and borders. The social and cultural disruption associated 
with the sapphic in Benstock’s definition is familiar to Carson and is explored in two of her 
                                                
12 See duBois for more on the paradoxical status of Sappho: “She is a woman but also an aristocrat, a Greek, but one turned 
toward Asia, a poet who writes as a philosopher before philosophy … She is named as the tenth muse, yet the nine books of 
her poetry survive only in fragments … We need to read her again” (25). 
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essays: “Dirt and Desire,” in which Carson discusses the danger of “female pollution” for the 
ancient Greeks, and “The Gender of Sound,” in which Carson explores how a woman’s mouth 
and voice disrupt masculine order. Both essays underscore the cultural anxiety about 
maintaining boundaries and the danger women pose by transgressing these limits. 
Women were perceived as “transgressors of boundaries” (MOH 130), and those who 
violated borders, including guests and strangers, evoked fear and anxiety. Carson first 
highlights the importance of order for the ancient Greeks: 
… any instance of contact is that of violating a fixed boundary, transgressing a closed 
category where one does not belong. The ancient Greeks seem to have been even more 
sensitive than we are to such transgressions and to the crucial importance of 
boundaries, both personal and extrapersonal, as guarantors of human order. (MOH 
130) 
Women were considered particularly dangerous and posed a great threat, as a female was a 
“mobile unit” (MOH 131) in society, moving from her father’s home to her husband’s home. 
Marriage facilitated and ensured this movement. This “transgression,” though necessary and 
legitimate, also has its attendant flaws. Carson points out that marriage creates a scenario for 
more illicit female movement, such as adultery. As a result, the ancient world possessed many 
strategies, rituals, and customs when it came to women and their isolation or movement within 
society. Carson examines one of these rituals – the ancient wedding ceremony – in Sappho’s 
fragment 31 at the end of “Dirt and Desire,” but first establishes some common perceptions of 
women in antiquity.  
Carson cites ancient poets and thinkers in order to distinguish women from men. The 
difference between the two genders is, consequently, binary. Women are wet, whereas men 
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are dry (Hippokrates). Aristotle goes further to describe women, characteristically wet, as 
“unbounded” and “polluted,” whereas men are “bounded” and “pure.” Women are formless 
and contribute matter, or content. Men, being bounded, provide form. The binary structure set 
forth by these philosophers, as Carson points out, has a basis in mythology:  
In myth, woman’s boundaries are pliant, porous, mutable. Her power to control them is 
inadequate, her concern for them unreliable. Deformation attends her. She swells, she 
shrinks, she leaks, she is penetrated, she suffers metamorphoses. (MOH 133) 
Just as a woman’s physical body cannot contain her, a woman’s mouth is a contraption that 
should remain shut, lest sound should erupt:  
In general the women of classical literature are a species given to disorderly and 
uncontrolled outflow of sound – to shrieking, wailing, sobbing, shrill lament, loud 
laughter, screams of pain or of pleasure and eruptions of raw emotion in general. (GIG 
126) 
Women are often seen metamorphosing, such as in the myths of Io, Kallisto, and Medusa. The 
monstrous threat of women is a result of the instability of their borders: Io turns into a cow, 
Kallisto into a bear, and Medusa, who has snakes for hair, has the ability to even threaten the 
borders and bodies of men. Female sound has also been associated with “monstrosity, disorder 
and death” (GIG 121). Carson’s examples include a fragment from Alkaios that mentions “an 
otherworldly echo of women’s awful yearly shrieking,” and an anecdote of Gertrude Stein, 
who was said to have “a laugh like a beefsteak” (123, 121).  
The “wet” quality of women – their ability to “leak” and to adopt other shapes – is best 
imagined as a sieve, which recalls the myth of the daughters of Danaos, whose punishment for 
murdering their new husbands was to gather water in a sieve or leaky jar for eternity. 
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According to Carson, “the sieve of the Danaids sums up in a single hellish image all that is 
problematic in the relation between women and boundaries” (MOH 135). A related image that 
Carson provides is “a boat filled with holes” (144). As she states, women are regarded as 
“formless creatures who cannot or do not or will not maintain their own boundaries and who 
are awfully adept at confounding the boundaries of others” (135).  
“Wetness” does not only pertain to women, but is also associated with emotion. Carson 
describes the liquefying and dissolving qualities of emotion which may threaten man: anxiety 
“falls in drops” (MOH 136), for instance. A Hellenistic epigram describes envy as “melting” 
the eyes and heart. Being porous creatures, women are more affected by emotion, and 
succumb easily to tears, jealousy, fear, and so on. The most harmful emotion is Eros: “desire is 
variously said to melt, flood, soften, loosen, boil, broil, roast, drown and disintegrate the lover 
who is his victim” (136).13 Carson draws a connection between “wetness” and “wantonness,” 
both of which are disastrous for men’s mind and body. Manliness, aligned with dryness, is 
vulnerable to “wet” Eros as it may threaten or dissolve its borders. Women, on the contrary, 
already share this quality with Eros. It is unsurprising, as Carson points out, that “Greek poets 
find sexuality in women a fearsome thing” (140).  
 Of course, this binaristic framing of women and their sexuality has been perpetuated 
throughout history and informs much, if not all, of Western culture.14 Simone de Beauvoir, 
most notably, offers an extensive study of man’s gradual domination of women, which 
involves the ancient Greeks, among them Pythagoras who states, “There is a good principle, 
                                                
13 See Anne Carson’s Eros the Bittersweet, particularly the chapter entitled “Finding the Edge.” It begins: “Eros is an issue of 
boundaries” (30). In my fourth chapter, I will address eros in broader terms as it relates to my thesis. 
14 Carson also draws attention to the perpetuation of this binary in “The Gender of Sound”: “I do not imagine that these 
polarities or their hierarchization is news to you, now that classical historians and feminists have spent the last ten or fifteen 
years codifying the various arguments with which ancient Greek thinkers convinced themselves that women belong to a 
different race than men” (GIG 124). 
  82 
which has created order, light, and man; and a bad principle, which has created chaos, 
darkness, and woman” (de Beauvoir 80). Carson, too, notes in both “Dirt and Desire” and 
“The Gender of Sound” the influence of the “so-called Pythagorean Table of Oppositions” 
(MOH 133) on thinkers such as Aristotle.15 Culture, responsible for creating and restating the 
unbounded-ness of women, is also responsible for providing boundaries: “since woman does 
not bound herself, she must be bounded” (142) in clothes, gestures, and customs. Carson 
reiterates this in “The Gender of Sound”: “Putting a door on the female mouth has been an 
important project of patriarchal culture from antiquity to the present day” (GIG 121).  
A popular and ancient method in which a woman is “bound” is marriage. The “bonds” 
of matrimony are put in place to provide a domestic and sexual perimeter for women; 
marriage dictates how a woman is bound to her husband, restricting her from leaving him, but 
also restricting anyone else from entering. Any occurrence of “leakage,” such as adultery, is 
described as “pollution,” “contagion,” or, as Carson puts it, “dirt.” 
 The “dilemma posed by female dirt” (MOH 131) is of interest for Carson. She defines 
dirt as “‘matter out of place’ … Dirt is matter that has crossed a boundary it ought not to have 
crossed. Dirt confounds categories and mixes up form” (143). What intrigues Carson about 
dirt is how it violates borders and troubles the division between inside and outside. She 
concludes “Dirt and Desire” with an interpretation of Sappho’s fragment 31, a fragment that 
we will encounter again in Carson’s poetry when I discuss its relation to the sublime. Here, 
Carson draws attention to the ancient wedding ceremony, a controlled ritual of female borders, 
and the disruptive revelation the speaker experiences when the bride is unveiled. The wedding 
                                                
15 See also Glass, Irony & God: “…in the document cited by Aristotle that goes by the name of The Pythagorean Table of 
Opposites, we find the attributes curving, dark, secret, evil, ever-moving, not self-contained and lacking its own boundaries 
aligned with Female and set over against straight, light, honest, good, stable, self-contained and firmly bounded on the Male 
side” (124). 
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ritual itself is a series of borders and liminal spaces in which all transgressions are carefully 
managed. As Carson points out, marriage rites emphasize the importance of “doorways, 
thresholds, lintels, exits, entrances” (148), and involve various practices, or “ruptures,” such as 
the unveiling of the bride, the opening of the gifts, and, of course, the breaking of the hymen. 
Carson translates fragment 31 as follows: 
He seems to me equal to gods that man 
who opposite you 
sits and listens close 
to your sweet speaking 
 
and lovely laughing – oh it 
puts the heart in my chest on wings 
for when I look at you, a moment, then no speaking 
is left in me 
 
no: tongue breaks and thin 
fire is racing under skin 
and in eyes no sight and drumming 
fills ears 
 
and cold sweat holds me and shaking 
grips me all, greener than grass 
I am and dead – or almost 
I seem to me … (MOH 150) 
 
This poem, as many critics have asserted, “has proved to be an engrossing text to many 
readers, arresting in its physicality yet elusive in its description of what is happening between 
the speaker, the addressee, and the man” (Budelmann 1). The first line hints at a possible 
(heterosexual) desire on the part of the speaker, but the second to final stanzas shift and 
displace the “I’s” assumed desire for “he,” to a definitive (homosexual) desire for “you.”16  
                                                
16 This reading has been provided by a number of critics. Colleen Lamos writes: “This well-known poem describes a 
triangular relationship in which the female speaker burns with desire for a woman who is occupied by the attention of a man” 
(157-8). See also Barbara Goff (Citizen Bacchae 93): “an unnamed man (keinos) is represented as sitting opposite the beloved 
and listening to her, but is quickly replaced in the dynamics of the poem by the (presumably female) speaker, who experiences 
far more dramatic reactions to the beloved than the apparently stolid keinos”; and Alistair Blanshard: “[the fragment] recounts 
the pangs of jealousy that Sappho feels when seeing a woman that she loves being courted by a man” (155). 
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 According to Carson, Sappho’s speaker uses the opportunity of the unveiling of the 
bride to explode her own boundary between inside and outside. “At the moment of unveiling, 
for the first time, the intact boundary of her person is violated by contact: the contact of vision” 
(MOH 149). The bride is penetrated by the glance of the groom. This breaking of borders 
typically occurs between the two parties; however, Carson argues that Sappho structures the 
poem in such a way so that the speaker is also involved in the “contact of vision,” thus, 
breaking her own boundaries and exposing her own desires.17 The dynamics of desire and the 
physical position of the speaker, which Carson categorizes as the poem’s “notorious oddities” 
(151), are clarified if we consider the poem as taking place during the unveiling ritual of a 
wedding ceremony.18 The irreverent timing of the speaker’s display of desire is not lost on 
Carson who states: “Sappho has chosen the most solemn and authoritative of the rituals that 
sacralize female boundaries and used it to explode the distinction between outside and the 
inside of her self” (152). Her observation recalls Benstock’s definition of sapphic modernism 
as a disruption in the “social and cultural fabric.” Here we have an example from antiquity of 
female desire as disruptive to the marriage ceremony, which is rooted and maintained in 
society and culture.  
 “Dirt and Desire” and “The Gender of Sound” provide some useful coordinates to 
consider rupture. As Carson makes clear, rupture is characterized as feminine, threatening, 
                                                
17 The physical arrangement of the subjects in the poem is key to Carson’s reading. The “staging” of the fragment will prove 
to be more important later on in the chapter when I turn to Carson’s metaphor of film and cinema. For now, see Carson’s 
description of the placement of figures:  
The man is the initial subject and visual focus of the poem because Sappho, if positioned behind the bride’s back, is 
looking straight at him over the bride’s head. For the same reason, namely her rearguard position, Sappho does not 
at first respond to what the bride looks like, since she cannot see her face, but rather to the bride’s voice and 
laughter, which is well positioned to hear … Yet it is not the bride who stands revealed at this wedding. It is not the 
material boundaries of a bridal veil that fall open. It is not the bridegroom who suddenly sees what he has not seen 
before. Sappho has constructed her poem as a play upon the ritual formalities of the unveiling ceremony in order to 
situate her own emotions, which are intensely personal and properly hidden emotions, at the single most 
extraordinary moment of exposure in female life and so to bend its ritual meaning onto herself with an irony of 
reference as sharp as a ray of light. (MOH 151-2) 
18 See Jane McIntosh Snyder, “The Wedding Song Theory” (Lesbian Desire in the Lyrics of Sappho 29-30). 
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contaminated, and disruptive to masculine “order.” Females are “pollutable, polluted and 
polluting in several ways at once” (MOH 143), playing both passive and active roles; women’s 
borders are vulnerable, and other borders are vulnerable to women. Indeed, this gender binary 
that splits and adopts opposing characteristics is the basis of our intellectual heritage and 
continues to inform twentieth century thinkers. While I would like to move away from these 
models and to move beyond the feminized readings of Sappho’s fragments, they are useful to 
keep in mind as I explore Carson’s particular use of the Sapphic archive and the ancient poet’s 
participation and role in Carson’s poetics of error. I want to turn instead to the material 
borders of Sappho’s textual fragments and to the manner in which they “contaminate” and 
threaten the borders of other texts. 
  
If Not, Winter: Material Rupture 
“[S]he plays havoc with boundaries and defies the rules that keep matter in its place.”  
–Anne Carson (MOH 152) 
 
 
The social disruption of women established in Carson’s essays is useful to keep in mind as we 
move ahead and look at Sappho’s fragmentary corpus. If Woman is a social pollutant that 
disrupts civil boundaries, then we can think of the sapphic fragment as a textual “pollutant” 
that disrupts the boundaries of a coherent archive, while threatening the boundaries of other 
texts.  
Carson has described Sappho as a “representative of the whole mysterious, polluted 
species of ancient womanhood” (MOH 152). But Sappho, as mentioned earlier, has evolved 
and has been adapted to suit other scenarios. Reynolds argues that “‘Sappho’ is not a name, 
much less a person. It is, rather, a space. A space for filling in the gaps, joining up the dots, 
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making something out of nothing” (2). What Sappho appears to represent for Carson is an 
opportunity for pollution, or “leakage,” of another kind. The appearance of Sappho and her 
fragments opens up a space in which Carson experiments with order, definitions, established 
structures, and the ensuing possibility of error.  
Why would Sappho be an ideal candidate for such a project? Similar to Reynold’s 
conception of Sappho as “a space,” duBois notes that when researching the ancient poet, “we 
realize that there is no there there” (82).19 What we discover in Sappho is not only fragments, 
but a persistent absence:  
Her poems have come down to us only in the most fragmentary of forms, quoted in 
other poets’ work, translated by Catullus, cited by rhetoricians as exemplary texts, 
found in shreds of papyrus stuffed in sacred crocodiles at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt. There 
is no text of Sappho, really, just reports, distant sightings, rumours, a few words 
reputed to be hers. Even many of the poems assigned to her by scholars have features 
that make attribution questionable – words from the wrong dialect, even her name 
spelled variously in different situations. (82-3) 
With Sappho we encounter distance, not only in the incompleteness of her poetry, but also in 
the way she is always separated from us by two or three degrees of reception and transmission. 
Quoting Sappho often entails what others have already quoted, and at times in the wrong 
dialect. The reception of her work is accompanied, to a great extent, by error. More 
                                                
19 duBois is (intentionally) plagiarizing the famous line from Gertrude Stein’s Everybody’s Biography (1937). Carson herself 
extends Reynold’s and duBois’s spatial metaphors of Sappho to include the sonic. As Carson writes, “Physical silence 
happens when you are looking at, say, a poem of Sappho’s inscribed on papyrus from two thousand years ago that has been 
torn in half. Half the poem is empty space. A translator can signify or even rectify this lack of text in various ways – with 
blankness or brackets or textual conjecture – and she is justified in doing so because Sappho did not intend that part of poem 
to fall silent” (Nay 4). See also Monique Wittig and Sande Zveig’s Lesbian Peoples: Materials for a Dictionary in which the 
entry for “Sappho” is simply a blank page. 
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importantly, we realize that when we read Sappho, she is already sharing borders, such as with 
Plato in the Phaedrus, or, as we shall see, Longinus in On the Sublime.  
Carson’s consideration of “pollution” among ancient women in the social realm draws 
attention to how she herself “plays havoc with boundaries” (MOH 152) and conventions in her 
own work. Seduced by “imperfect surfaces” and the impossibility of totality in the wreckage 
of ancient texts, we find in Carson numerous occasions of “rupture.” More than just the social 
transgressions conducted by women, we also witness boundaries of other kinds – such as the 
boundaries of a text, the categories of genre, and the crossing of these lines. Boundaries mark 
an edge, separating the outside from the inside. They determine the beginning and the end of 
something – both spatially and temporally. But Carson appears to be more intrigued by the 
breakdown of borders, the straddling of one thing by another; overall, she resists categories, 
opting instead for a more ambiguous “middle.” 
With this in mind, we can take up Carson’s extensive translation of Sappho’s 
fragments in If Not, Winter.20 In her translation, Carson makes deliberate use of negative space 
and line breaks in order to give the sense of something erupted. Square brackets, inserted to 
indicate missing pieces of papyrus or illegible letters, “give an impression of missing matter” 
(INW xi). Carson’s translation keeps the fragments separate, dedicating a new page to each 
fragment. Thus, some pages have as few as two words. The reading experience departs from 
other canonical translations, such as The Loeb Classical Library (1982) translation by David 
Campbell, or even later translations, such as Jim Powell’s The Poetry of Sappho (2007). 
Carson emphasizes the blankness of the page, doing away with footnotes and other extraneous 
                                                
20 During the writing of this chapter, parts of two previously unknown poems by Sappho were discovered. See J. Romm (The 
Daily Beast): “Scholars Discover New Poems from Ancient Greek Poetess Sappho.” See also Daniel Mendelsohn (The New 
Yorker): “Girl, Interrupted: Who was Sappho?” The new additions are now included in a new collection, translated by Diane 
Rayor: Sappho: A New Translation of the Complete Works (2014).  
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marks, thus highlighting the broken edges of the fragment. As Bruce Whiteman describes the 
translations, “To my ear her versions sound more like trots than fully achieved English poems” 
(685). The page is in constant tension between what remains and what is lost. Riffling through 
the pages, If Not, Winter appears as a plain stack of sheets, punctuating the eye now and then 
with ink.21 
We better see the rupture in Carson’s translation when set against Sam Hamill’s 
translation. I’ve selected Hamill because he purposely takes a different route from Carson and 
arranges Sappho’s fragments as complete pieces. The following, for example, is Hamill’s 
translation of fragment 34: 
All the stars turn away their faces 
when the pale moon grows full, 
who, in her splendour, 
turns the wide, shining world 
into silver. (4) 
 
In his foreword, Hamill states that he chose to present each fragment “as an entire poem” in 
the belief that it “capture[s] a universal human experience in an infinite moment” (ix). Despite 
the separation from its original context, the fragment functions as a complete unit. However, 
this rendition is counter to what duBois believes Sappho’s fragments should be. As she states:  
Her poetry epitomizes the blanc, the blank, the whiteness of the page marked only by 
scattered, shattered words. Her poetry can produce anxiety because it exemplifies lack, 
and Sappho herself sometimes becomes a fetish object, made whole, perfect, sealed on 
the page by translators who are made uncomfortable by the holes in her writing. (27) 
                                                
21 My use of “punctuating” recalls Barthes’s definition of the “punctum” of a photograph. While the studium of a photo 
corresponds to its symbolic meaning, the punctum concerns an element, or number of elements, that punctuates the stadium, 
or meaning of the photo, and in turn punctures the viewer: “A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but 
also bruises me, is poignant to me)” (CL 27).  
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In light of this, Carson is not a translator who is uncomfortable with the gaps in Sappho.22 By 
contrast, Carson’s translation arranges the fragment on the page so as to capture its 
disconnection rather than making it “whole.” As Dimitrios Yatromanolakis notes: “[Carson] 
prefers poetic fragmentariness and transparency to scholarly reconstruction” (271). Sappho’s 
words – to borrow duBois’s terms – scatter, as much as they are scattered, and shatter as much 
as they are shattered. Carson’s placement and typesetting of Sappho’s words is an attempt to 
illustrate its rupture: 
stars around the beautiful moon 
 hide back their luminous form 
 whenever all full she shines 
  on the earth 
 
  silvery (INW 69)  
 
We see at work in Hamill’s interpretation a desire for totality, coherence, and self-containment, 
conventionally demarcating the fragment’s beginning with a capital and its end with a full stop. 
Comparing diction and syntax, it is apparent that Hamill’s version takes considerable creative 
liberties. For instance, the stars are personified and have “faces” while Carson makes only 
mention of a singular “form.” While Hamill embellishes and beautifies the line about the full 
moon (“when the pale moon grows full”), Carson comes down with brute force: “whenever all 
full.”  The sparseness is deliberate on Carson’s part as she states in the introduction: “I tried to 
put down all that can be read of each poem in the plainest language I could find, using where 
possible the same order of words and thoughts as Sappho did” (INW x).  
Apart from these syntactical and rhetorical differences, I am interested in the way 
Carson presents her translation. The line breaks do not take the reader very far, as there is no 
                                                
22 In an interview, Carson states: “making Sappho a complete text with sentences that go from right to left [is] kind of 
endearing to do but it’s so hopelessly silly” (Fleming). 
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indication as to how much or how little exists between them.23 Though it reads logically (“she 
shines / on the earth”), who is to say that this was Sappho’s intention? The mystery 
surrounding the fragments is foregrounded by the white space. There are as few black marks 
as possible on the page, no inserted punctuation, and fewer words than in Hamill’s version. 
The arrangement parallels the original ancient Greek on the facing page but it is still not as 
tightly woven as Hamill’s contained five-line stanza. The use of indentation on the fourth line 
of Carson’s version creates a longer pause, which invites readers to speculate. The final word, 
“silvery,” floats below, separated from the quatrain. What this adjective modifies remains 
unclear.   
Carson recreates the challenges of her process, and of her poetics of translation, by 
using square brackets, which “will affect your reading experience, if you allow it” (INW xi). 
Though we are reading Sappho in English, Carson insists that there “is no reason you should 
miss the drama of trying to read a papyrus torn in half or riddled with holes” (xi; emphasis 
mine).24 Indeed, maintaining the drama of reading torn papyrus is opposite to philology, which 
attempts to eliminate the processive drama in order to recreate an ideal exemplar. Carson’s use 
of white space, as Johanna Drucker would argue, is “integral to textuality” (“Graphical 
Readings” 271). Not only is it a field with “a set of elements in contingent relation” (275), it 
also embodies history and loss. Reading Carson’s translations provide the sense of genuine 
obscurity and incompletion. This can be seen in Fragments 92 and 93 of If Not, Winter: 
 
 
                                                
23 “On a papyrus roll the text is written in columns, without word division, punctuation or lineation. To read such a text is hard 
even when it comes to us in its entirety and most papyri don’t” (INW ix). 
24 Indeed, duBois also places importance on the “riddling of holes” and the presentation of the fragments: “A crucial question 
for the presentation of the Sapphic text has always been how to represent the absences, the holes, the gaps in the poetic object; 
how does a publisher, without sanitizing, rectifying, fetishizing, print these fragments, show the tears, frangible edges, 
erasures, abrasions? … Her texts, as we receive them, insist on the impossibility of recapturing the lost body” (28-9). 
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Fragment 92: 
 
] 
] 
] 
] 
robe 
and 
colored with saffron 
purple robe 
cloaks 
crowns 
beautiful 
] 
purple 
rugs 
] 
] (181) 
 
 
Fragment 93: 
 
] 
] 
] 
] I have 
] of girls (183) 
 
Despite the scantiness of fragment 92, which has been described as “virtual debris” (D’Agata, 
“Stripped-Down Sappho”), the Sapphic fragment has been translated and transformed by 
Willis Barnstone into an eight-stanza poem, complete with even the title, “Recalling a Letter 
Atthis Wrote Me.” While Barnstone, like Hamill, aims for completion and closes the gaps, 
Carson uses the space of the page to recreate the papyrus’s deterioration. The white space 
explodes the text and invites new possible connections. Readers of Greek, a highly inflected 
language, would be able to extract further details not available to English readers, but Carson 
translates the material “drama” of manuscript and papyrus. Consequently, readers of English 
are still able to engage with the ambiguous text as detotalized. Fragment 92, for instance, is 
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rich in colour, but we are not given a clear sense of place, speaker, or subject. Similarly, 
fragment 93 leaves the reader with more questions. The four words are the only coordinates on 
the page. What the speaker has and how it relates to the next line remains unknown and the 
possibilities are infinite. As Carson puts it, “Brackets are exciting … brackets imply a free 
space of imaginal adventure” (INW xi). A text, as Barthes similarly asserts, has “an irreducible 
… plurality” (RL 59). The multiplicity of meanings in Sappho’s poems is created by these 
fragments, but this crucial indeterminacy depends largely on the materiality of the surrounding 
white space. Negative space participates in the production of meaning. It signifies a presence 
of words that are eternally lost. Absence straddles presence, and vice versa, thus, blurring the 
borders between them. The text is ruptured and the remaining words, like shrapnel, are thrown 
out, free to pierce through other textual boundaries. While Carson has established in “Dirt and 
Desire” and “The Gender of Sound” the social pollution of women, here Sappho participates 
in pollution of a textual register that transgresses even the boundaries of Carson’s own works, 
resulting in formal, stylistic, and generic “contamination.”  
 
Generic Boundaries: “Friskes, skips and jumps” 
The act of pollution by which boundaries are broken down coincides with Carson’s overall 
poetic practice. She is interested neither in fixed entities nor in the maintenance of their 
fixities; rather she is intrigued by their mixing and by the emergence of new forms. Indeed, the 
mixing of genres as a transgressive act is not unlike the “leakage” that Carson identifies in the 
social realm. If, according to trans-historical patriarchal edict, Woman needs laws and rituals 
to maintain her boundaries in order to prevent impurity, pollution, and monstrosity, such is the 
case with genre. As Derrida points out: “as soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a 
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norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk impurity, anomaly, or 
monstrosity” (“The Law of Genre” 57). 
The “line of demarcation,” however, is not a boundary that simply exists between 
genres. It is not a line impervious to mixing; rather, and in keeping with Derridean 
deconstruction, the law of genre that aims to ensure purity is also at once a law of impurity:  
What if there were, lodged within the heart of the law itself, a law of impurity or a 
principle of contamination? And suppose the condition for the possibility of the law 
were the a priori of a counter-law, an axiom of impossibility that would confound its 
sense, order, and reason? (“The Law of Genre” 57) 
We may recall the law of marriage by which the union of a man and woman is legitimized. 
This social convention also follows what Derrida formulizes: when the border dividing man 
and woman is broken down via the controlled ritual of marriage, they become immediately 
vulnerable to illegitimate transgressions – adultery. As Derrida writes, “The law and the 
counter-law serve each other citations summoning each other to appear, and each recites the 
other in this proceeding (proces)” (58). In the case of genre, Carson admits to the difficulty of 
distinguishing prose from poetry. In an interview, she speaks cryptically about the difference, 
stating that she identities each by the “smell”: “The two modes fade in and out of one another 
and at a certain point the work congeals into a form” (di Michele 7). Echoing Derrida on how 
the law simultaneously summons its counter-law, Carson, too, does not pay heed to the 
authoritative or conventional rules of genre.25 She recognizes that while such rules command 
                                                
25 We also see this echo in Lacan: the law is obscene, commanding us to enjoy what it forbids. 
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order, they invite defiance by their very existence. As she states, “Genres are conventional. 
Conventions exist to be re-negotiated” (di Michele 8).26  
This “renegotiation,” or movement across borders and genres, is best seen in 
Decreation, where “impurity,” “anomaly,” and “monstrosity” are at play. The cover blurb 
describes the book as a collection of “Poetry, Essays, Opera,” but such appellations do not 
contain all that Carson accomplishes within the pages.27 Carson also plays with ekphrasis, the 
essay, tableau, rhapsody, oratorio, documentary, and screenplay. The opening epigraph of the 
book is fitting in that it applies to Decreation’s wide-ranging styles and forms, but also to 
Carson’s poetics as a whole: “I love a poetical kinde of a march, by friskes, skips and 
jumps.”28 While Carson sources the line as coming from Montaigne’s “Essay on Some Verses 
of Virgil,” (a fictional essay), the line, in fact, is taken from Montaigne’s “Chapter IX: On 
Vanity,” as translated by Florio in 1603.29 This misattribution is itself a “skip” in the sense that 
Carson “skips over” proper citation (and we will see this again when she misquotes Longinus 
in the “TV Men” series). More importantly, Montaigne’s line describes a playful movement in 
                                                
26 Carson’s statement about genre echoes what is put forth in Derrida’s “The Law and Genre” (1980): “ ‘Genres are not to be 
mixed’ could strike you as a sharp order. You might have heard it resound the elliptical but all the more authoritarian 
summons to a law of a ‘do’ or ‘do not’ which, as everyone knows, occupies the concept or constitutes the value of genre. As 
soon as the word ‘genre’ is sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one attempts to conceive it, a limit is drawn. And when 
a limit is established, norms and interdictions are not far behind: ‘Do,’ ‘Do not’ says ‘genre,’ the word ‘genre,’ the figure, the 
voice, or the law of genre” (56). 
27 Derrida also investigates subtitles in Maurice Blanchot’s La Folie du jour, which calls itself “an account” (Un récit). 
Carson often plays with her subtitles, calling The Beauty of the Husband, for example, “A Fictional Essay in 29 Tangos” 
(more on this in Chapter 4). See Derrida (“The Law of Genre” 73-4): “Could you tell whether these titles, written earlier and 
filed away in the archives, make up a single title, titles of the same text, titles of the account (which of course figures as an 
impracticable mode in the book), or the title of a genre? Even if the latter were to cause some confusion, it would be of the 
sort that releases questions already implemented and enacted by La Folie du jour. This enactment enables in turn the 
denaturalization and deconstitution of the oppositions nature/history and mode/genre.”  
28 Carson’s choice of Montaigne’s line (poetry as “a march,” “friskes,” “skips and jumps”) echoes her own claim that “words 
bounce” (AR 3). 
29 Ian Rae also notes this misattribution and states: “This misattribution seems to be a scholarly joke since the sentence 
preceding the Montaigne citation states, in the original, that ‘the titles of my chapters, embrace not always the matter’” 
(“Verglas” 165, fn. 2). We can speculate briefly on Carson’s reference to Virgil in her misattribution. Virgil is one of the chief 
representatives, along with Homer, of masculine, classical, epical poetry. Mentioning Virgil is mischievous in that 
Montaigne’s praise jibes more with the Sapphic/Carsonian-poetics. 
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language that is evidenced in Carson’s work, that is, the “skips and jumps” that both cross 
borders of genre and also the linguistic and temporal gaps between the present and antiquity. 
The epigraph is taken from a passage that describes a poetic platform consistent with 
Carson’s own approach. Both Montaigne and Carson testify to an aesthetics that involves 
opportunity for accidents, play, and error: 
I love a Poeticall kinde of march, by friskes, skips and jumps. It is an arte (saith Plato) 
light, nimble, fleeting and light-brain'd. There are some treatises in Plutarke, where he 
forgets his theame, where the drift of his argument is not found but by incidencie and 
chaunce, all stuffed with strange matter. Marke but the vagaries in his Daemon of 
Socrates. Oh God! what grace hath the variation, and what beautie these startings and 
nimble escapes; … I am indiscreetly and tumultuously at a fault; my stile and wit are 
still gadding alike. A little folly is tolerable in him … (Montaigne 138-9)  
Montaigne cites the Greeks, Plato, and Plutarch, and describes a poetic art that is “light, 
nimble, fleeting” and that requires strangeness, forgetfulness, incidence, chance, variation, and 
folly. Indeed, these qualities are evident in Carson’s own work, particularly the collection that 
houses this epigraph. A number of critics have noted the generic jumps and the variety of 
styles found in the book. William Logan, for example, describes Decreation as “a ragbag of 
strange ambition … Carson delights in dizzy leaps of thought” (“Victoria’s Secret”; emphasis 
mine). The poetry “appears to have been dashed off with the relaxed hand of an artist” (Guriel 
46). Much of what is startling about Decreation is its openness to form, jumping from poetry 
to essay, from opera to documentary, and its inclusion of a range of figures rarely seen 
together, such as Longinus, Betty Goodwin, and Michelangelo Antonioni. To borrow 
Montaigne’s words, Carson’s “strange matter” in Decreation demonstrates her “nimble escape” 
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from conventional forms and expectations. The deliberate subtitle in Decreation – “Poetry, 
Essays, Opera” – enacts a law, but also encompasses the relations formed around it. What 
results is not a principle of order and organization, but a “ragbag.” As Derrida puts it: “The 
law is mad. The law is mad, is madness; but madness is not the predicate of law. There is no 
madness without the law; madness cannot be conceived before its relation to law (“The Law 
of Genre” 81).  
Throughout the collection, Carson plays with the madness of genre, calling her poems 
in one section “Sublimes,” in another section “Gnosticisms.” Her piece, “Foam,” is an “essay 
with rhapsody.” Carson continually re-negotiates convention and genre. Sam Anderson 
whimsically describes her as “someone from another world, either extraterrestrial or ancient, 
for whom our modern earthly categories are too artificial and simplistic to contain anything 
like the real truth she is determined to communicate” (“Inscrutable”; emphasis mine). The 
transgression of borders and the experimental play in Decreation result in striking 
idiosyncrasies. When artificial and “earthly categories” cannot contain Carson, she moves into 
new forms more fitting. Her more recent works, such as Nox and Antigonick, pay special 
attention to medium and the physical attributes of the work.  
Border transgressions and rupture are nothing new for Carson, as she herself 
participates in such “leakages.” In “Gender of Sound,” Carson writes, “Woman is that creature 
who puts the inside on the outside. By projections and leakages of all kinds – somatic, vocal, 
emotional, sexual – females expose or expend what should be kept in” (GIG 129). There is a 
striking parallel between the flow and spillage of the woman and the outpouring of the poet, 
pointed out by Montaigne. In the lines following the chosen epigraph, Montaigne describes the 
poet’s speech: 
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A Poet (saith Plato) seated on the Muses footestoole, doth in a furie powre-out 
whatsoever commeth in his mouth, as the pipe or cocke of a fountaine, without 
considering or ruminating the same: and many things escape him, diverse in colour, 
contrary in substance, and broken in course. (139) 
The connection between Poet and Woman is reminiscent of Julia Kristeva’s study of language 
and literature. Kristeva’s definition of the maternal chora is evidenced by “rupture and 
articulations (rhythm)” (Revolution 26; emphasis mine). For Kristeva, language must consider 
both its “semiotic” (coded as feminine and maternal) and “symbolic” (coded as masculine and 
paternal) dimensions. The symbolic governs the expression of ordered meaning via 
grammatically and syntactically formulated utterances. The semiotic, however, is not rule-
governed; it indicates a process by which libidinal energies, affects, and drives are 
unconsciously discharged into language. The semiotic injects language with libidinal energy, 
just as the female “projects” and “leaks,” polluting the world around her. I would argue that 
we could also call the semiotic by another name: the sapphic. Both are characterized by 
rupture, chaos, spontaneity, improvisation, the feminine, as well as desire and affect. We have 
already mentioned Sappho’s call upon Aphrodite as both goddess of love and Muse, thus, 
yoking together desire and discourse. Carson, too, sensualizes language, and notes: “the 
history of a text is like a long caress” (AR 6). Indeed, the history of Greek fragments, their 
transmissions, translations, and receptions, are all part of this “long caress” that shows itself 
by how they mingle with and leak into other texts. 
While it is may be said that all poets are to some degree agrammatical, I propose 
examining a selection of Carson’s poems under the auspices of this metaphor of “leakage,” 
which recurs and is taken up by her in varying ways. Though we can understand the sapphic as 
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Kristevan semiotic, I would argue that these two terms are not simply interchangeable. The 
sapphic also signals for Carson a larger issue at stake. The sapphic is not limited to 
intertextuality and linguistic intersections, but involves a creative praxis that encompasses 
error, the material, the fragmentary, and loss. “Foam,” an essay in which Carson discusses the 
sublime as “spillage,” is a useful text through which her poems may be examined, and 
partakes in a larger discussion of how “leakage” functions in material and textual rupture. 
 
Foam: A Documentary Technique 
The danger of border transgression accompanying a text is familiar to Carson. In her essay, 
“Foam,” she writes on the sublime in Longinus and Antonioni. Carson describes Longinus’s 
use of intertextuality as follows:  
Longinus skates from Homer to Demosthenes to Moses to Sappho on blades of pure 
bravado. What is a quote? A quote (cognate with quota) is a cut, a section, a slice of 
someone else’s orange. You suck the slice, toss the rind, skate away. Part of what you 
enjoy in a documentary technique is the sense of banditry. To loot someone else’s life 
or sentences and make off with a point of view … (D 45) 
What is this “sense of banditry” that Carson is referring to? According to Carson, Longinus’s 
treatise On the Sublime, is “an aggregation of quotes,” which, she claims, does not provide a 
clear, coherent argument: “You will come away from reading its (unfinished) forty chapters 
with no clear idea what the Sublime actually is” (D 45).30  
                                                
30 Carson’s description of Longinus’s treatise as an “aggregation of quotes” has been noted by other classics scholars. See 
Longinus, Trans. W. Rhys Roberts (1899): “Reference is made to as many as fifty Greek writers, whose dates range over 
something like a thousand years” (26). See also the book’s “Appendix C. Literary With a List of Authors and Quotations” 
(211-246). 
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We can understand Carson’s “documentary technique” through a Bakhtinian lens. 
According to Bakhtin’s science of utterances, our words are never in isolation but are always 
part of a dialogue. Utterances reply to past utterances. We never reinvent the signification of 
our language when we speak; rather our words are connected with what preceded them. Every 
utterance we make is dialogical and thus, resonates with things previously said and written, 
and also anticipates utterances to come. As Bakhtin states:  
language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot 
conception of the world. All words have the “taste” of a profession, a genre, a tendency, 
a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and 
hour. … Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic) are inevitable in 
the word. (293) 
Kristeva also claims that the literary word is no fixed point, but is “an intersection of words 
(texts) where another word (text) can be read” (Desire 66). For Kristeva, every text has to be 
understood as a “mosaic of quotations” (66), or, as Carson describes it, an “aggregation.” 
Intertextuality is not a simple matter of texts intersecting each other and being analyzed 
together; rather, it is a transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another, resulting in 
a creative and revisionist interference between two sign systems. Every text, ultimately, is an 
open system. Indeed, Carson’s own metaphor of “leakage” dovetails with Kristeva’s 
formulation of the text as being open to other texts.  
It is important to point out that Carson’s argument is not actually a complaint against 
Longinus; rather, she states that the technique by which he quotes (or “loots”), analyzes, and 
“skates” from reference to reference, is itself a performance of the Sublime. The vibration that 
arises out of the “brutal juxtaposition” (D 46) and documentation in Longinus, and is felt by 
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the reader, is synonymous with being touched by the Sublime. This enjoyment, which 
Longinus cannot define but which he illustrates in his attempt to define it, is itself an 
experience of rupture and spilling, what Carson nicknames “foam”: “Longinus moves through 
the chapters of On the Sublime covered with foam himself” (48).  
Wetness and spillage are intrinsic to the Sublime. While the vulnerability of 
boundaries has been deemed feminine and threatening (the breaking of borders an indication 
of loss of control and order), in this case, the method of Longinus’s documentation is actually 
“exciting” (D 45), since textual control is constantly shifting, passed along, and possessed 
briefly by somebody else: 
Watch this spillage, which moves from the man who hits, to the words of Demosthenes 
describing him, to the judges hearing these words, to Longinus analyzing the whole 
process, to me recalling Longinus’s discussion of it and finally to you reading my 
account. The passionate moment echoes from soul to soul. Each controls it temporarily. 
Each enjoys it quote by quote. (D 46) 
To experience the Sublime, according to Carson, is “to share a bit of electric life with the 
artist’s invention, to spill with him” (46). Banditry, or anarchy (literally as “being without a 
ruler”) is pleasurable.  
Carson posits that Antonioni’s films also play with the “spilling” of contents and the 
“possibility of foam” (49). Antonioni, of course, does this differently from Longinus’s 
discussion of literature and rhetoric as the director demonstrates the Sublime by way of 
cinema: 
Antonioni’s films involve different kinds of playing with the passionate moment, 
different ways of spilling its contents. He enjoys, for example, drawing attention to 
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offscreen space by placing a mirror in the middle of the scene so that you glimpse a 
stray piece of world there. Or he likes to give you two successive shots of the same 
portion of reality, first from close up, then a little further away, scarcely different yet 
noticeably the same. (D 49) 
Both Antonioni and Longinus are interested in portraying “passionate moments,” “spilling,” 
and breaking of rules (a sense of wrong, or error). We have understood foam thus far to mean 
a sense of sublimity, but Carson also uses it to suggest a meaning that is closer to error. 
In her comparison, Carson describes Antonioni’s unique method of filming, termed 
temps mort by French critics, in which he leaves the camera running after a scene is finished. 
Recording continues and “spills” from the moment of conscious performance to unconscious 
“real life.” Temps mort crosses the border between cinema and reality, thus, opening the 
possibility for capturing something worthwhile that is outside the script: 
“When everything has been said, when the scene appears to be finished, there is what 
comes afterward … the actors continue out of inertia into moments that seem ‘dead.’ 
The actor commits ‘errors.’ …” 
 
Antonioni likes to document these moments of errors, when the actors do unscheduled 
things, act “back to front” as he says. Possibility of foam. (D 49) 
It is understandable that Carson would turn to Antonioni as his methods are in line with her 
own poetics of errancy. He, too, has a predilection for accidents, for the breaking of rules, the 
unpredictable movement, or “inertia,” of the moment. Like Carson, who negotiates 
conventions, Antonioni occupies the in-between space between deliberate and spontaneous 
recording. The quality of this leakage is, for Carson, identified as foam. Not only is 
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Antonioni’s technique, “the opening out [of] the frame” (emphasis mine), associated with the 
sublime, but the artful contingency, or error, is a “possibility of foam” (D 49). Indeed, the 
“opening out” and breaking of received frames related to gender, form, translation, and genre 
is another useful analogy to describe the leakages, ruptures, and boundary-crossings with 
which Carson is concerned. 
How does Carson place herself amongst Antonioni and Longinus as a participant of the 
sublime? More importantly, how does Sappho, an exemplary figure of the sublime for 
Longinus, fit into this strange realm that also includes Antonioni? The connection, as I will 
argue, is one of performance and sight. 
Sappho’s fragment 31, preserved for us by Longinus in his treatise, is an illustration of 
sublimity.31 In the notes of If Not, Winter, Carson excerpts Longinus’s passage on the 
fragment (“Are you not amazed at how she researches all at once the soul the body the ears the 
tongue the eyes the skin all as if they had departed from her and belong to someone else?” 
[364]), and emphasizes the complexity of bodily and affective “rupture” that take place in the 
fragment: “Sappho’s body falls apart, Longinus’s body comes together: drastic contract of the 
sublime” (364; emphasis mine). Indeed, fragment 31 demonstrates such a “documentary 
technique” as we move along the poem from body part to body part, one sense and sensation 
to another, as if “skating” from quote to quote (“a cut, a section, a slice”). Each passionate 
moment “spills” from the “he” to the “you” and to the speaker as evidenced by the sight of “he” 
who is “opposite you,” his ear listening closely, the woman’s “sweet speaking” and “lovely 
laughing,” and finally the complex configuration of the speaker’s bodily response to the 
                                                
31 See Longinus (10.3) translated by Carson in If Not, Winter: “Are you not amazed at how she researches all at once the soul 
the body the ears the tongue the eyes the skin all as if they had departed from her and belong to someone else? And 
contradictorily in one instant she chills, she burns, is crazy and sensible, for she is in terror or almost dead. So that no single 
passion is apparent in her but a confluence of passions. And her selection (as I said) of the most important elements and her 
combination of these into a whole achieves excellence” (364). 
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unveiling of the bride: “no speaking is left in me … tongue breaks … fire is racing under skin 
… cold sweat holds me … greener than grass I am and dead – or almost” (INW 63). 
 The sublime, according to Carson, is experienced on multiple levels in Longinus’s 
treatise. There is, more broadly, the juxtaposition of various poets, as seen in Longinus as he 
“skates” (leaps, skips, bounces) from quotation to quotation, from Homer, to Sappho, and so 
on.32 In addition to the interplay of various texts, we also have the juxtapositions within the 
excerpts themselves, as seen in the combination of affective elements documented in Sappho’s 
fragment 31. Understanding the sublime as Carson understands it is useful to keep in mind 
when we turn to the poems that follow.   
 Carson’s poetry also employs the documentary technique. With a “sense of banditry,” 
Carson loots and steals from a number of personal, cinematic, literary, and philosophical 
sources. Just as On the Sublime has been described as “a veritable storehouse of quotations” 
(Rhys Roberts 26), the twelve poems bring together a number of figures and quotes in an 
eclectic mix, such as Longinus, Michelangelo Antonioni, Monica Vitti, Kant, Sappho, and 
family members. The epigraph of the section begins: “Everything might spill” (D 60),33 and, 
indeed, we don’t know how or where we will splash.34 The poems spill from imagined or 
impossible worlds (as in “Longinus’s Dream of Antonioni” and “Kant’s Question about 
Monica Vitti”), to films by Antonioni (mentioned are Red Desert, L’Avventura, L’Eclisse), or 
to personal and familial memories such as in “Spring Break,” which details a family road trip 
                                                
32 The “skating” or rapid movement and turning from writer to writer, text to text, generates a sense of vertigo, or textual 
dizziness. According to Barbara Claire Freeman (The Feminine Sublime: Gender and Excess in Women’s Fiction), “The 
absence of a fixed point of view or visual focus produces orientation … Vertigo, of course, is a typically sublime feeling 
connected with the falling away of the ground or centre; it is what we feel when abyss opens up before us” (50).  Indeed, this 
appears to be at the crux of Carson’s praxis: where is her centre?  
33 This line is repeated again later in the poem “Ode to the Sublime by Monica Vitti” (D 65-6). 
34 The metaphor of spillage draws a striking connection to Heidegger (Poetry, Language, Thought), who argues that an object 
exists in its functionality. He provides the example of a jug: “the gift of the outpouring is what makes the jug a jug” (170). 
Correspondingly, one might argue that the literary archive (or what remains) exists only in its “spilling,” when it is reactivated 
in the present. 
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from Canada to Carolina. Like much of Carson’s work, there are many possible threads to tug. 
In the next section, I will focus primarily on Sappho’s fragment 31 and trace its appearance in 
the “Sublimes” and the “TV Men” series. In both sections, Sappho is aligned with film and 
television and I will explore this metaphor in terms of poetic rupture and its larger resonances 
for Carson’s poetics. 
 
Fragment 31: Staging a Scenario 
As mentioned earlier, the connection between Sappho and Antonioni is dependent on 
performance and sight. Carson describes Sappho’s fragment 31 explicitly in terms of 
performance: “Sappho is staging a scenario inside the little theatre of her mind” (D 160). This 
is an apt metaphor for the ceremonial ritual of the bride and groom. As we have seen in my 
discussion earlier on “Dirt and Desire,” Sappho’s fragment is dependent on gaze, particularly 
how the “contact of vision” (MOH 149) violates the social borders set up in the marriage ritual. 
The speaker’s desire for the bride is especially transgressive given the heterosexual 
relationship that is being sanctified. Vision takes on a geometrical figure: the “he” gazes at the 
“you,” and the “I,” who first looks at the “he,” shifts her gaze to the “you.” But it is this shift 
that gives momentum to the fragment. The act of looking gives way to rupture and desire that 
violently affects the body of the speaker: “for when I look at you, a moment, then no speaking 
/ is left in me.” The speaker is rendered voiceless, blind, deafened, hot, as well as cold. The 
visual contact, as Carson argues, transgresses established borders. Similarly, Antonioni plays 
with the gaze by way of the camera. The camera continues to “look” and record even after the 
scene is finished. Like the state of Sappho’s speaker who describes herself as “dead,” the 
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“moments of error” (D 49) after the “cut!” is called temps mort, translating to “dead time.” 
Carson connects Sappho and Antonioni with this act of looking and re-looking.  
If we are to understand Longinus’s technique of “skating” from quote to quote and 
Antonioni’s temps mort as aesthetic spillage, a “possibility of foam,” then Carson, too, 
demonstrates her own spillage via her use of Sappho’s fragments, and the continual 
reappearance of the ancient figure in her work. Departing from Eros the Bittersweet, Sappho 
continues to echo for Carson as she is used again and again in some form, spilling in new 
ways. For example, the triangular relationship of desire that Carson illustrates in Eros the 
Bittersweet (modelled after Sappho’s fragment 31) is one that Carson herself explores in her 
own work.35 This depiction of desire is revisited and recontextualized in Carson’s poetry, such 
as Beauty of the Husband and Plainwater (which I shall discuss in the final chapter). Sappho 
also appears as a fictional character in the “TV Men” series (where she plays, fittingly, an 
actress), in “Irony is not Enough,” and in a study of women together with Marguerite Porete 
and Simone Weil. Sappho continually pops up in Carson’s work, making cameo appearances. 
Sappho, using Carson’s term, is “dirt.” She is “matter out of place” (MOH 143), or matter that 
has crossed boundaries. This is another way of understanding what Hugh Kenner means when 
he remarks: “Tiny though they are, these Sapphic details can rub off on other writings like bits 
of red dye” (59).  
Carson’s reference to Antonioni is deliberate because he, too, sees in Monica Vitti new 
ways of spilling, new forms of artistic outcomes on screen. Vitti stars in a number of his films, 
her image repeating but styled in different characters each time, a striking resemblance to how 
                                                
35 See Carson (Eros 77): “Writing about desire, the archaic poets made triangles with their words. Or, to put it less sharply, 
they represent situations that ought to involve two factors (lover, beloved) in terms of three (lover, beloved and the space 
between them, however realized?).” 
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Sappho “stars” in a number of Carson’s poems. Carson casts Sappho as an actress in her 
chapter “TV Men” (MOH 62, 118), which aptly echoes Antonioni’s (re)use of Monica Vitti in 
his films. 
But the reuse and repetition of Vitti and Sappho is continuous and inexhaustible. 
Carson sheds light on how even movies cannot “contain” Vitti, or pin her down, in the same 
way that Sappho is elusive as a character. While “Ode to Monica Vitti” is read with Vitti in 
mind, I argue that the poem also offers a reading that is relevant to Carson’s approach to 
Sappho. When we read “she” – the speaker not only refers to Vitti, but also to the ancient poet. 
The poem references Antonioni’s film, L’Avventura, which is set in a coastal villa, just 
outside of Rome. It opens with a classical setting: 
caught 
in the time of the island, scraping themselves back and forth over 
the rocks, men slant against the wind and her golden 
hair going horizontal in whips on the ecstatic sea, boats roar 
up, roar off, men stand 
gazing (D 63) 
 
Indeed, this scene brings to mind Sappho, inhabitant of her own island, Lesbos. The nature 
imagery and harsh diction (“caught,” “scraping,” “rocks,” “whips,” “ecstatic,” “roar”) are 
reminiscent of H.D.’s Sea Garden poems, which have been argued to depict the coastal Greek 
landscape and have been read as Sapphic in style and content. “Caught / in the time of the 
island,” can also be understand as being caught in the time of Lesbos. But “caught” is an 
interesting verb to use as the men here assume a position of stasis, containment, and capture. 
What they gaze upon, however, escapes capture: 
as 
for the scandal of our abandonment 
in a universe of “sudden trembling love,” blondes 
being 
always 
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fatally 
reinscribed on an old cloth 
faintly, 
interminably 
undone, why  
does Plato 
call Necessity 
a “wandering cause” isn’t it because 
you can 
‘t 
tell where 
she got in? (D 63-4) 
 
The poem suggests that “blondes” (or Woman) have always been subordinated and pinned 
down permanently. As the speaker states, she is “always / fatally / reinscribed on an old cloth.” 
To inscribe is not only to write something down, but also to draw a figure within another so 
their boundaries do not touch. Woman, as we have discussed earlier, have always confounded 
borders and much has been done for their borders to be maintained. Here, “reinscribe” 
suggests that this task is done again and again, repeated throughout time. But, as the speaker 
points out, such dogma is problematic. Recalling the metaphor of the sieve, an image that 
embodies all that is problematic about women and their boundaries, it is uncertain “where / 
she got in” as well as how she gets out. The task of reinscribing or carving out a place for 
Woman is “faintly / interminably / undone.” Though it is deemed necessary – a “Necessity” as 
something that’s required according to logic or law – it is, as Plato describes it, a “wandering 
cause.” By the end of the poem, we see not an image of containment, but rupture, or “rip”: 
men steady on the rock 
now they have put that gilded night 
down 
a little rip in their minds. (D 64) 
 
Both “rip” and “rupture” are from the Proto-Indo-European root reup-, meaning “to snatch,” 
which is emblematic of the “banditry” or “looting” found in the sublime. The “little rip in their 
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minds” signals not only the escape of Woman, Vitti, and Sappho, but also the “rip,” or flaw, of 
a “gilded,” ideal, and impossible ideology. The final line suggests an elusion of masculine 
thought and capture.  
 Sappho appears again in Carson’s “TV Men” series, first published in Glass, Irony and 
God. An extended version was published in Men in the Off Hours, this time with an epigraph 
by Longinus: “TV makes things disappear. Oddly the word comes from Latin videre ‘to see’” 
(61). This, of course, is a fictional quote attributed to Longinus and even cited as coming from 
de Sublimitate, 5.3. Carson’s attribution is characteristic of her play with the archive as she 
undermines its veracity.  
In the case of Antonioni, we have the spilling cinematic gaze, or temps mort, in 
relation to the sublime. This time, Carson introduces television, which, as she points out, 
“comes from Latin videre ‘to see.’” Similar to “Ode to Monica Vitti” where we have a poem 
about how it is “to see” Vitti inscribed and “reinscribed,” in “TV Men: Sappho,” we have an 
example of another actress who also experiences masculine expectations: 
No one knows what the laws are. That there are laws 
we know, by the daily burnings if nothing else. 
On the second  
 
day of shooting in the Place de la Concorde 
I notice the leaves in the Jardin have changed 
overnight, 
 
but mention this to no one 
for fear of continuity problems. (MOH 62)  
 
Reminiscent of the “blondes” who are “always / fatally / reinscribed on an old cloth,” here we 
have Sappho as an actress who is aware of the “fear of continuity problems.” In this case, the 
problems with continuity are in the context of film (“On the second / day of shooting”), as 
well as the replacement of the ancient Greek landscape associated with Sappho for a 
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contemporary landscape of Paris (“Place de la Concorde,” “Jardin”). But we can also 
understand “continuity” to refer to time and the linear trajectory of history according to “laws.” 
Indeed, the presence of Sappho is indicative of discontinuity and transgression and is 
disruptive to the scene: 
I had already invalidated 16 (otherwise good) 
 
takes this morning by changing an earring. 
You cannot erase. 
Is this a law? 
 
No, a talent. To step obliquely 
where stones are sharp. 
Vice is also sharp. 
 
There are laws against vice. 
But the shock stays with you. (MOH 62) 
 
The first line of the poem, “No one knows what the laws are,” is self-aware and flippant. 
There are laws present, as the speaker knows, but what they are exactly remains a mystery 
(“That there are laws / we know, by the daily burnings if nothing else”). In fact, Sappho has 
already undermined these laws, or “invalidated” the filming, by her earring change. She 
continues to side with “vice” (from the Latin vitium meaning “defect, offense, blemish, 
imperfection”) by not mentioning the leaves that have “changed overnight.” While this can be 
considered a playful anachronistic poem where Carson recasts the ancient poet as a modern 
day actress, there are elements here that point to a larger commentary on Sappho and her 
reception. Indeed, the shooting, or recording, of the subject recalls another form of recording, 
one that is archival and historical. The desire to abide by the laws and repeat the shoot as to 
keep it synonymous to the first day is in line with a desire for order, coherence, and “presence.” 
However, Sappho, who “step[s] obliquely” into the scene, notes the impossibility of such a 
recording. Her changed earring has already “invalidated” sixteen takes, but, more importantly, 
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the changed leaves hint at a perpetual disturbance that lurks in the background. The 
disturbance already happened, and will continue to happen as the leaves continue to change, 
thus rendering a perfect take impossible. This detail, noticed by the speaker, is something she 
intentionally does not mention. As she puts it: “There are laws against vice.” 
 The conceit of film in these poems is useful in depicting the “staging” of Woman. 
Carson highlights the artificial and premeditated arrangement of traditional perceptions of 
females, as well as the desire to maintain consistency via the careful filming of Sappho. 
However, the “performance” and compliance of the women are undermined; there is a 
knowingness in the tone of both speakers: one calls Necessity a “wandering cause,” the other 
notes that though there are “laws against vice / … the shock stays with you.” In both poems 
there is the dilemma of repeatability – that is, repeatability associated with sameness, as 
opposed to a repeating of a subject in new and different contexts. In “Ode to Monica Vitti” 
there is the “reinscribing” of “blondes,” and in “TV Men: Sappho,” we have the “16 takes.” 
But both instances are also followed by counter-actions, as suggested by the words “undone” 
in the first poem and “invalidated” in the second. The desire to control and repeat is 
accompanied by some rupture that prevents it from being done. We finish instead with “a little 
rip” or “shock” – ultimately, a difference.  
Why is this important? A helpful entry into this is the fictional quote Carson provides 
at the beginning of the chapter: “TV makes things disappear. Oddly the word comes from 
Latin videre ‘to see’” (MOH 61). It is useful to read this in conjunction with the original 
passage of Longinus’s treatise on the sublime from which she claims this quote is culled: “All 
these undignified faults spring up in literature from a single cause, the craving for intellectual 
novelties, on which, above all else, our own generation goes wild” (Section 5, Trans. Prickard, 
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10). Here Longinus addresses the desire for novelty in writing, which may generate both vice 
and virtue in composition; he goes on to say: “It would almost be true to say that the sources 
of all the good in us are also the sources of all the bad.” Carson reinterprets this loosely via the 
image of the television. The contrary predicament of “good” and “bad” in novelty is 
embedded in the etymology of “Television.” “Tele,” meaning “far off, afar, at or to a distance,” 
and “videre” (“to see”) pulls the word in opposite directions, as the prefix strains the sense of 
sight. “Television” is “to see,” but to see at a distance. Carson makes the leap to say: “TV 
makes things disappear.” The “TV Men” poems are indeed a “disappearance” of known 
historical and literary figures. In place, Carson “replays” novelty in her depiction of not only 
Sappho, but also figures such as Artaud, Tolstoy, Lazarus, Antigone, and Akhmatova. What 
she continually seeks out is novelty. As she states in “TV Men: Lazarus”:  
Each time I have to  
raise my slate and say 
“Take 12!” or “Take 13!” and then “Take 14!” 
I cannot restrain a shudder. 
Repetition is horrible.36 (MOH 89-90)  
 
How else can we understand television? In the same poem, Carson meditates on this word 
explicitly and at length: 
if   
God’s gift is simply random, well 
for one thing  
it makes a  
more interesting TV show. God’s choice can be seen emerging 
from the dark of reason 
 
like a new planet. No use being historical 
                                                
36 Carson discusses her own experience with acting. See Burt (“Poetry Without Borders”): “The process is just dehumanizing 
… the thing with TV is that nothing happens right the first time, and you have to do it over and over and over. We did that 26 
times, into traffic, saying the same things, and the worst part of it is not the death-defying scenario itself but having to repeat 
your own language. Nothing deadens language like repetition. So you write a sentence and you really like it and you have it in 
your mind and then you say it once, twice, three times. By the seventh time it's just the worst sentence in the world and then 
you hate it and you have to go on to number 26” (56). 
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about this planet, 
it is just an imitation. 
As Lazarus is an imitation of Christ. As TV is an imitation of 
Lazarus. As you and I are an imitation of 
 
TV. Already you notice that 
although I am merely  
a director of photography, 
I have grasped certain fundamental notions first advanced by Plato, 
e.g. that our reality is just a TV set 
 
inside a TV set inside a TV set, with nobody watching 
but Sokrates, 
who changed 
the channel in 399 B.C. (MOH 88-9)  
 
TV takes on a Platonic dimension and we gain a different understanding as to the importance 
of “videre,” and the reality we see. The world as we sense it, according to Plato, is a moving 
image of the pure and eternal world of the Forms. Carson literalizes Plato’s allegory by 
transforming the cave to the televisual medium, which mediates images, or representations of 
“reality.” Prisoners (or TV viewers) mistake shadows on the wall for reality. This, too, is a 
seeing “at a distance,” as those in the cave are unable to turn their heads at the object, but can 
only view the object’s shadow as it passes in front of a fire. 
 Thus, through television, Carson works creatively within the parameters of novelty, as 
suggested by Longinus, and imitation, according to Plato. Sappho fits within this framework 
as an actress who undergoes multiple shoots (repeating her character, her lines) but because 
each take is imperfect, it is a repetition with a difference, thus, making each “take” new. In 
“Irony is Not Enough,” the narrator asks, “After all why study the past? Because you may 
wish to repeat it” (MOH 122). Indeed, Carson’s use of the classical past is both in part 
imitation, as well as innovation. 
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The final poem of the “TV Men” chapter also depicts Sappho, again assuming the role 
of an actress. Here Carson overlays the action of the filming with Sappho’s fragment 31. 
Similar to poems such as “Sumptuous Destitution,” where Carson plays with alternating 
voices and “braids” fragments from letters by Emily Dickinson with her own words, here 
Carson draws particular attention to Sappho’s protean quality alongside the incompletion of 
her corpus: 
Sappho is smearing on her makeup at 5 a.m. in the woods by the hotel. 
He She Me You Thou disappears 
 
Now resembling a Beijing concubine Sappho makes her way onto the set. 
Laugh Breathe Look Speak Is disappears 
 
The lighting men are setting up huge white paper moons here and there on the grass. 
Tongue Flesh Fire Eyes Sound disappears 
 
Behind these, a lamp humming with a thousand broken wasps. 
Cold Shaking Green Little Death disappears 
 
Places everyone, calls the director. 
Nearness When Down In I disappears 
 
Toes to the line please, says the assistant cameraman. 
But All And Must To disappears 
 
Action! 
Disappear disappears 
 
Sappho stares into the camera and begins, Since I am a poor man – 
Cut (MOH 118) 
 
Textual leakage spills onto the scene of action. The second line in each couplet echoes and 
corresponds to each stanza of Sappho’s fragment 31 as preserved for us by Longinus. 
Compare, for example, the lines “Tongue Flesh Fire Eyes Sound” and “Cold Shaking Green 
Little Death” with the third and fourth stanzas of the fragment: 
no: tongue breaks and thin 
fire is racing under skin 
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and in eyes no sight and drumming  
fills ears  
 
and cold sweat holds me and shaking 
grips me all, greener than grass 
I am and dead – or almost 
I seem to me (INW 63; emphasis mine) 
 
The fragment is atomized into its recognizable elements. As the poem progresses, we also 
follow the fragment’s progression, but while the action of the framing poem is one of 
appearance (Sappho “smear[s] on her make up” and “makes her way onto the set”), the 
incorporated fragment is one of disappearance, each atomized stanza punctuated with the 
word “disappears.” This poem best exemplifies what Carson means when she says, “TV 
makes things disappear,” as it strains in opposite directions. We “see” Sappho as she makes 
herself more present for the film, all the while her lines from fragment 31 recede. The poem 
becomes palimpsestic. The staging of the marriage ritual in the fragment withdraws, making 
room for the staging of a new scene: when the director calls out “Action!” the final remnant of 
the fragment goes (“disappear Disappears”).  
 Longinus preserves this poem and quotes four complete Sapphic stanzas and what 
remains of the first line of the next stanza: “But all is to be dared, because even a person of 
poverty” (INW 63). As Carson notes in If Not, Winter: “the first verse of what looks like a fifth 
stanza … breaks off, no one knows why” (364). What do we do with the residue? It too is 
incorporated into Carson’s poem and echoed by the Sappho-actress in the penultimate line: 
“Since I am a poor man.” Carson’s Sappho, whose monologue begins with “a poor man,” 
picks up where the speaker in the fragment left off, contemplating “a person of poverty.” The 
director’s call at the very end of the poem (“Cut”) refers to the end of the filming as well as 
the end of the fragment. In “Dirt and Desire,” the speaker states: “Sappho is one of those 
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people of whom the more you see the less you know” (MOH 152), and we finish the poem 
with a strong sense of incompletion and abruption. While Carson imaginatively brings the 
ancient poet closer, there is still the sense of omission. Sappho remains a space where, as 
Reynolds states, something can be made out of nothing (2). 
  Carson also incorporates part of Sappho’s fragment 31 in the poem, “Mia Moglie 
(Longinus’s Red Desert),” where she weaves three different texts together. As the title 
indicates, Carson incorrectly assigns Antonioni’s film, Red Desert (also starring Monica Vitti), 
to Longinus – a gesture similar to her attributing the fictional quote to Longinus in “TV Men.” 
Here, too, the Sapphic fragment “leaks” into the poem. Each word from the phrase “greener 
than grass and dead almost I seem to me” (which comes from the fourth stanza of fragment 
31) appears consecutively in every third line. Every second line is clipped from section 10 of 
Longinus’s treatise, in which he discusses and praises the Sapphic fragment: 
For instance, Sappho everywhere chooses the emotions that attend delirious passion 
from its accompaniments in actual life. Wherein does she demonstrate her supreme 
excellence? In the skill with which she selects and binds together the most striking and 
vehement circumstances of passion … Are you not amazed at how at one instant she 
summons, as though they were all alien from herself and dispersed, soul, body, ears, 
tongue, eyes, colour? Uniting contradictions, she is, at one and the same time, hot and 
cold, in her senses and out of her mind, for she is either terrified or at the point of death. 
The effect desired is that not one passion only should be seen in her, but a concourse of 
passions. (Trans. Rhys Roberts 69-71) 
Carson gives us a polyvocal arrangement, in which the reading of the poem is part puzzle, part 
mosaic. Longinus’s words are indicated in Carson’s poem by quotation marks. Sappho’s 
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words are italicized and in a different font. The remaining words belong, presumably, to 
Carson, or the “primary” speaker of the poem. Like Longinus, Carson also “skates” from 
quote to quote. The words, plucked from their original passages, are forced to work in new 
ways in the poem and take on new meanings:  
A caught woman is something the movies want to believe in. 
 “For instance, Sappho,” as Longinus says. 
 
  greener	  
 
Caught from within, she has somehow got the Sublime inside her. 
 “As though these could combine and form one body.” 
 
   than	  
 
Her body vibrates, she is always cold, there is a certain 
 cold industrial noise, she is also hot, has stuck a thermometer 
 
    grass	  
 
under her arm and forgotten it and at the wall she turns glistening, 
 aghast: your prey. “Are you not amazed?” (D 67) 
 
I have already combined Vitti and Sappho as one figure in my reading of “Ode to Monica 
Vitti.” “Mia Moglie” also brings the two women together. Sappho is another example of “a 
caught woman” (or the woman inscribed in cloth) that the movies would like to “believe in.” 
But what does it mean when we consider what movies depict and “believe in”? It is suggested 
that the movies, too, are nothing other than the “TV set” reality, where everything is an 
imitation of everything else, and reality is nothing more than a TV set inside another TV set 
viewed by no one. “A caught woman,” of course, is a woman who can be contained, captured, 
inscribed, and controlled. But, as the next stanza makes clear, the woman is not caught without, 
but “caught within.” The violent bodily sensations the woman in this poem experiences are 
indicative of the sublime, which is invested in “intensity” (Longinus, Trans. Prickard 27). Her 
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body, which “is always cold” and “also hot,” is reminiscent of Sappho’s speaker who notes the 
“fire racing under skin” and “cold sweat.” Later in the poem we see a more explicit connection 
between Sappho and Vitti: 
In the clinic she met a girl whose problem was she wanted everything. 
 Bolts of everything hit the table. 
 
      seem	  
	  
Now she is well she says of this girl who has turned out to be herself. 
“Sublimity is the echo of a great soul.” 
 
       to	  me (D 68) 
 
The girl who “want[s] everything” refers to the previous poem, “Ode to the Sublime by 
Monica Vitti,” in which the speaker (Vitti) states: “I want everything. / Everything is a naked 
thought that strikes” (D 63). Seeing its echo here further adjoins Sappho and Vitti – if not their 
persons, then their condition of ekstasis. The Sapphic line “greener than grass I am and dead 
almost I seem to me” has been what Carson describes as “ekstasis, literally ‘standing outside 
oneself’ … a condition regarded by the Greeks as typical of mad persons, geniuses and lovers 
and ascribed to poets by Aristotle” (161). Ekastasis, or ecstasy, as Longinus asserts, is also the 
aim of the Sublime in language (Trans. Prickard 1).37 The speaker of Sappho’s poem observes 
herself from outside her own body. She is, as Longinus describes her, “in her senses and out of 
her mind.” In “Mia Moglie,” Carson provides another instance of someone “standing outside 
oneself”: the “she” in this poem meets a girl (in a “clinic,” presumably a mental institution) 
who “turn[s] out to be herself.” 
                                                
37 See Longinus (Trans. Prickard): “For it is not to persuasion but to ecstasy that passages of extraordinary genius carry the 
hearer: now the marvelous, with its power to amaze, is always and necessarily stronger than that which seeks to persuade and 
please” (2). 
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 Ekstasis, or ecstasy, is to cross a border, to step outside of one’s being. Carson points 
this out in her discussion of how women tamper with borders via their voices, putting outside 
what was once inside: “Female sound was judged to arise in craziness and to generate 
craziness” (GIG 128). To confound the borders of oneself is, in short, mad.38 Carson also 
reiterates this state of ecstasy in her depiction of Akhmatova in the “TV Men” series: 
Borders trembled all around her. 
She saw friends by now gone mad with wolvish grins. 
“This is some terrible mistake.” (MOH 108) 
 
and Artaud in the same series: 
Artaud is mad. 
He stayed close to the madness. Watching it breathe or not breathe. 
There is a close-up of me driven to despair. (MOH 73) 
 
Borders, madness, and ecstasy find themselves again in this poem and its intricate composition 
finishes on, fittingly, a note of crazy: “What is that antenna for? she asks a man. To listen to 
the noise / of stars –” (D 68). 
This poem is challenging and rich in its layers, which are philosophical, poetic, and 
cinematic. Sappho’s fragment is an entry into sublimity defined by Longinus as “the echo of a 
great soul.” The echoes are internal to the poem (the “echo” of souls between Vitti and 
Sappho) as well as external (Carson’s own reference to her own work, and the reappearance of 
the ancient poet). Carson further ruptures Sappho’s fragment and sets it in dialogue with her 
own poem, as well as with ancient literary criticism. We “spill” from Carson to Vitti to 
Sappho to Longinus, making off with someone else’s point of view. Carson plunders multiple 
boundaries and, in doing so, illustrates the “madness” of the text and the “documentary 
                                                
38 In the final chapter, I will bring up madness again, but this time in relation to the demented Father, eros, and the archive. 
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technique” of the sublime. To be touched by the sublime, or “caught within,” is to also 
undergo ekstasis as experienced by the speaker in fragment 31 and in “Mia Moglie.”  
According to Carson, “You have to admire the mad. They know how to value a 
passionate moment. So does Longinus. … [the end of] the manuscript of On the Sublime 
breaks off. The next page is too damaged to read and after that you cannot say how much is 
missing. Longinus skates away” (D 50). In the poems I have examined in which Sappho 
makes an appearance, however explicit or spectral, her presence indicates incompletion, 
elusiveness, and madness.  Extending “Sappho” to also mean “Woman” is certainly suggested 
by Carson, but more broadly, “Sappho” is an opportunity to demonstrate what Carson means 
when she says, “Consider incompleteness as a verb” (PW 16). Carson’s metaphor of television 
and cinema is an apt metaphor to play and replay Sappho, as well as to spotlight the ways in 
which poetry attempts to capture, record, and realize the ancient poet, her fragmented corpus, 
and history, which is, ultimately, inconclusive.  
The final poem I want to turn to is from Carson’s chapter, “Sublimes.” “Blended Text,” 
as the title indicates, blends Carson and Sappho as she interprets Sappho’s line from fragment 
31: “for when I look at you, a moment, then no speaking / is left in me”: 
You have captured:   pinned upon 
my heart:    the wall of my heart is your love 
with one glance:    as one 
with one bead:    as an exile of the kings of royalty 
of your eyes:     my heart 
you have something of mine:   a torn thing 
again the moon:    now 
the rule:     (who knows) (D 79) 
 
In this poem Carson takes the documentary technique of “sublime spillage” to the extreme. 
While “Mia Moglie” threads together three separate but unified and distinct texts (Carson, 
Sappho, Longinus), reading it linearly is also following and reconciling three different 
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temporal and poetic strands. In this case, words become material. Textual rupture leads to 
chaos and the poem offers a horizontal reading (jumping from column to column in a line) as 
well as a vertical reading. Sappho’s line, recognizably rephrased in the left column, is “a torn 
thing.” The final phrases in the poem (“the rule:” “(who knows)”) suggest that there is no rule 
for the arrangement and reading of the text. The “rule,” or “law,” is unknown or tentative, and 
the poem finishes with uncertainty. Carson (and Sappho), once again, leaves us without an 
ending, just a parenthetical dismissal that basically tells us nothing at all. The lack of 
boundaries in this seemingly brief poem renders it incomplete and inexhaustible in its reading. 
Carson, I would say, puts it best when she describes the condition of ekstasis in fragment 
31:“ecstasy is just a means to an end. Unfortunately we don’t reach the end, the poem breaks 
off. But we do see Sappho begin to turn towards it, towards this unreachable end” (D 161).  
 
Conclusion 
“Experiments, seeing how much can be left out and still make sense.”  
 –Anne Carson (di Michele 12) 
 
“What holes, and made of what?”  
 –Anne Carson (MOH 70, 73) 
 
 
In “The Anthropology of Water,” Carson writes: “I am not a person who feels easy talking 
about blood or desire. I rarely use the word woman myself” (PW 189). When asked about this 
passage and her relationship with the word “woman,” Carson states: “A relationship of dis-
ease” (di Michele 10). “Woman” marks a gendered relationship of “dis-ease” for Carson, but it 
is also a marker of poetic resistance (a negation of “ease”), as well as a condition of illness 
(what she has also called “madness”). Sappho is in many ways a suitable index for Carson’s 
anxieties. Through “Sappho,” Carson can – as many other women writers have done – 
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approach subjects of desire and Woman, but it is Sappho’s absent corpus that persists and 
implicates a poetics of error and rupture. “Sappho” indicates a perpetual lack (she is a “space,” 
“distant sightings,” “rumour”) that accounts and conditions much of the difficult layers, leaps, 
and “holes” in Carson’s own poetry. As she asserts, “Sometimes you come to an edge that just 
breaks off” (PW 191). 
 In the next chapter, I shall discuss Nox and the thematics of absence in Carson’s 
personal life: the death of her brother, Michael. This loss, however, is not intimately 
associated with Sappho, but another ancient poet: Catullus. Again, Carson’s access to the 
classical past sets up a platform on which she resigns herself to the tasks of grief and 
translation – the agenda of a melancholy poetics. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
“Overtakelessness”: The Archive, Grief, and Translation in Nox 
 
 
“Archives do not record experience so much as its absence; they mark the point where 
an experience is missing from its proper place, and what is returned to us in an 
archive may well be something we never possessed in the first place.” 
 –Sven Spieker (The Big Archive 3) 
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Anne Carson’s engagement with the classical past, figured by Sappho, can be understood in 
terms of “rupture,” “leakage, “spillage,” and “residue.” For Carson, antiquity does not simply 
reside at a point of commencement; rather, it survives and “leaks” into new and future texts. 
Particular to Carson’s treatment of the past is her predilection for the absent, the fragmentary, 
and the useable. The residue of the classical archive becomes an opportunity to make 
imaginative leaps and to dwell in speculation and error. Most crucial to Carsonian poetics is a 
resistance to available categories – primarily “the past” and “the present.” The emptiness, or 
loss, surrounding an ancient fragment troubles notions of borders, boundaries, and frames. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, these formal ruptures present themselves in Carson’s poetic 
treatment of history, translation, and genre.  
 In this chapter, I shall turn to Nox – a text that aptly illustrates the terms I have 
established. In Nox, we see “spillage” materialized as Carson adapts Catullus’s elegy to her 
own fragmentary and familial history. The physical production of the book exemplifies 
Carson’s straying from set categories of genre, as she collects, interweaves, and layers a 
miscellany of scraps from the past. This chapter will continue my study of the accidental 
“spills” and “leaks” in Carson’s work, but will now focus on the archival and material 
dimensions of history.  
 
Nocturnal Materiality 
Carson once said in an interview that she never thought of herself as a writer: “I don’t know 
what I do yet. I know that I have to make things. And it’s a convenient form we have in our 
culture, the book, in which you can make stuff, but it’s becoming less and less satisfying” 
(Burt 56). It is unsurprising to discover that Carson’s recent elegy to her brother, Nox, is 
  124 
published not as a book, but produced in another form more to her satisfaction: a box which 
contains (or “coffins”) a long pleated page of fragments. 
Like much of Carson’s work, Nox is a text that does not fit within available generic 
categories. Part literary text, part art object, Nox has been described as “a pastiche of 
numbered entries” (Stang), “a tactile and visual delight” (Martinuik), and a “diversion from 
our expectations” (Bradshaw). In accordance with the book’s many pleats, Nox is a layered 
text that implicates translation, history, and grief while entangling languages, time, and 
memories. Carson’s intentions, too, are many as she describes her processes of translating 
Catullus, memorializing her brother, and understanding history.  
As Abigail Deutsch states, “Nothing could prepare you for Nox.” Deutsch’s statement 
suggests that Nox’s form is novel, but it is important to point out that it is not the first book of 
its kind. Like Carson’s other works that have a modernist bent, Nox finds a formal predecessor 
in the 1913 collaboration between poet Blaise Cendrars and painter Sonia Delaunay. The 
poetic experiment of La Prose du Transsibérien et de la petite Jehanne de France is described 
as 
a unique book-object with its pages illustrated by Sonia Delaunay … the Delaunays 
had been experimenting with “simultaneism” since 1912, and this beautiful art book 
was to be the “first simultaneous book.” It consists of a single sheet of paper folded up 
like an accordion in 22 panels that, when laid flat, total a length of 2 meters. Hence the 
entire run of 150 issues would reach the height of the Eiffel Tower, if one were to paste 
them together. The right-hand side of the pages contain the text of a free verse poem 
whose divisions are marked by coloured half-pages … The left-hand side is painted, 
and looks like semi-abstract forms in bright primary colors. (Rabaté 60-1) 
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Robert and Sonia Delaunay adopted the term “simultanéisme” from The Law of the 
Simultaneous Contrast of Colors (1839), a scientific treatise by Michel Eugène Chevreul. 
Chevreul, a chemist, systemized colours according to the “laws of the harmony of contrasts” 
and the “laws of the harmony of analogy.” From his theories, Robert Delaunay discovered that 
opposing complementary colors, when beside each other, appear brighter and more vivid. 
Together, contrasting colours intensify the field. The two-way influences between opposing 
colours create a “vibration” in the viewer’s eye and Delaunay understood this phenomenon as 
“movement and rhythm … appropriate to a modern society in motion” (Düchting 35). The 
collaboration between Cendrars and Delaunay was the “first simultaneous book” in the sense 
that the book is neither a poem, nor a painting, but is to be both read and viewed. The right 
hand side containing the text “vibrates” with the left hand side containing the abstract coloured 
forms. We engage with Prose “laterally and then as a whole” (Rabaté 61). 
From Cendrars-Delaunay book, we acquire a concept of structural “simultanéisme.” 
Simultaneity implies time, or the occurrence of two events within the same frame of time. 
Carson, indeed, offers her own temporal vibration, but in her case, explores the resonance 
between two losses from two different periods: antiquity, as suggested by the presence of 
Catullus, and another more recent history belonging to Carson. Like the Cendrars-Delauney 
book in which the left and right hand side of the fold are to be read and viewed together, Nox 
offers a similar method of reading. As Neil Corcoran notes, “The necessity that we read both 
texts more or less simultaneously means that our reading is constantly interrupted or disrupted 
by oscillations of attention” (376; emphasis mine). The interruptions, disruptions, and 
oscillations take place between the left hand side of Nox’s pages, which contains indexical 
entries for each Latin word in Catullus’s Elegy 101, and the right hand side, which contains 
  126 
fragments pertaining to a personal and familial history. Together, the two distinct events find 
an intersection in grief. 
Another important aspect of Chevreul’s law of simultanéisme is the spatial adjacency 
of elements. In Chevreul’s case, colours are not only viewed at the same time, but are placed 
side by side. Adjacency for Carson plays a critical role in the production of Nox as she 
positions, side by side, a variety of cultural products: translation, palimpsests, autobiography, 
memoir, letters, found art, and photography. The box form highlights the spatial and temporal 
miscellany of Carson’s fragments. We may imagine how a box of fragments may be “read” 
(and “misread”) according to the order by which each artefact is pulled out, or the way we 
piece them together. Carson, too, understands the poetics of adjacency found in a box of 
fragments. As she writes in Autobiography of Red, “The fragment numbers tell you roughly 
how the pieces fell out of the box” (6-7).  
However, a box of fragments resists linearity and is rarely kept in order. It leads to 
arbitrary and surprising juxtapositions. Carson goes on to say in Autobiography of Red: “You 
can of course keep shaking the box … Here. Shake” (6-7). Adjacency, then, is always at risk 
of losing its common side. As much as we may perceive the intersections of grief and memory 
among the fragments in Nox, we also make out the gaps and artful randomness that we would 
expect a box of fragments to contain. A perfect example of interstices that, in fact, structures 
Nox, is the appearance of Carson’s fragments within the spaces between each Latin word of 
Catullus’s elegy. This structure is as much a poetics of adjacency as it is a poetics of 
interstices. Indeed, as rich as Nox is, there is a plenitude of absence, evidenced by the white 
spaces of the page, the loss in translation, and the loss of a sibling. 
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The structure of adjacency that informs Nox allows Carson to collocate grief, history, 
and translation. These reciprocally related elements are coordinates in what Benjamin would 
call a “constellative” array.1 For Benjamin, the poet, or “aesthetic engineer,” creates an object 
of art, or constellation, by “juxtapos[ing] disparate and despised artefacts, forms, and media, 
so as to generate an electrifying tension, an explosive illumination of elements in the present” 
(Gilloch 4). Similar to Chevreul’s contrasting colours that appear more vivid when next to 
each other, these juxtapositions also result in an “explosive illumination.”  
Benjamin’s “constellation” suggests that artefacts, or “dusty, derelict things” (Gilloch 
5), are not implanted in the past, but may be plucked out and rearticulated in the present, 
particularly as they relate to other objects. Carson, too, shares Benjamin’s concern with history 
in Nox, in which she uses materials of antiquity as part of the constellation of Michael. The 
simultaneous and adjacent qualities of Benjamin’s constellation exist in the “flash” through 
which it is perceived: 
It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on 
what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash 
with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. 
For while the relation of the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what-
has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural [bildlich]. Only 
dialectical images are genuinely historical … (Benjamin, AP 463) 
                                                
1 Graeme Gilloch, in Walter Benjamin: Critical Constellations (2002), describes Benjamin’s concept of “constellation” as 
such: “It is the time in which the object is subject to transformations and interventions which recognize its significance and 
‘actualize’ its potential: translation, transcription, imitation, criticism, appropriation, (re)construction, reproduction, 
remembrance, redemption. These are precisely the tasks of Benjamin's ‘aesthetic engineer.’ Objects, edifices, texts and images 
are fragmented, broken and blasted from their usual contexts so that they may be painstakingly recomposed in critical 
contemporary constellations. The eclectic engineer juxtaposes disparate and despised artefacts, forms and media, so as to 
generate an electrifying tension, an explosive illumination of elements in the present” (4). 
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In order to elucidate the constellative array constituted by grief, history, and translation, I will 
point out the generic, visual, and linguistic dimensions of Nox and argue that the 
juxtapositions and tensions found within and between each other participate in not only 
expressing the loss of Michael, but also loss in language and history. The grief felt for Michael 
is, simultaneously, grief for what is lost in translation and what is lost in the process of 
archiving.  
Fragopoulos states, “what Carson finally accedes to is the very darkness of it all” 
(emphasis mine). I end the chapter by arguing that what we understand about the “very 
darkness” of Michael’s death (what Carson terms “nox”) may be carried over, simultaneously, 
to her exploration of adjacent subjects. “Nox” extends from a private grief to encompass, 
more publicly and openly, loss in translation and the archive.  
  
Dead Spaces: Epitaphs and Archives 
Both the epitaph and the archive are conceptual figurations that concern themselves with, 
broadly speaking, history, people, or events long passed. They are “haunted” by the dead, 
inhabited by absence, and created to memorialize the past. The paradoxical objective of both 
forms is revealed in the following observations, by Carson on the epitaph and Carolyn 
Steedman on the archive: 
Carson:  
“No genre of verse is more profoundly concerned with seeing what is not there, and 
not seeing what is, than that of the epitaph” (Economy 73). 
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Steedman:  
“Historians read for what is not there: the silences and the absences of the documents 
always speak to us” (151). 
In both forms, one may “read” and “see” what is absent, but what is actually made present is 
the place of absence, or the lacuna. As a historian, Steedman is responsive to how silence and 
absence “speak”; what is not there is given voice. Carson’s use of “not,” however, is less clear. 
Similar to Steedman’s observation, the epitaphic verse pertains to seeing what is “not there” 
but is also concerned with “not seeing what is.” What does it mean for Carson to not see what 
is there (and vice versa)?  
In Chapter 1, I discussed the importance of negation (“no,” “not”) used by Sappho in 
her depiction of death in fragment 55. Correspondingly, “not” is a fitting paragram for a 
project such as Nox. The undoing of this “knot” between seeing and not seeing, presence and 
absence, life and death, as well as the impossible (“not”) possibility of unravelling these issues 
is at the crux of Nox. To begin, it would be useful to examine the physical formation of the 
book and how it fails as a self-described “epitaph,” and how I propose to approach it: as a 
representation of an archive. 
Carson’s method of composition in Nox has frequently been referred to as 
“scrapbooking.”2 Scrapbooking is no doubt the modern archival practice to which we can 
liken Carson’s conservation (or the representation of conservation), and little has been said on 
the text as forming an archive in itself. Indeed, scrapbooking is an activity determined by 
decisions on what gets in and what stays out. When discussing Nox as an archive, we can also 
consider Carson as an archivist who decides what is excluded and what is included in the text.  
                                                
2 See Bradshaw, Stang, Hamilton, Fragopoulos, O’Rourke, Anderson (“Family Album”), Deutsch. 
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 The box-container is an appropriate construction for defining the inside from the 
outside. A box is a coffer, or storage box, that can be locked and held secret from some, or 
unlocked and accessed by others. A box can also be a container that is closed once, never to be 
opened again, as in the case with a coffin, sarcophagus, or, what Carson calls a “deathbox” 
(“Now What” 45). When reading Nox, readers get the thrill of opening something that is at 
once valuable but not intended for them. They open a box – the “deathbox” of Michael – 
containing a private assemblage (the reproduction of Carson’s notebook). 
On the outside of the box-container, Nox is labeled an epitaph. Carson describes the 
literary work as an “epitaph … in the form of a book.”3 We may say that the text inside ought 
to generate an epitaph, but such a thing is impossible. Indeed, the further Carson moves from 
pith and concision, the more it fails to serve as an epitaphic statement. Rather, Nox generously 
provides testimonials and fragments sourced from a variety of figures such as Carson, her 
mother, Michael, his widow, Catullus, and Hekataios. Despite the large size of the book, a 
lack of clarity in portraying Michael accompanies the abundance of fragments. Nox provides a 
rich, visual experience of sifting through textual and photographic evidence of a personal past 
and even seduces the reader with scraps of paper that are attractively tactile. Between the folds, 
we are situated in a space of varying tensions between the past and the present, the dead and 
the living, the spectral and the real. Just as in Short Talks where the speaker loses words and 
writes in order to make present what has gone, Nox endeavours to explore the nature of 
absence and presence.  
Absence is represented in the visual assemblage of the book. Fragments of letters and 
photographs, impressions of a strongly pressed pen, the white page that surrounds and 
                                                
3 There are other instances in Carson’s oeuvre in which she “plays” with the epitaph, such as the seven epitaphic poems in 
Men in the Off Hours. See also Erin Wunker (28-32). 
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overwhelms each scrap, and the charcoal rubbings that emphasize negative space, amplify 
Michael’s absence. Yet it is not only Michael’s death with which Carson must contend, but his 
long estrangement as well. His physical absence, felt by Carson for much of her life, is 
foregrounded; Michael is not merely a dead figure, but a fugitive figure whose presence (and, 
conversely, absence) is constantly felt. I use “fugitive” not only to refer to his running away 
from the police in 1978 (N 2.2), but to the quality of constant movement and Carson’s (and 
thus our) resultant difficulty in bringing him into focus.4 Michael is always in motion and out 
of grasp. He is someone who is continually leaving and whose return is anticipated. What we 
perceive of Michael are suggestions or metonymical traces of his presence: the cigarette butted 
“in a frying pan on the stove” (5.4); his dog who, following Michael’s death, becomes 
overcome with anger (1.2); or his final disappearance in the stairway. We also catch hints of 
Michael’s potential but thwarted return such as the laconic telephone conversations he has 
with Carson in which “all the years and time that had passed over him [come] streaming” (5.2), 
or the sound of a car for which his mother always listens hopefully.  
To engage with the epitaph and the archive is to engage with traces of the dead. 
However, we must distinguish the epitaph from the archive, as they are distinct forms of 
cultural meaning. The former is an element of the latter. To understand this distinction in the 
most literal terms, the epitaph is limited to a tombstone, whereas the archive is an ongoing 
collection. One formalizes mourning’s rituals; the other is much more amorphous and far less 
aware of its purpose. In Carson’s consideration of Simonides, a composer of epitaphs, she 
states that the “epitaphic contract” (Economy 74) is a metaphor for exchange, involving a 
transaction between a death on a battlefield and a life on a monument. Death, too, lurks in the 
                                                
4 Due to Nox not having page numbers, I will cite using the passage numbers Carson provides. 
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archive. As Steedman points out, “dust” not only refers to the bacteriological occupational 
hazards that arose in artisanal and scholarly professions in the early nineteenth century, but 
also the metaphorical dust of the dead that Michelet describes from his days in the archives.5 
Much like the epitaphic contract described by Carson, the archive also poses a transaction 
between life and death, the archivist and the documents.6 Death resides in both the epitaph and 
the archive, but the epitaph is, more precisely, an archival instance that functions as a 
memento mori. Carson states, “A poet’s task is to carry the transaction forward, from those 
who can no longer speak to those who may yet read (and must yet die)” (Economy 75). I 
would argue that the archive, in its larger economy, also shares this call to remember, but the 
practice of reading and the practice of memory in the epitaph and archive differ in their 
relationship to time. 
Like the epitaph, the archive is a “space of exchange between present and past by 
gaining a purchase on memory” (Economy 85). Just as the epitaph inscribes memory into 
stone, transforming it to become a substrate for commemoration, the archive is also a space 
that receives and organizes historical documents and shapes them into something like 
memory.7 It is crucial to point out that though the epitaph and the archive are configurations of 
memory, the epitaph is a present inscription that refers to a past life, whereas the archive is a 
present collection intended for a future life. The epitaph is written to honour the dead; the 
monument’s purpose is “to insert a dead and vanished past into the present” (73). The archive 
                                                
5 See Steedman (Dust 27): “We are forced to consider whether it was not life that [Michelet] breathed … but death, that he 
took into himself with each lungful of dust.”  
6 Steedman goes on to say, “a symbiosis between the historian and History … This ingested History was also Death” (27). 
7 Steedman clarifies the long use of the archive as a metaphor for human memory and states: “An archive may indeed take in 
stuff, heterogeneous undifferentiated stuff … texts, documents, data … and order them by the principles of unification and 
classification. This stuff, reordered, remade, then emerges some would say like a memory – when someone needs to find it, or 
just simply needs it, for new and current purposes” (68; emphasis mine). 
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is always created for the living, with the intention of providing a chronicle for future archivists 
and historians.8  
Carson’s description of Nox as an “epitaph” is obviously a metaphor. Indeed, this is 
not a literal epitaph that is traditionally written upon (epi-) the tomb (taphos). Such an 
inscription for Michael is not possible, as Carson makes clear, for lack of a) a body and b) a 
tomb. When her parents died, she was able to bury them. In the case of her estranged brother, 
this is not an option:  
I buried [my parents’] ashes under a stone cut with their names. For my brother I had 
no choice, I was a thousand miles away. His widow says he wanted to be cast in the 
sea, so she did this. There is no stone and as I say he had changed his name. (N 5.6) 
Carson describes the epitaph as a marker of a dead body; it is a “σωµα that becomes a σηµα, a 
body that is made into a sign” (Economy 73). Furthermore, even if there were a stone for the 
body, the name would be incorrect, marking another error. To add to this double bind of an 
absent corpse and a false identity, there is the temporal distance between Michael’s 
disappearance and death, and the physical distance between his death and Carson: “I was a 
thousand miles away … his death came wandering slowly towards me across the sea” (N 5.6-
6.1). What I want to emphasize in this image is the irretrievability of the body. “[H]is death” 
that wanders in is a figure of a ghost, or the slow arrival of bad news. In her study of collage 
poetics, Vanderhart claims that Ian Rae’s comparison of Carson to the ancient Egyptian 
goddess Isis, who gathered and assembled Osiris’s body parts, is apt as “the recovered body in 
                                                
8 The archive’s investment in conserving history for futurity brings up some unanswerable questions. Given that this is a 
reproduction of Carson’s notebook, for whom is this facsimile of an archive assembled? Who will be there to remember? Is 
the reader invoked as the supplement for a familial future – a Carson-to-come? Perhaps I am narrowing in on something that 
is irrelevant in the greater scope of the project, which is how Carson, like all artists, touches on a particular in order to move 
to the universal. “Michael” is not Carson’s brother, but everyone’s lost loved one. Nox does not present grief for Michael, but 
immense and terrible grief in general. 
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Nox is that of Carson’s estranged brother Michael” (35). However, I would contest 
Vanderhart’s neat suggestion of Michael’s recovery as “a single body composed from a crowd 
of fragments” (35). Such a result would provide easy answers to Carson’s many questions, to 
which I will return in more detail.  
Carson recognizes that the σηµα is mentioned in literature as early as Homer and 
indicates the tomb of a dead warrior put there so “some passerby in later time will stop and 
remark on it” (Economy 73). An epitaph, as we all know, is written on a tomb and identifies 
the dead (“Here lies …”). It does, in fact, provide an answer to the question, “Who were 
you?”9 But an epitaph for Carson is always a “replica”: a word derived from the Latin 
replicare meaning “to reply,” but also “to copy” and, most importantly, “to refold.”10 Carson’s 
“reply” can only be a copy, a simulacrum, something that always gives itself to more foldings 
and refoldings, in accordance with the material constitution of Nox. The work of the 
monument both falls short and is extended indefinitely. 
In place of the stone that would traditionally confirm the identity of the dead is the 
reader who assumes the role of the archivist. We do not have, as Vanderhart claims, “a single 
body,” or closed system, but more “bodies.” As Derrida states, “The archivist produces more 
archive, and that is why the archive is never closed” (AF 68). Integrated into Carson’s 
selection of fragments are materials collected by her mother and Michael’s widow. Among the 
layers in Nox is the presence of other archives, collections, and scraps that participate in the 
attempted reconstitution of Michael. For instance, Carson’s mother has “a box at home with 
all [their] letters in it” (N 2.1) that she bequeaths to Carson. Michael’s widow is also in 
                                                
9 “Who were you” is a rubbing, printed on the same page as 2.1 in Nox. 
10 Carson’s use of the word “replica” on the box to describe the book is deliberate and highlights Nox’s position as a “copy” 
that falls short: “This is a replica of it, as close as we could get it.” 
  135 
possession of archival “stuff” now left to her after Michael’s death, such as “some old diaries 
she found … filled with photographs” (3.2) and “his papers” (6.1). It is clear that what we 
have in Nox is not self-contained and complete, but reaches out to other deaths, other archives, 
and other clues regarding the identity of the lost brother. The archive intends to “order,” but 
recalling Carson’s “Short Talk on the Total Collection” in which Noah’s world of order 
“engulf[s] his life” (ST 43) and finally drowns him, we question the success of the ordering of 
these fragments. The reading and handling of Nox is not linear. The search for Michael, as 
Carson illustrates, is endless.  
Carson writes, “an epitaph is a way of thinking about death and gives consolation” 
(Economy 95). Though Nox primarily commemorates Michael, we soon doubt its ability to 
console. Nox must first serve as an archive in order to take on the pressing question that haunts 
the book. Just as the epitaph marks the end of a life, the archive also functions as a space for 
endings, but is a space that is intended for the future. As Steedman states, “nothing starts in the 
Archive, nothing, ever at all, though things certainly end up there” (45). Carson offers readers 
an epitaph, but the reader continues her work of shuffling through and piecing together the 
contents of an archive. 
 
Who Are You? The Looming Question and The Likelihood of a Missing Piece 
Nox is introduced as an elegy for Carson’s brother, but is also, more importantly, a 
contemplation of history. In the first passage of Nox, Carson writes: “No matter how I try to 
evoke the starry lad he was, it remains a plain, odd history. So I began to think about history” 
(1.0). Carson is both a griever and a historian who asks the driving question, “Who were you?” 
The act of asking, as Carson explains, participates in the activities of mourning and 
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remembering: “History and elegy are akin. The word ‘history’ comes from an ancient Greek 
verb ἱστορεῖν meaning ‘to ask’” (N 1.1). Indeed, Nox is punctuated by questions such as “How 
do you know?” and “What is a voice?” As Carson admits after passage 5.2, “I love the old 
questions.” Folded in grief and situated toward the past, Carson searches for answers.  
The looming question of Michael has preoccupied Carson, as seen in earlier works. 
The loss of a brother is anticipated in “The Wishing Jewel” (PW 245), an introduction to 
“Water Margins,” which is a series of texts about Carson’s brother. In fact, this chapter in 
Plainwater may be read as a prequel to Nox, as it provides a brief account of growing up with 
Michael prior to his disappearance. Their fraught sibling-relationship is marked by “hatred” 
leading up to “unexpected days of truce” (PW 246). Remembering her estranged brother, 
Carson writes: “a sadness began in me that I have never quite put down” (246). This response 
is an echo of another story of loss, “The Glass Essay” (GIG 1), in which the speaker’s mother 
tells her, “You remember too much … Why hold onto all that?” The speaker in this case 
responds in much the same way and asks: “Where can I put it down?” (7).11 In both cases, 
memory and its accompanying affects are made palpable and become objects carried in the 
hands of Carson’s speakers. Nox’s speaker, too, suffers loss and this elegy acts as a container, 
or a place for Carson to “put down” the grief. 
According to Steedman, “the practice of history in its modern mode is just one long 
exercise of the deep satisfaction of finding things” (10). With that in mind, the archival 
disposition of Nox comes to light as Carson gathers together miscellaneous texts and 
fragments, arranges them on a long single sheet, and folds history into a box. Reminiscent of 
an archive, Carson presents the reader with a small, personal archive of carefully selected 
                                                
11 Of course, to “put it down” also refers to writing, as in, “to put something down on paper.” 
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fragments.12 Nox is a long exercise of finding things. History is set down and available for 
those who seek some resolution from grief. 
 I would go so far as to think of Nox as a scaled down version of an archive that houses 
classical material, and, indeed, the classical archive lurks in the background. As a classicist, 
Carson no doubt has engaged with archival material and handled the torn papyrus of ancient 
texts. Nox, as it happens, includes such fragments from Greek historians Hekataios and 
Herodotus. Furthermore, Carson’s description of the classical archive as coming to us “in 
wreckage” (Aitken) also resembles Derek Walcott’s comparison of ancient texts and 
civilizations to “shards of vocabulary” (69) that may be reworked into new patterns. “Shards,” 
moreover, is reminiscent of an archaeological dig in which shards of pottery are sieved and 
recovered.13 Carson borrows these terms used in discussing the classics in an interview on 
Nox: 
I wrote the book because when my brother died I hadn’t seen him for twenty-two years, 
and he was a mystery to me, and he died suddenly in another country, and I had a need 
to gather up the shards of his story and make it into something containable. (Aitken; 
emphasis mine) 
Carson’s notion of these shards being “containable” is striking. Shards of pottery are most 
often those of an urn, or vessel, that once contained water, oil, or wine. Shards, more 
importantly, are indexical: they point toward the whole “container” that once was. What is 
                                                
12 I have borrowed the definition of “personal archive” from Genres of Recollection in which Penelope Papailias defines it as: 
“a textual, material, and theoretical construct that marks the borders between secrets and revelation as well as between private 
lives, state authority, and national imaginaries. The personal archive can be constructed to stand beside or even compete with 
state archives, but it can also be a hiding space in which subversive memories are stored and preserved for possible future 
disclosure (3). 
13 In Archive Fever, Derrida, too, draws a link between archiving and archeology. Speaking about Freud’s writing, Derrida 
states: “These classical and extraordinary works move away from us at great speed, in a continually accelerated fashion. They 
burrow into the past at a distance more and more comparable to that which separates us from archaeological digs” (18). 
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containable for Carson moves from the object to the writing subject: Carson attempts to 
contain the shards of that object which no longer contains life. 
While the box contains Michael’s shards (or what Carson has curated for the public’s 
viewing), the inherent nature of the fragment itself resists the neat suggestion of 
“containability.” Rather, the fragments draw attention to their own lacunae and lack of a 
coherent narrative. In order to illustrate this underlying lack, I will turn to the image of the 
home as it figures in Nox, both as a site of memory and history, and as a figurative archival 
locus that houses the past. 
 
Haunted House 
“Haunting implies places, a habitation, and always a haunted house.” 
 –Jacques Derrida (AF 86) 
 
“Archives of grief I see falling upon this house.” 
 –Anne Carson (Antigonick)  
 
 
We have already encountered the image of the house in Carson’s discussion of ancient Greek, 
likening the classics to “a home in [her] mind” (Aitken). The home is also an important space 
for Derrida’s conception of the archive.14 The early archons, or “the document guardians” (AF 
2), ensured the security and recognized the authority of archival documents by filing them in a 
specific locale. The archive, as Derrida points out, requires a residence: “It is thus, in this 
domiciliation, in this house arrest, that archives take place” (AF 2). The box-container of Nox 
functions as a place in which Carson gathers together fragments and is also where the archival 
scraps are consigned, not only as the place where they are deposited, but also where they form 
                                                
14 As Derrida explains, “[T]he meaning of ‘archive,’ its only meaning, comes to it from the Greek arkheion: initially a house, 
a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded … On account of their 
publicly recognized authority, it is at their home, in that place which is their house (private house, family house, or 
employee’s house) that official documents are filed” (AF 2). 
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a system. Consignation, as Derrida explains, is also “the act of consigning, through gathering 
together signs” (3). These “signs,” consigned to the box-container as “archival domicile,” are 
available for the reader-cum-archivist to unify, identify, or classify. 
 It is fitting that the image of home informs Carson’s small, personal archive and is a 
sign of the memory of Michael. The home refers to both the haunted childhood home and the 
haunted space of the archive. Penelope Pepailias’s definition of “personal archive” neatly joins 
these two resonances: a personal archive  
can refer to the home and its contents, which through calculation or circumstance take 
on the status of historical evidence. The word personal highlights the control and 
management of archives by individuals, families, or groups and the manner in which 
they knit their identities and histories into them. (3) 
Indeed, the space of the home as a point of condensation of personal history participates in 
Carson’s memory of Michael; the emptiness of that home on account of his long-time absence 
is a void that Carson attempts to fill. 
The cover of Nox depicts a young Michael in swimming trunks standing in front of a 
house. The image is cropped and we see only the corner of a sloping roof. The home in the 
background participates in a field of intensity, which Carson recognizes as she justifies the 
way in which she cropped the photos: “the backgrounds [of our family photos] were dreadful, 
terrifying, and full of content. So I cut out the backgrounds … the backgrounds are full of 
truth” (Aitken). Nevertheless, the house peeks out from behind Michael and we continue to 
catch sight of it from various angles in the book. For instance, the first photograph of the 
series is a shadowy, backlit image of two young children sitting inside a home, a glare coming 
from the windows behind them. The next photograph is the frontal view of the home in winter 
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and what appears to be Carson, her brother, and mother standing in front of it. The 
photographer here appears only as a shadow stretching toward the group as the sun is behind 
him. Carson’s decision to crop these family photos jibes with the nature of her poetics in 
general. Much like the encounter of the Greek fragment in Carson’s works, the reader here is 
presented with a selection of fragments, and a sense of uncertainty and curiosity as to what 
was cut out. The photographer or viewer is ambiguous, as are the shadows surrounding the 
subjects.  
The house, as suggested by Carson and Derrida, is an important locale in both its 
respective configurations as a literal home, and an archival domicile.15 Perhaps because 
Carson never learned the whereabouts of her brother, this notion of place is relevant. In both 
“The Wishing Jewel” and Nox, the phrase, “No return address,” recurs. Stamps on postcards 
and letters are the only clues to Michael’s location and even a letter from Carson’s mother 
asking him for an address (“I hope I have an address for you where I could mail a box for 
Christmas”) results in none.16 This homelessness in Michael’s life, thus, gives his last known 
address a particular charge and poignancy. As Carson states: 
Port Hope … was a place we lived for six, seven years and my parents for about fifteen 
years and my brother intermittently, so the book, because it’s about him, is connected 
to that place in some ways. But it’s a place where everyone’s life fell apart. That’s too 
strong. It was a place where we all, my brother and I, met the end of our adolescence. 
So that’s a serious order. (Aitken) 
                                                
15 The house for Gaston Bachelard, too, participates in a similar formation of self and history. In The Poetics of Space, 
Bachelard explores the home as an important primary factor in shaping one’s thoughts, memories and dreams. See Bachelard 
(xxxvi): “the house image would appear to have become the topography of our intimate being.” Vanderhart uses Bachelard’s 
text as an “analytic foil” to understanding Nox and the importance of the physical and metaphorical house of memory. See 
Vanderhart (Under a New Law 50). 
16 Carson clarifies: “She never got an address for him. Indeed during the last seven years of her life he wrote to her not a 
single word” (N 4.2). 
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Their home in Port Hope is a central location for Carson’s remembrance of her brother. 
Congruent with Bachelard’s description of the house one is born in as being “physically 
inscribed in us … [where] the feel of the tiniest latch has remained in our hands” (14-15), 
Carson’s childhood home retains this quality of nostalgia and familiarity. Furthermore, the 
home becomes a place of prolonged waiting, a place of hopeful homecoming. In passage 4.1, 
Carson writes, “I can see [my mother] standing at the kitchen sink scraping carrots. For years 
after he left she would glance up every time a car came spinning along the road.” Like the 
faraway “oneiric house” that “sees, keeps vigil, vigilantly waits” (Bachelard 34), Carson’s 
mother waits and anticipates Michael’s return. His absence is made more pronounced when 
we learn in 4.2. that Carson’s mother ultimately gives up hope (“Eventually she began to say 
he was dead … she said When I pray for him nothing comes back”), and she dies without ever 
hearing from her son again. 
Clearly, the home is closely entwined with Michael’s memory and charged with 
anticipation and disappointment. It marks not only the last known residence of Michael, but 
also the end, or death, of adolescence. The home is a shared place for Carson and her brother 
and acts as both a catalyst for her mournful search, and an archival space in which to place her 
findings. Bachelard writes that “when we return to the old house, after an odyssey of many 
years, [we] find that the most delicate gestures, the earliest gestures suddenly come alive” (15). 
Indeed, the primal home with its accompanying dreams and memories ossifies and it is as if it 
is “physically inscribed” (as Bachelard puts it) when Carson states: “Places in our bones, 
strange brother” (after N 3.3). 
 A salient childhood memory of Michael is set in the stairwell of the home:  
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Stairwell smell (I remember) him huddling in the stairwell where we kept our coats 
and boots winter Sunday blood on his face he was about nine and my mother around 
him with all her hands crying What now oh What now? (N 5.3)  
Absent of punctuation, the memory surfaces in a string of phrasal (fragmentary) units, each 
charged with trauma. The scene is recovered via the senses: the “stairway smell,” the chill of 
“winter,” the sight of Michael “huddling” with “blood on his face,” the frantic fluttering of a 
panicked mother and “all her hands,” and the sound of her cries. The memory is particularly 
disturbing, as the mother’s cries not only indicate uncertainty, but an implication that these 
traumatic experiences occur regularly. The mother, it appears, is always baffled by the “secret 
behind what torments [Michael]” (after 5.4) and, not unexpectedly, he continues to live a life 
of torment: drugs (8.2), homelessness, poverty, and hunger (5.3).  
The memory itself is triggered by Michael’s widow’s memory of their time together 
(described earlier in N 5.3): “They lived for two years on the street, sleeping in stairwells, 
eating once a week.” Stairwells are associated with Michael and it is worth considering the 
topographical nature of the stairwell as an intermediate space, marking the passageway 
between floors. Bachelard mentions the stairways in his description of the “oneiric house,” 
particularly as a place of movement between cellar, ground floor, and attic: “We always go 
down the one that leads to the cellar … we go both up and down the stairway that leads to the 
bed-chamber … we always go up the attic stairs” (26-7). The architectural function of the 
stairs as accommodating movement fits the fugitive nature of Michael. In Carson’s memory, 
Michael is associated with the stairwell of their home, haunting this in-between space, not 
quite belonging in one room or another.  
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 We deduce later in 8.2. that this memory is associated with the preceding photograph. 
In the black and white photo, a boy stands alone at the base of the tree while a group of boys 
congregate in the tree house above. Carson writes: 
When we were children the family moved a lot and wherever we went my brother 
wanted to make friends with boys too old for him. He ran behind them, mistook the 
rules, came home with a bloody nose, it puzzled me from the beginning, it made my 
heart sink. I have a photograph of him (taken in the bush behind Bald Rock) about ten 
years old standing on the ground beneath a treehouse. Above him in the treehouse you 
can see three older boys gazing down. They have raised the ladder. (N 8.2) 
In this scenario we have another example of a home, as seen by the tree house, and stairs, or, 
in this case, the ladder. The raising of the ladder prevents Michael from joining the boys, a 
gesture that keeps him excluded and isolated. Michael, as we see in Nox, is always at a 
distance, a point at which he occupies throughout his life with his family, his widow, and 
Carson. Both in death and life, he is regarded with an attitude of puzzlement (“it puzzled me 
from the beginning”) or, as seen in 5.3, with confusion and pity (“What now oh What now”).  
 The stairway as a state of indeterminacy and as a site of passage (between one “level” 
and another) fits the fugitive nature of Michael, and is emphasized by the images of stairs that 
Carson cuts and disperses in the pages following passage 9.1. The physical structure of the 
book and its accordion pleat also replicates the appearance of stairs as each fold imitates a step. 
Carson, thus, reproduces her memory of Michael in the stairs by pasting the fragments 
metonymically associated with him between the physical folds of the book and creates a 
literary work that also functions as an art object.  
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However, it is important to emphasize that Michael cannot be captured in the physical 
containment of art, nor in the incorporeity of Carson’s memory. As Carson states, 
“Remembering draws attention to lostness … Memory depends on void, as void depends on 
memory” (Economy 38). Even though this moment brings the absent (Michael) into the 
present moment of our reading, memory is transparent and all we are left with is the void that 
is the empty stairwell. The final words of Nox make up an italicized line that reads: “He 
refuses, he is in the stairwell, he disappears.” Michael’s memory and spectrality are intimately 
linked to the stairwell of the home. What he refuses (the “No” in Nox) remains unclear, but I 
would argue that Michael’s refusal is not only a refusal to be comprehended and totalized by 
Carson and the reader, but also a resistance of the archive as a repository for his life’s 
fragments. While we “reach” for comprehension, there is no firm grasp. The refusal is 
reminiscent of the negation in “Now What?”: 
You go quickly. 
[…] 
In two negations. 
 (No. 
No). 
That reach like two arms. 
Toward memory and toward. 
Desire. (44) 
Though we have arrived at the end of Carson’s personal archive, what we have attempted to 
capture “disappears.” In this moment we have an apt depiction of the hauntedness of both the 
home and the archive. As Derrida states, “the structure of the archive is spectral. It is spectral 
a priori: neither present nor absent ‘in the flesh,’ neither visible nor invisible, a trace always 
referring to another whose eyes can never be met” (AF 84).  
Memory, too, becomes spectral, as seen by the vanishing figure of Michael in the 
stairwell. Between his appearance and his disappearance in the final italicized line, “we hover 
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between awareness of being and loss of being” (Bachelard 58). There is no engagement with 
Michael’s phantom, simply his refusal to engage. The instant we have located Michael in the 
home, he disappears, signalling the destructive principle in archivization that is already 
inherent in the process: “produc[ing] the very thing it reduces” (AF 94).” 
 
The Archival “Aura” 
I would like to return to the “shards” collected by Carson and this time focus on their visual 
representation. I have discussed the fragments in terms of their constituting a “personal 
archive,” but a large part of the book’s pleasure is found in their graphic qualities and what I 
call the archival “aura.” Bradshaw echoes Benjamin in the title of her article, “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Technical Translation: The Materiality of Anne Carson’s Nox,” but given the 
attention she pays to its physicality and material production, it is surprising that she does not 
mention “aura.”  Similarly, Vanderhart does not explore the concept of aura despite using 
Benjamin’s “literary montage” as a lens through which to view Carson’s “collage poetics.” 
Moreover, for the purpose of this chapter, it is worth pointing out that Benjamin himself was a 
steadfast archivist who collected, logged, and systemized fragments and scraps.17 He has also 
compared the poet to a collector in his well-known dictum, “Ragpicker and poet: both are 
concerned with refuse” (The Writer 108). 
In this section, I will focus on the visual make-up of Nox and how the aura lends itself 
to the archival experience. I will also compare Carson’s engagement with history to Michelet 
and poet Susan Howe’s experience. Vanderhart has already linked Howe and Carson in her 
study as they are both contemporary “collage artists and poets, invested in the pursuit of a 
                                                
17 See Walter Benjamin’s Walter Benjamin’s Archive: Images, Texts, Signs (2007). 
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text’s ‘spirit’ and the fragment’s ghostliness” (36), but I will further this comparison by 
distinguishing their experiences within the archival space. 
Nox opens with a wrinkled and stained copy of Catullus’s Elegy 101. Like most of the 
fragments in the book that exhibit raw details of having just been ripped or handled, and 
lifelike tangibility, the poem is yellowed and smudged. Carson plays with the aesthetic of an 
ancient Roman text and gives the poem “a patina of age … by soaking the pages in tea, which 
add[s] a mysterious sepia overtone” (Aitken). While this is not Carson’s actual scrapbook but 
a facsimile (or “replica”), her decision to stain the page and give it “a historical attitude” 
(Aitken) lends an archival “aura” to the book. The archival aura, or traces of the past, 
accompanies the experience of working with archival material. Steedman describes the 
materiality of the archive as dust, and, in its most literal sense, is what Michelet breathes in 
while working in the “catacombs of manuscripts” (26). The close relationship between 
materiality and the dead is also echoed in Howe’s description of working in the libraries in 
which she is “surrounded by raw material paper afterlife” (16). For both Michelet and Howe, 
working in close proximity to the dead and handling “original” documents is a stirring 
experience. The “amazement at perpetuity itself” (Steedman 161) experienced by Michelet as 
he worked, and the “raw material paper afterlife” that causes Howe to exclaim, “my spirits 
were shaken” (16), partake in the archival “aura” that Carson qualifies as “mysterious,” 
“interesting,” and “attractive.”18  
An incongruity arises in my use of the word “aura” to describe Nox, which, as 
mentioned, is a replica of Carson’s notebook. As Benjamin explains, aura is what withers in 
the reproduction of a work of art (I 221). Nevertheless, Carson manages to retain a sense of an 
                                                
18 See Aitken, The Paris Review, The Art of Poetry No. 88. 
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archival aura in the replication of her collection of scraps, and captures the coarseness of its 
assemblage, the wrinkles and shadows of the paper, and details such as ink and impressions 
that seep or imprint onto the successive fold. The point of the material production of Carson’s 
notebook and its box is to “transmit” aura. While the replication conveys the feel of paper 
textures and the tone of time, it is not immediate. Carson foregrounds mediation, as every 
aspect of Nox invites us to consider the difference between original and copy. This “difference” 
is essential to Carson’s project as what she offers in the reproduction of her notebook is the 
lost original, and, implicitly, the lost object.  
 Similar to Michelet and Howe, someone who picks up Nox experiences a thrill at 
perusing its “raw material paper afterlife.” The experience of Nox extends, more importantly, 
to the accordion pleat. A haptic dimension exists in the reading of the text that forces a reader 
not only to encounter Nox as a literary text, but as an object. In turn, this also changes the 
space in which one reads and holds the book. As one critic writes: 
Few things in this world have the power to make me clean my desk. One of them, it 
turns out, is Anne Carson’s new book-in-a-box, Nox. Before I even opened it, I felt an 
irresistible urge to spend twenty minutes purging my worktable of notes, napkins, 
magazines, forks, check stubs, unpaid bills, and fingernail clippings. The urge struck 
me, I think, for a couple of reasons. For one, Nox is unwieldy. (Anderson, “Family 
Album”) 
Indeed the unwieldiness of the book is due to its unique pleating, which, depending on the 
number of folds unfolded at one time, dictates the amount of space it will take up. If one end 
of the book accidently unravels over the edge of a table, it will, like a toppling row of 
dominoes, pull the rest of the book down with it. The pleated form allows the “book” itself to 
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spill. Being “un-centred” from the spine lets the pages spill, not just be turned. The pages of 
Nox are at risk of crumpling under their own weight, or even ripping. Deutsch notes that the 
book “resembles a house of cards” and since it has no binding, “its revolving ‘pages’ circle a 
column of air.” While I argue above that the book’s accordion pleat has a metaphorical and 
mnemonic association with Michael in the stairwell, I would also say that the pleat provides an 
archival experience where we become aware of our space and the materiality of the object 
before us. 
Returning to Michelet and Howe, there are some overlaps particular to their time in the 
archives that Carson achieves in her presentation of Nox. The reading of Nox is a deliberate 
act in all senses of the word: we are conscious of the materiality of the object (particularly its 
lack of a secure spine) and careful with the pages and folds. We are also unhurried as we fold 
and unfold each pleat, often flipping back or forward as we follow Carson’s narrative. Finally, 
there is a silent asceticism that accompanies the reading, which is not only suggested by the 
white spaces in Nox, but also the urge to have a clean space in order to accommodate the 
object itself. As Anderson points out: “Processing it, as a reader, seems to require several acres 
of clear space—mental, physical, emotional, attentional—every inch of which Carson fills, 
immediately, with her own special brand of clutter” (“Family Album”). Carson’s “special 
brand of clutter” is what Steedman would call “heterogeneous undifferentiated stuff” (68) or, 
in other words, the clutter of the archive. Indeed the overwhelming clutter of the archive in 
which one works silently and in solitude is familiar to Michelet and Howe. For Michelet, the 
archives are “the quietly folded and bundled documents … where he believes the past lives” 
(Steedman 70). Howe, too, is in awe of the “stacks of books” and “narrowly spaced 
overshadowing shelves” (14). The act of reading Nox participates in “the grubby trade” of an 
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archivist as the text itself is part of “the infinite heap of things … the great, brown, slow-
moving strandless river of Everything” (Steedman 18). 
Surrounded by the clutter and heap of the archive, Michelet and Howe describe an 
identical relationship between the past and the production of their own work in the following: 
Michelet:  
“as I breathed their dust, I saw them rise up. They rose from the sepulchre … as in the 
Last Judgement of Michelangelo or in the Dance of Death. This frenzied dance … I 
have tried to reproduce in [my] work” (Steedman 27).19 
 
Howe:  
“These Lethean tributaries of lost sentiments and found philosophies had a life-giving 
effect on the process of my writing … This may suggest vampirism because while I 
like to think I write for the dead, I also take my life as a poet from their lips, their 
vocalisms, their breath” (14-16). 
Both Howe and Michelet provide similar accounts with the archive in which their “exchanges” 
with the dead affect their writing. This exchange echoes the “epitaphic contract” Carson 
describes in which there is an exchange between death on a battlefield and life on a monument. 
In the archives, there exists also an exchange with the dead represented by the inhalation of 
dust, vocalisms, and breath that, upon exhaling, has an effect on the act of writing. Though 
this transaction with history and writing is figurative, as Steedman clarifies (“[Michelet] 
inhaled the by-product of all the filthy trades that have, by circuitous routes, deposited their 
end-products in the archives” [27]), the descriptions of their intimate engagement with the 
                                                
19 Steedman goes on to say: “In a quite extraordinary (and much scrutinized) passage, it is the historian’s act of inhalation that 
gives life” (27). 
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dead (or the Lethean and the lost) are a consequence of the archival aura. Their handling and 
reading “original” documents shape their compositions or new writing, a shift from the dead to 
new life.  
Carson, too, comments on imperfect surfaces and how artefacts make their way 
through time by going through processes of discovery, investigation, classification, 
totalization – all of which are “layers” that “add up to more and more life” (Aitken).20 What 
kind of exchange is taking place here? In this case, what is old doesn’t appear to “lose” aura, 
but gains more aura by each successive historical layer. The life that Carson perceives is 
reflexive and is given back, restored, to the past. Unlike Michelet and Howe who participate 
somatically with history, Carson, I would argue, is far more restrained. Unsurprisingly, when 
asked if Nox helped her understand her brother, she responds, “No. I don’t think it had any 
effect whatsoever on my understanding” (Aitken). While the aesthetic composition of Nox 
captures an archival aura and is suggestive of a reconstructive biography of a dead brother, the 
notion is fleeting. Carson does not experience any enduring regenerative exchange with the 
past. The life that is perceived in the fragments of Nox emphasizes a life that is lost. Michael 
remains fugitive, appearing and disappearing in the stairwell.  
The matter of exchange is not limited to what is exchanged between us, or Carson, and 
the materiality of the archive. Even the exchange of languages (Latin for English) taken up by 
Carson suggests an impossible task that cannot be totally apprehended. 
 
 
                                                
20 Carson’s notion of “more life” is reminiscent of Johanna Drucker’s (Figuring the Word) comment on writing and material: 
“But the authority of written documents, as I mentioned once before, does not depend upon their pristine and unaltered 
condition. Quite the contrary – it is the capacity of material documents to record change which makes them such believable 
witnesses. Their very substance is a testimonial since marks, means of writing, and material all change over time” (227).  
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The Archival Shard: Translating Catullus 
“Repent means ‘the pain again.’” 
 –Anne Carson, Nox 
 
 
The notion of “the fugitive” takes shape in the process of translation. Carson “prowls” for the 
right word in the same way she “prowls” for her brother. The attempts to grasp Michael’s 
figure in the stairway coincide with her endeavour to translate and master language and 
meaning in Catullus’s Elegy 101. The language of grief, thus, corresponds to the language of 
translation and both pose similar difficulties of capture and containment. 
Catullus serves as the lens through which loss is comprehended, as well as a paradigm 
of mourning. I would like to stress that translation, which frames Carson’s grief, suggests 
something beyond a linguistic conversion from Latin to English. A classicist such as Carson is 
certainly capable of translating Latin, but here, translation is also a search, or prowl for the 
“universal” in ancient literature and the classics. Indeed, we sense two distinct historical 
timelines that Carson intentionally brings close together (deep history, or antiquity, as 
suggested by the presence of Catullus, and a more recent, familial history in Michael) along 
with their respective endeavours (translating and mourning). However, it becomes apparent 
that both experiences have no attainable end. Both are experiences of non-arrival. The 
figurative task of “translating” the archival fragments in Nox into something as coherent and 
seamless as Catullus’s elegy is, of course, a translation that is impossible.  
The poem, as Carson explains in passage 7.1, was written by Catullus for his own 
brother who died in the Troad, signalling a similarity between the two poets as both brothers 
passed away while abroad. Carson takes this poem apart and provides a denotative and 
connotative “definition” of each Latin word of the text as it appears in the poem (63 words in 
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total). The word-by-word translation at first appears to display a translator’s “fidelity to the 
word” (Benjamin, I 78). But Carson is ironic and aware of the misguided assumption that the 
translator’s art is merely “a task that does not occur in the realms of thought but between the 
pages of a dictionary” (Maier 25). All translation is an approximation of a textual withdrawal 
that can never be exhausted. As Carson states: “[e]very translator knows the point where one 
language cannot be rendered into another … you cannot match them item for item” (Nay 4). 
Translation entails loss – loss in the very process – and nothing can make up for that loss. Loss 
is both the enabling and disabling condition of all translation. 
Benjamin provides a useful analogy of the translation and the original text as being 
recognizable fragments fitted to create the same vessel:  
Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the 
smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way, a 
translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in 
detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original 
and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments 
are part of a vessel. (I 78) 
In Nox, these dictionary entries operate similarly when Carson places her own archival “shards” 
adjacent to the fragments of Catullus. The vessel of which both Catullus and Carson’s 
fragments comprise is a sibling’s grief for a dead brother, a shared affect that Carson cannot 
translate from Latin, and that she herself cannot translate to a reader. 
We return, again, to a poetics of adjacency. Appearing on the verso pages, the entries 
are read together with various fragments pasted on the accompanying recto pages. Catullus’s 
poem is atomized, and though our reading of his poem is “continuous” in the sense that one 
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Latin word follows another, verso page by verso page, this linearity is interrupted by what is 
drawn into the adjacent field. Carson fits her own narrative between Catullus’s words, placing 
on the recto side more recent history of loss and the gathered fragments that bear witness to 
that loss. 
Catullus’s poem elegizing his own brother provides and points to an allusive space of 
lyric grief that Carson accesses for her own mourning. Her “definition” of each word begins as 
a traditional entry that identifies its part of speech, lists off the word’s multiple meanings and 
uses, and defines its use in common phrases. As the entry continues, it digresses and becomes 
inflected by Carson’s own personal story. For example, the first definition begins:  
 multas 
 multus multa multum  adjective 
[cf. Gk µάλα, MELIOR] numerous, many, many of, many a; many people, many, 
many women, the ordinary people … many words especially in elliptical phrases e.g. 
quid multa? ne multa: to cut a long story short; an abundance of, much, large, multum 
est: it is of value … 
By the end of the entry, however, Carson introduces another voice, one that is noticeably 
personalized: “multa dies or multa lux: broad daylight, multa nox: late in the night, perhaps too 
late.” It is apparent that the neutral voice associated with the dictionary is overtaken by one 
that is subjective, humanized, and, in this example, uncertain (“perhaps too late”). Each word 
in Catullus’s poem becomes a fulcrum upon which Carson balances her own grief. Each word 
is pried from Elegy 101, and no longer participates in the larger text, but is resituated into the 
neutral “genre” of the dictionary entry, and then re-integrated into Carson’s narrative. The 
word becomes meaningful again but does so in a way that is particular to her loss. 
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By borrowing the words of Catullus, Carson gains entry into grief and the dark realm 
of death or oblivion (which she terms “Night”/nox), and establishes a lexicon for mourning. 
“Entry,” here, functions both as the item listed in a reference book, and as the place of 
entrance.21 This glossary, however, will always be insufficient in conveying her loss. Carson’s 
inability to translate Catullus is due to the inadequacy of English. As she states in 7.1, 
“Nothing in English can capture the passionate slow surface of a Roman elegy” (and, indeed, 
we recall death “wandering slowly towards [Carson] across the sea”). The inadequacy of 
language and the impossible task of translating Catullus suggest other pursuits impossible to 
overtake, such as how to translate grief, how to convey grief, how to reconstruct an individual, 
and how to bring back the dead. 
 Carson explicitly links the metaphor of the home with translation: “I came to think of 
translating as a room, not exactly an unknown room, where one gropes for the light switch” 
(7.1). Carson’s comparison of translation to a room or abode is also echoed in her foreword of 
Electra, a Greek tragedy that centres on grief and the brother-sister relationship between 
Electra and Orestes. In the passage below, she describes the difficulty of pinning down the 
precise English word for the Greek verb, λυπειν [lupein]: 
During the days and weeks when I was working on this play I used to dream about 
translating. One night I dreamed that the text of the play was a big solid glass house. I 
floated above the house trying to zero in on v. 363. I was carrying in my hands 
wrapped in a piece of black cloth the perfect English equivalent for lupein and I kept 
                                                
21 Charles M. Stang writes in “‘Nox,’ or the Muteness of Things” (Harvard Divinity Bulletin, Winter/Spring 2012, Vol. 40): 
“Each of the left-hand pages, after all, is an entry, a point of opening in which the translator is not so much looking for le mot 
juste as le mot muet.” Furthermore, Carson states in an interview, “[E]tymology is the place where I begin any research. The 
story of how a word began to mean what it means is a point of entry to everything else about it” (Constantine 37). Indeed, we 
also see this interest in etymology earlier in Eros the Bittersweet in which she explores the meaning of the word “glukupikron” 
(“sweetbitter”). 
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trying to force myself down through the glass atmosphere of the house to position this 
word in its right place. But there was an upward pressure as heavy as water. I couldn’t 
move down, I swam helplessly back and forth on the surface of the transparency, 
waving my black object and staring down at the text through fathoms of glass. And I 
was just about to take the black cloth off and look at the word so as to memorize it for 
later when I awoke, when I awoke.  
I never did discover, asleep or awake, what was under that black cloth. I never 
did hit upon the right translation for lupein.22 (Electra 45) 
There is a similar sense of frustration in Nox due to Carson’s inability to translate Catullus – 
an inability that refers not to the task of converting Latin to English (as mentioned earlier, 
Carson is capable of that and indeed provides a translation in Nox) – but an inability to achieve 
the ideal translation. Just as one prowls for the universal in classical literature, or, as Woolf 
describes it, the “original” and “pure,” the translation Carson seeks is a literary imaginary. The 
ideal translation is always on the horizon, “just on the far side of language” (Woolf 14). To 
return to Carson’s experience of translating Electra, the “right translation” is the stuff of 
dreams, unrecoverable by morning, thus, leaving it beyond grasp and always desired. Carson’s 
comparison of the right word to an impenetrable, uninhabited house is reminiscent of what 
Bachelard says of the desired dream home: “Maybe it is a good thing for us to keep a few 
dreams of a house that we shall live in later, always later, so much later, in fact, that we shall 
not have time to achieve it” (61). 
                                                
22 Fittingly, the Greek verb that posed some difficulty for Carson as she was translating Electra means, in short, to grieve. But, 
as Carson points out, lupein is multifaceted in its meaning: “The Greek lexicon defines lupein in the active as ‘to grieve, vex, 
cause pain, do harm, harass, distress, damage, violate” and in the passive as “to be vexed, violated, harassed,” etc. or ‘to 
grieve, feel pain.’ The cognate noun lupê means ‘pain of body’ or ‘pain of mind’ or ‘sad plight’” (44). One could say that Nox 
embodies all these meanings of lupein. Nox is an elegy bound up in elegies. In addition to Carson’s grief for Michael, other 
episodes of distress and pain are presented in the book such as the death of Anna, the death of Carson’s mother and father, and 
the subsequent grief felt by all. 
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Catullus’s poem is one that Carson “ha[s] loved … since the first time [she] read it in 
high school” (N 7.1) and, since then, has tried to translate it adequately. One of these attempts 
is included in Men in the Off Hours, wherein Carson translates a selection of Catullus’s poems. 
Recalling Benjamin’s comparison of a translation and its original fitting like fragments of the 
same recognizable vessel, I would like briefly to compare Carson’s earlier translation to her 
later one. Though quite different, the earlier translation plots a set of coordinates that are later 
represented in Nox. 
Unlike the translation she offers in Nox, Carson’s version in Men in the Off Hours 
demonstrates a play, or infidelity to the word:  
Multitudes brushed past me oceans I don’t know. 
Brother wine milk honey flowers. 
Flowers milk honey brother wine. 
How long does it take the sound to die away? 
I a brother. 
Cut out carefully the words for wine milk honey flowers. 
Drop them into a bag. 
Mix carefully. 
Pour onto your dirty skeleton. 
What sound? (45) 
It would be useful to read this earlier “shard” alongside the one in Nox: 
Many the peoples many the oceans I crossed  
I arrive at these poor, brother burials 
so I could give you the last gift owed to death 
 and talk (why?) with mute ash.  
Now that Fortune tore you from me, you  
oh poor (wrongly) brother (wrongly) taken from me,  
now still anyway this – what a distant mood of parents  
handed down as the sad gift for burials – 
accept! soaked with tears of a brother 
and into forever, brother, farewell and farewell. 
Though both translations maintain the 10-line structure of the original elegy, the former 
includes, most notably, two ambiguous questions found in the fourth and final lines: “How 
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long does it take the sound to die away?” and “What sound?” respectively. Their apparent 
anomaly sets the coordinates by which we may compare Carson’s later version. 
In the fourth line, Catullus suggests a desire on the speaker’s part to communicate with 
the dead, despite the emptiness of communication (et mutam nequiquam adloquerer 
cinerem).23 An earlier translation by Sir Richard Francis Burton clarifies the “answerlessness” 
of conversing with the dead: “And I may vainly address ashes that answer have none.”24 In 
Nox, Carson translates this as: “and talk (why?) with mute ash.” The parenthesized “why” also 
suggests the speaker’s vain address to the ashes and functions as a subconscious interjection – 
why talk with “mute ash” if it will only lead to a one-sided conversation? In her earlier 
translation, Carson decides to translate this futile endeavour of the still-living into a question 
that, similarly, has no answer. At best, its answer is yet another question (“What sound?”).  
Furthermore, “How long does it take the sound to die away?” is addressed to an 
ambiguous listener. Is this a question posed for the “you,” the dead brother, as suggested by 
“your dirty skeleton”? Is it a rhetorical question for us, the readers? What does the sound refer 
to, exactly? Does it stand for grief and inquire into the end of mourning? Elena 
Theodorakopoulos suggests that the final question (“What sound?”) is Carson’s way of 
“ask[ing] the knowing reader to supply the sound of the omitted ave atque vale, but also … for 
                                                
23 See Peter Green’s translation (2005, 203): “A journey … has brought me here, brother … to let me address, all in vain, 
your silent ashes…” 
24 The full translation by Sir Richard Francis Burton (1894): 
Faring thro' many a folk and plowing many a sea-plain 
These sad funeral-rites (Brother!) to deal thee I come, 
So wi' the latest boons to the dead bestowed I may gift thee, 
And I may vainly address ashes that answer have none, 
Sithence of thee, very thee, to deprive me Fortune behested, 
Woe for thee, Brother forlore! Cruelly severed fro' me. 
…  
Yet in the meanwhile now what olden usage of forbears 
Brings as the boons that befit mournfullest funeral rites, 
Thine be these gifts which flow with tear-flood shed by thy brother, 
And, for ever and aye (Brother!) all hail and farewell. 
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a sound perhaps from the lost brother” (157). Indeed, the (lost) sound of the lost brother is 
confirmed in Nox when Carson speaks about the “muteness” (1.3) of Michael, borrowing 
Catullus’s “mutam” from his elegy. The sound of the lost brother is also echoed in 5.2 where 
Carson describes a taciturn conversation she has with Michael and notes that “[h]is voice was 
like his voice with something else crusted on it … What is a voice?”  
Another striking decision that Carson makes in her earlier translation is her repetition 
of “wine,” “milk,” “honey,” and “flowers.” While Catullus repeats “frater” three times in his 
elegy, Carson chooses, instead, to emphasize the libations. The unnamed “gifts” bestowed 
upon the dead is specified by Carson and harks back to antiquity as the usual offerings given 
to the dead (befitting, given that this is a translation of a Roman elegy).25 According to 
Theodorakopoulos, 
The imagery of collage (‘Cut out carefully the words for wine milk honey flowers. / 
Drop them into a bag. / Mix carefully’) is picked up again in Nox, where it becomes a 
guiding principle. This is in many ways a very simple approach to the process of 
translation as interpretation. (157) 
The rearrangement of “wine milk honey flowers” and the instructions to “cut out the words” 
certainly anticipate the cut-and-paste organization in Nox. Perhaps, though, it does not simply 
demonstrate Carson’s process of translation as interpretation, but, rather, translation as an 
infinite number of ways to “cut out,” and “mix” the elegizing of a brother. Despite the 
                                                
25 See Aeschylus’s Persians: “It is for this reason that I have come here from the palace once again, without my chariot and 
my former pomp, and bring, as propitiatory libations for the father of my son, offerings that soothe the dead, both white milk, 
pleasant to drink, from an unblemished cow, and bright honey, distillation wrought from blossoms by the bee, together with 
lustral water from a virgin spring; and from a rustic source, this unmixed draught, the quickening juice of an ancient vine. 
Here too is the fragrant fruit of the pale-green olive that lives the entirety of its life in luxuriant foliage; and garlanded flowers, 
produce of the bounteous earth” (lines 607-618). 
See also Euripides’s Iphigenia in Taurus: “O fate, I had one brother only and you carry him off and send him to 
Hades. For him, I am about to pour over the back of the earth these libations and the bowl of the dead: streams of milk from 
mountain cows, and offerings of wine from Bacchus, and the labour of the tawny bees; these sacrifices are soothing to the 
dead” (lines 156-166). 
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grammatical and syntactical discrepancies between Carson’s two versions of Elegy 101, and 
disregarding which of the two is better, or more “faithful,” it is apparent that they fit with the 
original as part of the same, recognizable vessel. The cut-and-paste images of offering and the 
inquiry into “dead” sounds find their resonances in Nox. The mystery of the final question 
(“What sound?”) resembles the mystery of the initial question that drives Nox (“Who were 
you?”). There is no single way to capture the elusiveness of Catullus’s poem, nor understand 
the death of a brother that Fortune has “(wrongly) taken.”  
We may also understand the differences between Carson’s translations more broadly as 
illustrating the non-fixity of classical reception. As Julia Gaisser puts it in her work on the 
reception of Catullus: 
Classical texts are not only moving but changing targets … [They] are not teflon-
coated baseballs hurtling through time … rather, they are pliable and sticky artifacts 
gripped, molded, and stamped with new meanings by every generation of readers and 
they come to us irreversibly altered by their experience. (387) 
This notion of the classical text as a “moving” and “changing” target is analogous, I would 
argue, to the fugitive quality of Michael. The capture of Michael is as impossible as a “teflon-
coated” translation. Whether sticking close to the meaning of the original, or creatively 
straying, translation falls short. This is further illuminated when we consider how Carson’s 
later version is still, despite her gesture toward the dictionary, far from her ideal. 
Carson admits in Nox, in much the same words as she did in her admission of not 
finding the precise word for lupein,  “I never arrived at the translation I would have liked to do 
of poem 101.” Like trying to pierce an impenetrable glass house, Carson “gropes for the light 
switch” but there is “no use expecting a flood of light.” This impossibility is made more 
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acutely following the death of Michael. Her inability to translate Catullus’s grief for his 
brother is the same inability to convey her own. A translation that can span from the ancient to 
the present, from Latin to English, and from Catullus’s brother to Michael is one that is 
imaginary, abstract, and beyond reach.  
Carson’s use of the dictionary entry in her translation is worth exploring. If the 
reconstruction of Michael via archival fragments is analogous to the translation of Catullus, 
then Carson’s experience of “archive fever” (seeking out an “origin,” that is, Michael) is also a 
febrile endeavour of uncovering the “original” meaning or poetic intention of Catullus. The 
dictionary is relevant in that it provides a definition for a word. To define is to bind, or limit, 
completely; a definition is a statement of the meaning of a word, limited to its indexical entry. 
The reference text may be considered the “etymological bedrock” which we consult. There is 
a desire for clarity when we look up a word in the dictionary; we seek out something 
categorical and absolute.26 Carson, too, desires clarity when “defining” Michael: “We want 
other people to have a centre, a history, an account that makes sense. We want to be able to 
say This is what he did and Here’s why. It forms a lock against oblivion” (N 3.3). 
The desire for a “lock against oblivion” echoes Noah (in “Short Talk on the Total 
Collection”) who denies “lack, oblivion or even the likelihood of a missing piece” (ST 43). 
One can even say that the desire to possess a cohesive history or “an account that makes sense” 
is what spurs Carson on to find the basic sense of Catullus’s words. However, the notion of 
literal meaning, or sens propre, is problematic, as Derrida points out.27 No word defined by 
Carson is restricted to a single meaning, in a perfect one-to-one correspondence. The above 
example of “multas” makes that apparent.  
                                                
26 As Carson herself states: “To categorize / means to name in public / … / To categorize / is to clarify, often” (PW 77). 
27 See “Signature Event Context” in Margins of Philosophy. 
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But why does Carson provide an exhaustive translation of each word? In Nay Rather, 
Carson describes the silence a translator encounters when a word does not translate: “In the 
presence of a word that stops itself, in that silence, one has the feeling that something has 
passed and kept going, that some possibility has got free” (26). In her indexical entries, Carson 
continues to chase after the “possibility” that has gotten free. It is not only an attempt to meet 
the silence, to reach the limit of the word where it “stops itself,” but also a way to surpass the 
silence. Carson takes each word to the farthest point where it is quiet, and then makes it sound 
again.28 As the entry continues, each of Catullus’s words is re-integrated into Carson’s own 
context and gains new meaning or inflection.29 Though she may desire a “centre” in Michael, 
this desire will never be satisfied. Both the archive and the dictionary promise to offer 
something it cannot: an origin, or source, a fundamental meaning and, as Derrida would call it, 
“pure presence.” There is, as Carson shows us, no “lock against oblivion.” A centre lacks in 
subjects in the same way that a centre lacks in words: “there are only contexts without any 
centre or absolute anchorage” (Derrida, Margins 12). We may also recognize this lack of 
centre represented in Deutsch’s description of Nox’s physical construction: the absence of a 
binding means that the pages “circle a column of air.” 
Nevertheless, this desire for cohesion and knowledge arises from the utter ambiguity 
and mystery that has surrounded Michael all his life. Between cut-out fragments of postage 
stamps, Carson pastes passage 2.2. four times in a row to emphasize the obscurity shrouding 
Michael: 
                                                
28 In Chapter 1, I discussed the “emptiness” (PW 94) and silence that Carson discovers between ideas (“towns”) in “The Life 
of Towns.” Here, Carson brings up silence, but this time refers to translation and the empty space between languages. 
29 See Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” (Margins of Philosophy 12): “Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoke or 
written … in a small or large unit can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, 
engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable.”  
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My brother ran away in 1978, rather than go to jail. He wandered in Europe and India, 
seeking something, and sent us postcards or a Christmas gift, no return address. He 
was travelling on a false passport and living under other people’s names. This isn’t 
hard to arrange. It is irremediable. I don’t know how he made his decisions in those 
days. The postcards were laconic. He wrote only one letter, to my mother, that winter 
the girl died. 
It is evident in this passage that Carson could never grasp a centre, a history, or an account of 
Michael. His disappearance and time away are unknown, as are his whereabouts, decisions, 
and identity. The fugitive quality of Michael highlighted in this passage (his running away, 
wandering, seeking, and travelling) can be seen in the “movement” of this repeated fragment 
as it shifts on the pages, eventually cutting off in its final repetition and leaving only half of 
the fragment legible. Michael’s life is one large error that is doomed to stand uncorrected, or, 
as she puts it, “It is irremediable.”  
In an attempt for transparency, it is not difficult to associate Michael with reference 
books that are typically used to consult for information and confirmed facts on specific matters 
– in short, the indexical, or “that which points.” I would argue that the archival fragments as a 
whole are indexical, each piece “pointing” to a larger narrative that is, ultimately, void of 
coherence, or a “centre.” 
The dictionary in Nox conjures up the thesaurus in “The Wishing Jewel,” which was a 
gift from Michael:  
  163 
He called me Professor and gave me Roget’s Thesaurus in the deluxe two-volume 
edition for Christmas. It is here beside me, volume one at least. He never got around to 
giving me volume two.30 (PW 246)  
Like waiting for the other shoe to drop, Carson reveals that she never received the second 
volume – ironically, the inevitable, undesired event is the fact that the second shoe did not 
drop at all. Like the non-arrival of the ideal translation, this, too, is an experience that does not 
see to an end. Even in this act of gift giving, Michael is only partially present, eventually 
vanishing as he did in 1978. Similar to Carson’s mother who vigilantly waits in the house for 
Michael, we see an echo of this anticipation and discontinuity, a sense of unfinished business.  
 The pressing question is how to define “brother” in his absence. In his elegy, Catullus 
repeats the word “frater” three times and the cognate adjective, “fraterno,” once. Carson 
defines these words as follows: 
frater 
frater fratris masculine noun  
[cf. Skt bhratar, Gk φράτηρ] a son of the same father or mother, brother; frater 
germanus: a full brother; (plural) brother and sister; (plural, transferred) of a kindred 
race; (especially vocative, as an affectionate way of referring to a person of one’s own 
age); (as a euphemism for a partner in an irregular sexual union); (as an honourific title 
for allies); (referring to a member of a religious club); cum fratre Lycisce: with dear 
old Lycis (of a dog).31 
 
                                                
30 See Passage 5.1. in Nox where this nickname is echoed: “He called me professor or pinhead, epithets implying intellectual 
respect but we never had a conversation about ideas in our life.” 
31 Defined before Passage 3.3. Subsequent definitions of “frater” read: “frater, see above frater fratris.” 
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fraterno 
fraternus fraternal fraternum adjective 
[FRATER+NUS] of or belong to a brother; proper to a brother, brotherly, fraternal; 
honourific term applied to allies.32 
Defining “brother” is a task that has long preoccupied Carson. “The Wishing Jewel” opens 
with the Roget thesaurus entry for “brother”: 
Brother (noun) associate, blood brother, cadet, colleague, fellow, frater, frère, friar, 
kinsman, sibling, soul brother, twin brother. See CLERGY, FRIEND, KINSHIP. (PW 
245) 
There are some obvious overlaps between these entries, such as kinship and alliance, but there 
is a stark contrast between these definitions and the reality of Carson’s relationship with 
Michael. The rhetorical phrase Michael uses to emphasize the incomparability of his 
relationship with his dead lover, Anna, “I have never known a closeness like that” (after N 3.3), 
may also be applied accurately to Carson’s relationship with Michael. Despite having a 
brother, he does not fit the dictionary definition of this sibling: Carson has “never known a 
closeness like that.” 
 Like Catullus, Carson repeats “brother” in Nox and refrains from using Michael’s 
name. He is referred to as “he,” “my brother,” “your brother,” or “strange brother.” But 
“brother” is clearly a word that is problematic for Carson. It is a word that is difficult to 
translate and possesses a meaning that is beyond her. A good place, appropriately, to begin 
searching for meaning is in a reference text. 
                                                
32 Defined before passage 9.1. 
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The dictionary and thesaurus intend to provide facts. Facts are important for Carson. 
Like her character Geryon, Carson “[has] a respect for facts” (AR 27). On the subject of her 
mother’s death, Carson writes, “Death is a fact” (MOH 166). The mother’s death precedes 
Michael’s death, but it is clear that in both cases, death and facts are slippery things, both 
within and out of reach for Carson. She writes in Nox: 
I am looking a long time into the muteness of my brother. It resists me … To put this 
another way, there is something that facts lack. ‘Overtakelessness’ is a word told me 
by a philosopher once: das Unumgängliche – that which cannot be got round. Cannot 
be avoided or seen to the back of. And about which one collects facts – it remains 
beyond them. (1.3) 
This may be one way to understand Carson’s dictionary entries. By attempting to define each 
word, Carson comes up against something that “cannot be got round.”33 Something “remains 
beyond.” Borrowing Heidegger’s term, das Unumgängliche, this “something” is what Carson 
translates to “overtakelessness.”  
 
Overtakelessness/das Unumgängliche 
In order to demonstrate how the failure to “overtake” presents itself in Nox, I will first 
consider its original use by Heidegger. Heidegger first uses the term “das Unumgängliche” in 
his discussion of modern science and its relation to Being.34 According to Heidegger, science 
cannot access the Being of its objects of study, and sets upon the real by “order[ing] it into 
place to the end that at any given time, the real will exhibit itself as an interacting network, i.e., 
                                                
33 As I mentioned earlier, this inability for complete grasp may be understood as the Derridean impossibility for pure presence. 
34 See “Science and Reflection” in Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1997). 
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in surveyable series of related causes” (The Question 167-8).35 In order for modern science to 
be theoretical and remain disinterested, it must observe and correspond to a fundamental 
characteristic of the real itself. That it to say, science must consider that which presences as 
object, otherwise known as “objectness” (“Gegenständigkeit”).  
 “Objectness” is a term Heidegger uses to characterize the mode of presencing that 
rules in the modern age.36 However, objectness does not take into account the whole of Being, 
but is “only one way in which what presences … reveals itself and sets itself in position for the 
refining characteristic of science” (The Question 174). An example Heidegger provides that is 
relevant to Nox is the science of psychiatry. While psychiatry may study the “objectness of the 
bodily-psychical-spiritual unity of the whole man” at a given time, the “openness-for-Being 
[Da-sein] in which man as man ek-sists, remains that which for psychiatry is not to be gotten 
around” (174, 174-5). Similarly, in 1.3 in which Carson uses “das Unumgängliche,” or 
“overtakelessness,” Michael is a subject of study that she cannot get around. All she has 
access to of Michael is his “objectness,” which differs from the objectness accessed by her 
mother, Michael’s widow, and Anna.  
Heidegger and, I would argue, Derrida and Carson, suggest something further, and that 
is that Michael himself cannot be fully encompassed. Even if we were to add up the multiple 
modes of presencing, his various “objectnesses” perceived by everyone connected to him, 
there would always be a reserve of Being. To put it simply, there will always be something 
more that cannot be grasped. We may recall the episodes of “non-arrival” related to Michael 
                                                
35 Modern science is characterized by “das Unumgängliche,” as science itself is incapable of questioning its own essence. See 
Trish Glazebrook (Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science 141) in which she writes: “For example, no experiment in physics can 
show what physics is; nor can what mathematics is itself be calculated. The essence of a science is inaccessible from within 
that science. To regain the Greek sense of the impotence of knowledge would be to recognize that knowledge needs a 
purposive guidance that no science can give itself.” 
36 See the footnote on page 163 of Heidegger’s “Science and Reflection” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays. 
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discussed thus far that illustrate a reserve or “something more” that is never secured by those 
around him, such as Carson never receiving the second volume of the thesaurus, her mother 
never receiving a return address, and the widow who understood that Anna – not she – was the 
“love of his life” (N 3.2). Michael remains at a point beyond Carson’s answerless questions 
such as “Who were you?” and “What is a voice?” (5.2). He eludes letters, phone conversations, 
and photographs: “He is giving the camera a sideways invisible look … that look. No one 
knew him” (8.2). 
Derrida would call this reserve différance, and, consequently, it denotes impossibility 
of pure presence, or, as mentioned above, Carson’s notion of “a centre, a history, an account 
that makes sense” (3.3). But this “lock against oblivion” is unthinkable on account of 
différance, or overtakelessness. As stated in 1.3, there exists that which Carson cannot avoid, 
which remains beyond her. We may understand overtakelessness in these spatial terms as 
Heidegger does in the context of modern science. Heidegger uses the term “one-sidedness” to 
describe the “blindness on the part of the sciences” (Glazebrook 15-6) to Being.37 Carson, too, 
experiences blindness and “cannot see to the back of” Michael. 
Objectness refers to only one kind of presencing. While we entrap and secure the real 
in its objectness, our experiences do not contain all of Being.38 “History” and “Language” as 
such can never be represented in their respective fields. As Heidegger states: 
Nature, man, history, language, all remain for the aforementioned sciences that which 
is not to be gotten around, already holding sway from within the objectness belonging 
                                                
37 See Trish Glazebrook (Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science 217): “Heidegger's claim is that when the one-sidedness of the 
sciences is lost to sight, then the other side is also lost. On the other side is being. The one-sidedness of the sciences is a 
preoccupation with but a single side of the ontological difference: beings.” 
38 The impossibility to contain (or, as Heidegger states, “encompass”) is also the impossibility to totalize. Returning to the 
distinction between epitaph and archive, we can understand the elegy as a pithy totalizing essence of a person. The archive is 
the ground of potential totalization. This is what comes apart, necessarily, in Nox. 
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to them, remain that toward which at any given time those sciences are directed, but 
that which, in the fullness of its coming to presence, they can never encompass by 
means of their representing. (The Question 175-6) 
 
Prowling History & Language 
“Prowling the meanings of a word, prowling the history of a person, no use expecting a flood of light.” 
 –Anne Carson (Nox 7.1) 
 
 
We may now begin to see how overtakelessness in history and language is important for 
Carson as she inquires into the biography of Michael and translates Catullus. Indeed, grief is 
framed by Carson’s own contemplation of history and translation of Elegy 101, both of which 
demonstrate a Heideggerian overtakelessness that is also, ultimately, transposed to Michael 
himself.  
In the case of the past, Carson shows us the impotence, or “non-encompassing” quality 
of History. She states: “Now by far the strangest thing that humans do … is history. This 
asking. For often it produces no clear or helpful account” (N 1.3). This lack of clarity, centre, 
and habitual overtakelessness may be seen in the example she offers of Hekataios’s fragment: 
He makes out of myrrh an egg as big as he can carry. Then he tests it out to see if he can carry it. After 
that he hollows out the egg and lays his father inside and plugs up the hollow. With father inside the egg 
weighs the same as before. Having plugged it up he carries the egg to Egypt to the temple of the sun. 
(Hekataios fr. 324 Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ed. Jacoby [Berlin 1923] cf. Herodotos 2.73) 
 
Hekataios is describing the sacred phoenix which lived in Arabia but came to 
Heliopolis in Egypt once every five hundred years to bury a father there. The phoenix 
mourns by shaping, weighing, testing, hollowing, plugging and carrying towards the 
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light. He seems to take a clear view of necessity. And in the shadows that flash over 
him as he makes his way from Arabia to Egypt maybe he comes to see the immensity 
of the mechanism in which he is caught, the immense fragility of his own flying – 
composed as it is of these ceaselessly passing shadows carried backward by the very 
motion that devours them, his motion, his asking. (1.1) 
By including this ancient description of the phoenix’s activity of mourning, Carson at once 
brings together the habitual overtakelessness of grief and history. Furthermore, this “motion,” 
or “asking,” is cyclic and never-ending. The phoenix’s flight is “immense,” “fragile,” and 
composed of “ceaselessly passing shadows carried backward by the very motion that devours 
them.” The fragment is marked by continuity and repetition. The phoenix itself is a mythical 
creature that is known to die and revive from its own ashes. Death and the mourning ritual is 
also a regular occurrence, taking place “once every five hundred years.” But this flight from 
Arabia to Egypt is itself unending. Grief does not finish at the temple of the sun, but will 
repeat again in five hundred years, and so on. It is only in flight, in mourning, that the phoenix 
realizes “the immensity of the mechanism in which he is caught.” 
More striking is the image of the egg, now hollowed out and containing a dead parent. 
The egg is a common image of birth, a point of beginning in the life cycle. The phoenix’s 
mourning ritual, however, troubles this notion of beginnings, as the egg becomes a vessel for 
the dead. The parent no longer carries the egg in preparation for life, but it is the phoenix/child 
that holds the egg in death.39 While Hekataios’s fragment above sheds light on the cyclic 
return of death, I would argue that the more important movement is unbroken continuation. 
Death’s envelopment in life, as seen in the image of the egg, blurs the clear point of origin, or 
                                                
39 A similar image of eternal return is found in Williams’s Paterson: “the snake with its tail in / its mouth / rolls backward into 
the past” (212). 
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beginning. Like the phoenix rising out of the ashes, or the egg posing as a coffin, there 
remains a trace of death. As Carson writes, “Death lines every moment of ordinary time” 
(MOH 166). 
 Paralleling the physical and metaphorical shape of the egg in Hekataios’s fragment, 
Carson’s own grief is characterized by ellipses. During her visit with Michael’s widow in 
Copenhagen, Carson alludes to the phoenix’s mourning ritual. For instance, the church in 
which Michael’s funeral takes place is described as “white and clean as an eggshell inside” (N 
5.4). Furthermore, the regenerative quality of the phoenix is suggested in 8.3 when Carson 
writes: “More than one person has pointed out to me a likeness between my brother and 
Lazarus.” 
A more explicit echo to the phoenix is made when, in the church, Carson lets “the 
sheets of memory blow on the line” (N 5.5) and recalls the funerals of her parents. She writes: 
“both my parents were laid out in their coffins (years apart, accidentally) in bright yellow 
sweaters. They looked like beautiful peaceful egg yolks. I have always admired the design of 
the egg – yellow circle within a white oval” (5.5). A small painting of two yellow ellipses 
precedes this fragment. A cut-up negative of an egg in a nest follows it. By invoking the 
phoenix described by Hekataios, Carson participates in this ritualistic mourning, aligning, 
once again, an egg with death. Like the phoenix who adheres to this custom once every five 
hundred years, Carson, too, repeats (“years apart”) the dressing of her parents in yellow 
sweaters. Here the coffin and the church, like the egg, harbours death. From antiquity to the 
present, Carson engages in the same immense “mechanism” that repeats, is continuous, and 
sees no end. The immensity of this timeless, endless mechanism opens out to the processes 
found in elegy and translation, but also the figure in perpetual motion, which cannot be 
  171 
apprehended in Michael. Herodotos quotes Pindar in 5.5, “Custom is king of all” (3.38.1-3), 
and it is the custom of mourning that reigns. It is a continuous circling, like the sunflowers that 
Michael’s widow throws into the sea after she puts in his ashes; the sunflowers continue to 
“turn around on the water” (7.2). 
 This notion of the elliptical that participates in activities of mourning (and, in a larger 
context, history) is also seen in language. The elliptical refers not only to the ellipse, but also 
to ellipsis. There are, for instance, the ellipses that punctuate much of Michael’s discourse. 
Part of what makes Michael so elusive is his silence. His letters are few and far between and 
are described as “laconic” (N 2.2). When he phones, there exists impenetrable silences: “when 
he telephoned me … about half a year after our mother died he had nothing to say” (5.1). And 
it goes further than mere silence; even when Michael speaks or writes, his discourse is 
elliptical, in the sense that it is cryptic. Indeed the fragments themselves are visually presented 
to emphasize their fragmentary states by being smudged, ripped, folded, and unreadable, but 
the fragments of Michael’s dialogue also suggest something more that is not being shown. The 
transcribed conversation after 5.1 illustrates Michael’s clipped responses to Carson and 
provides no clue as to what he is thinking, feeling, and experiencing: 
 Mother is dead. 
 Yes I guess she is. 
 She had a lot of pain because of you. 
 Yes I guess she did. 
 Why didn’t you write. 
 Well it was for hard for me. 
 Are you sick. 
No. 
Do you work. 
Yes. 
Are you happy. 
No. Oh no. 
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Michael’s recycled and curt responses give us a strong sense that there is much left unsaid. 
Meaning, or the overtakelessness of meaning, troubles Carson and she aligns their dialogues 
with her “dialogue” with Catullus. Listening to Michael is itself an encounter with différance, 
and is a language that requires the supplement of translation: “Because our conversations were 
few (he phoned me maybe 5 times in 22 years) I study his sentences the ones I remember as if 
I’d been asked to translate them” (8.1). Following this fragment is a list of phrases Carson has 
transcribed, all of which are opaque and assembled together at random, reminiscent of a found 
poem: 
Lots of crime in Copenhagen. 
Danes are hardworking. 
I am painting the flat. 
We have a dog that’s him barking. 
Yes he barks in Danish. 
Don’t go back to the farm don’t go alone. 
What will you do sit on Bald Rock and look 
down at the graves. 
Put the past away you have to. 
 
Needless to say, the affect and tone captured in these lines are ambiguous. Succinct and 
withheld, we cannot help but recall Carson’s question that haunts her: “What is a voice?” At 
this point in Nox, Carson illuminates the “overtakelessness” of language. While temporal and 
linguistic distances may be more obvious in the translation of an ancient Roman poem, similar 
distances are inherent in all iterations, despite the common language shared between speakers, 
and despite, more unfortunately, kinship. To traverse these distances and reach a precise and 
“pure” meaning of Michael’s utterances would be like finding the ideal, adequate translation. 
As Carson discovers: “I never arrived at the translation I would have liked … I came to think 
of translating as a room … I guess it never ends” (7.1). She continues to prowl in a dark room. 
Though Michael’s voice may “light up for a moment” (5.2) when he calls her by a familiar, 
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childhood epithet (“pinhead”), it goes “dark again” and his voice remains “crusted … black, 
dense” (5.2).40 One may grope for a light but, as Carson states, “Human words have no main 
switch” (7.1). Comparable with Heidegger’s assertion that the whole of being cannot be 
encompassed but may only be understood via objectness, for Carson there exists only 
moments of light that go dark again. There is “no use expecting a flood of light” (7.1) to 
brighten every corner of the room. 
 In addition to mourning and understanding Michael, the “elliptical” is also played out 
in Carson’s translation of Catullus. She introduces the ellipse in the first indexical entry, 
“multas:” “many thing, much, to a great extent, many words especially in elliptical phrases …” 
Again, “elliptical” may denote a) a cyclic motion, or b) phraseological ambiguity. The 
recurrence of “nox,” or “night,” in her indexical entries contains both meanings as it is 
phrased and rephrased in various ways throughout the text. Stang notes: “It is odd that nearly 
all [of] Carson’s entries on Catullus’s poem 101 are bent toward nox, since it is not one of the 
elegy’s sixty-three finely chosen words.” Indeed nox creeps into the creative “definitions” 
provided by Carson, and its regular appearance marks a linguistic and spatial ellipse. So, how 
can we understand nox as it functions in Carson’s work of mourning and translating? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 Carson describes a similar experience communicating with her brother in Plainwater: “Then very early one morning, about 
three years after he left, he called from Copenhagen (collect). I stood on the cold linoleum, listening to a voice that sounded 
like him in a padded costume. Layers and layers of hard times and resentment crusted on it” (246-7). 
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The Recurring Nox 
“The world’s darkening never reaches  
to the light of Being.” 
–Heidegger (Poetry, Language, Thought 4) 
 
 
In order to answer this, I would like to return to Heidegger’s concept of overtakelessness and 
its use in Carson’s poem “Longing, A Documentary” (D 241). The poem, which plays with the 
form of a cinematic shot list, describes a woman who drives out into the night and lays out 
photographic papers at the bank of a river in attempt to capture something. What this 
“something” is remains ambiguous. The photographic paper may be used to catch moonlight 
through the water, or, perhaps, night itself.  
The subtitles of shots 9, 10, and 15 are striking in that they reiterate a similar struggle 
in Nox and draw an intimate link between night and overtakelessness: 
“Night is not a fact.” 
“Facts lack something, she thought.” 
“‘Overtakelessness’ (what facts lack).” (D 244-45) 
Overtakelessness, defined by Carson is “what facts lack.” As we’ve seen earlier, 
overtakelessness is indeed a kind of lack, in the sense that what we perceive fixes an object in 
time, allowing us access to only one instance of presencing. However, an object as we 
conceive of it is a donation of Being. Being gives as it withdraws. We cannot encounter all of 
Being; there is something more inaccessible to us – we encounter overtakelessness, a lack. 
How, then, can we read “night” (which is “not a fact”) in this poem?  
The poem details the speaker’s wait (“she sits awhile in the reeds, arm on knees” [D 
245]) and it remains uncertain if she has captured what she wanted on the photographic paper. 
Despite this uncertainty, the final subtitle of the speaker driving off suggests that this task is 
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cyclic: “As usual she enjoyed the sense of work, of having worked. Other fears would soon 
return” (245). Indeed, the beginning of this poem already suggests the repetitive nature of this 
art: “It was for such a night she had waited” (243).  
 Night returns for Carson. Night, or nox, marks a similar overtakelessness in “Longing” 
as it does in the elegy for her brother. While “nox” does not appear in Catullus’s poem, 
Carson still encounters it in her indexical entries. It is not simply a metaphor for death, but as 
the word appears and reappears throughout the book, it points to something more difficult to 
grasp.41 “Nox” diverts Carson away from the neutral genre of the dictionary entry and its 
intimation as denotative “bedrock.” It deflects her from the fidelity of meaning so she cannot 
“see to the back of” the word.42 “Nox” is an obstacle that counters fact and keeps facts lacking. 
As Carson puts it in “Longing,” “Night plucks her, she stumbles, stops” (D 243). 
 I would argue that Heidegger provides a way to access nox. As Carson suggests in 
“Longing,” nox is not a fact that can be overtaken; nox, then, can be thought of as Being, in 
the sense that it is a “fullness” which cannot be “encompassed.” As Heidegger states, “Nature, 
man, history, language” (The Question 175) are all that cannot be gotten around, and indeed, 
these are all subjects that Carson associates intimately with night. The overtakelessness of 
language, for instance, is made apparent by the indexical entry. There is no one single 
meaning of a word, in the same way that there is more than just one instance of presencing or 
“objectness.” A word’s Being is something that cannot be seen to the back of, and though we 
may reach the end of the entry, the very appearance of “nox” suggests that we did not reach 
                                                
41 Deutsch also contemplates the relevance of “nox,” but does not settle on one thing. See Deutsch (“Tribute and Farewell”): 
“Nothing could prepare you for Nox, but the title tries: It sounds like ‘book’ and ‘box,’ and ‘nix’ and ‘knocks,’ maybe even 
‘knick-knack.’ To elegize her brother, Anne Carson has packed a study of night and nothingness in a cardboard container.” 
42 In a discussion on Celan and Hölderlin, Carson writes: “Now a private language is a kind of riddle. It raises the same 
problem of pure origin: you cannot get behind the back of it” (Economy 132). The inability to “see” or “get to the back of” 
something is the same in the case of “pure origin,” or “pure presence” in language and Michael. Carson describes this inability 
as “overtakelessness.” 
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the end of the word at all. “Nox” signals a reservoir of Being that offers further exploration. 
We may think of these indexical entries as a line, defined in mathematics as a continuous 
entity, or, as Euclid put it, a “breadthless length.” While each meaning offered by Carson may 
be plotted on a line, there is no end point. The word is never present. 
It would be tedious to examine every single occurrence of “nox” in the text, so I would 
like to point out a few selections from the indexical entries. These examples also participate in 
the conceit of night as Being. I have ordered these entries in such a way to illustrate the 
“breadthless length” of night/Being and its “uncontainability”: 
multas: occurring in a high degree, full, intense, multa dies or multa lox: broad 
daylight, multa nox: late in the night, perhaps too late. 
 
et: and after all that? (adding an enlargement of the thought) and indeed, and 
moreover; … (et nocte) (you know it was night) 
 
aequora: a level stretch of ground, plain; inmensumne noctis aequor confecimus? have 
we made it across the vast plain of night? 
 
advenio: advenientes ad angulos noctis reaching to the very corners of the night. 
 
ad: on the side next to, ad dextram, laevam, noctem on the right, left, night side etc. 
Though fragmentary and allusive, Carson’s mentions of “nox” contain Heideggerian 
resonances. Described as “full,” and “intense” (multas), night is appended with a “moreover” 
(et), a suggestion that there is something further. Night has an unfathomable depth (“reaching 
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into the corners of the night”) and a mystifying vastness (“have we made it across the vast 
plain of night?”), which is, respectively, unreachable and uncrossable. “Night side” echoes 
Heidegger’s calling science “one-sided.” Science is only equipped to deal with “objectness” 
(beings), but not the “other side” of ontology (the “Night side”), which pertains to Being. 
 It is important to point out that Carson’s encounter with nox is not neutral, but is 
wrought by grief and frustration. This is made apparent when we consider the genre of the 
indexical entry, and the addition of a subjective voice to the otherwise “neutral” genre. Carson 
is aware of the ubiquitous night and the overtakelessness that exists, but, like anyone who 
partakes in translation or history, is frustrated by the inherent shortcomings: 
atque: similiter atque ipse eram noctuabunda just like him I was a negotiator with 
night. 
 
miseras: nocte fratris quam ipso frater miserior: made sadder by the brother’s night 
than by the brother himself 
 
quae: an unspecified, any, anyone called - ; anyone, anything; quod homo est non est 
hoc nox a man is not a night! 
 
vale: to mean, signify, parum valent graeci verbo the Greeks have no precise word for 
this (but we call it ‘night’). 
While I propose to think about the salience of nox in terms of Being, a more sombre reading 
lurks in the background. I would posit that, beyond death, what Carson mourns is not the loss 
of the “brother himself” but the “brother’s night” or Being, the realization that she is unable to 
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fully know Michael. She may protest that “a man is not a night!” but, dismayingly, Michael’s 
meaning and signification is ungraspable: “we call it ‘night.’”  
Carson touches on the nonsensical nature of Being (and grief) and, ultimately, the 
“blindness” of language. As Derrida puts it, “Being itself is alone in its absolute resistance to 
every metaphor” (Writing 73). Thus, while Carson may understand that she is prowling a dark 
room with no end in sight, the poetic configuration of darkness, night, or nox that she sets up 
breaks down and is itself also an inadequate frame for dealing with Carson’s study: 
donarem: ego te quid donem? what would I give you? nox nihil donat nothing is 
night’s gift. 
 
manantia: omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat the whole pointless night seeps 
out of the heart. 
 
“There is no possibility I can think my way into his muteness. God wanted to make 
nonsense of “overtakelessness” itself. To rob its juice, and I believe God has 
succeeded.” (N 8.5) 
How perfectly the metaphor of night maps onto Being is perhaps beside the point. I would 
argue that what Carson stresses in Nox is that language itself is no match for grief, and, by 
extension, Being. Language is a vehicle that cannot convey the meaning behind Michael’s 
utterances, or the ideal translation of Catullus. There is no light, and no main switch. Night, 
thus, is a befitting representation in line with Heidegger’s notion of Being. As he states: 
…what is inaccessible and not to be gotten around remains inconspicuousness … The 
inconspicuousness of the state of affairs, its failure to shine forth, is grounded rather in 
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the fact that it, of itself, does not come to appearance. (The Question 178-9; emphasis 
mine) 
In the footnote we learn that “inconspicuous,” or  “unscheinbar,” means literally, “not shining,” 
“not bright” (Heidegger, The Question 177). The inaccessible (“overtakelessness”) is 
associated with the inconspicuous (“not shining,” or, I would say, “nox”). Carson makes an 
exception to the inconspicuous and offers moments of illumination and appearance, but all, in 
the end, return to the dark. Michael’s voice lighting up over the phone is a mere flicker. A 
more striking image Carson offers is the ideal translation that is perceived but then forgotten, 
much like in her dream of translating Electra: 
But all those little kidnaps in the dark. And then the luminous, big, shivering, 
discandied, unrepentant, barking web of them that hangs in your mind when you turn 
back to the page you were trying to translate. (N 7.1) 
How then, does Carson’s engagement with Heidegger affect her process of translation, and, 
more pressingly, redeem her despairing stance toward her grief? At the end of “Science and 
Reflection,” Heidegger writes:  
What have we achieved? We have become attentive to that which is inaccessible and 
not to be gotten around, which is constantly passed over. … We shall be satisfied with 
having pointed to the inconspicuous state of affairs. … Through this pointing to the 
inconspicuous state of affairs we are, however, directed onto a way that brings us 
before that which is worthy of questioning. (The Question 179; emphasis mine) 
Carson, too, has become attentive to the “overtakelessness” of her tasks posed in Nox. Though 
unable to look or think her way into Michael’s “muteness” she can, at least, contemplate “that 
which cannot be got round” (N 1.3): her encounter with nox, the prowling of a dark room. We 
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return, once again, to the indexical entries, always pointing toward Being, or nox: “In one 
sense it is a room I can never leave, perhaps dreadful for that. At the same time, a place 
composed entirely of entries” (7.1). 
 
Conclusion 
The layered and entangled abundance that Carson provides in Nox illustrates her primary 
concerns laid out in her earlier works: the reception of the past, its reactivation in the present, 
and the accompanying error, loss, and novelty. The material and visual features of Nox emerge 
out of Carson’s scholarly and creative interest in ancient Greek fragments, the wreckage of the 
classical past, and the space of loss, absence, and imaginative possibilities. In this chapter, I 
continue my discussion on “rupture,” but this time broaden the scope to address the material 
aspects of the archive (both classical and personal), and the importance of adjacency with 
which we read the generic, visual, and linguistic dimensions of the book. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I set out to elucidate the constellative array in Nox and 
argue that Carson’s grief for Michael is also at once grief for archival and linguistic loss. I also 
set out to investigate the implications in Fragopoulos’s statement, “what Carson finally 
accedes to is the very darkness of it all.” The “darkness” of it all, which may be conveniently 
rephrased to “the nox of it all,” does not only pertain to Michael’s death, but, simultaneously, 
history, language, and the archive. The treatment of personal loss is also the treatment of these 
adjacent subjects, in which “overtakelessness” and endless “prowling” exist. To be a 
“negotiator of night” does not imply that a deal will be reached, but that one is always 
negotiating.  
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Steedman states: “Historians, writing the narrative that has no end, certainly make 
endings, but as we are still in it, the great, slow moving Everything, in which nothing has gone 
away and never shall, you can produce only an Ending, which is a different thing indeed from 
an End” (167). As in translation, there may be “an ending” – Carson eventually produces a 
translation – but “an End” (the imaginary translation) does not exist. 
 So to return to what Stang notes, I would argue that the absence of the word “nox” in 
Catullus’s poem does not indicate the absence of nox in the Carsonion-Heideggerian sense. 
Catullus, too, stares into the “muteness” of his brother, and speaks “with mute ash.” Elegy 101 
is itself a “little kidnap in the dark,” a “luminous … web” (N 7.1), or template that Carson 
employs to chart out her own grief. Though “nox” does not appear as one of Catullus’s 63 
words, the fathomless depths and distances of his brother imply a sense of “overtakelessness”: 
“into forever, brother, farewell and farewell.” Just like death, nox “hides right inside every 
shining sentence we grasped and had no grasp of” (MOH 166). 
 A possible answer, finally, that responds to the overarching question of Carson’s 
fugitive brother may be found quite neatly in  “The Wishing Jewel” wherein the swimmer 
plunges into the “black glass of the lake”:  
The swimmer is grateful to escape underneath to where his dim water kingdom 
receives him. Silently. … Who else ever knew me? the swimmer thinks. The hand with 
the wedding ring floats down past his face and disappears. No one. (PW 249) 
In the next chapter, I will return to error, but shift my focus to error in Eros. Through Carson’s 
love-narratives, I want to develop the concept of eros (commonly understood as love or sexual 
desire) to also encompass errancy in the re-membering of erotic experience, and, by extension, 
desire for totality within the archive. Carson’s assertion that “Eros is in between” (Eros 109) 
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engenders the liminal spaces that I have hitherto discussed. Eros is not only between lovers, 
but also occupies the gaps, leaps, and distances in language and time.  
Crucial to my argument is the demented father, a recurring figure in Carson’s work. If 
the desire for an origin and totality is intrinsic to the “law” of the patri-archive, then the 
presence of the demented father suggests a resistance to such a desire and, consequently, an 
alternative conceptual model of the archive. In addition, the father has a bearing on established 
and traditional notions of eros as a “totalizing” affect, what Lacan calls the “becoming a One.” 
The terms I have used thus far – “error,” “accident,” “spillage,” and “non-arrival” – can be 
adapted to Carson’s depictions of eros and the disordered state of the Father. Recalling 
Derrida’s assertion that “there is no madness without the law” (“The Law of Genre” 81), I 
want to conceptualize the archive (or the “madness” of the text) in terms of the father’s 
madness, as well as erotic madness.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
“Eros is in Between”: Desire and the Archive 
 
 
“The history of a text is like a long caress.” 
–Anne Carson (AR 6) 
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Thus far, I have argued that Anne Carson’s response to the classical archive is framed within 
the parameters of error and accident. Carson does not work to preserve or to find coherence in 
the past; rather, she embraces and incorporates the temporal, linguistic, and even physical gaps 
inherent in ancient texts. The inclusion of mistakes in transmission as well as contingencies 
that arise in the poetic process itself all contribute to what I call Carson’s poetics of error. 
Sappho – her fragments, as well as her ambiguous biography – is emblematic of 
Carsonian poetics. The “rupture” that fragments the material remains of Sappho’s work is 
crucial to Carson’s own work; when we hear or detect the ancient poet in Carson (in the form 
of a line of poetry, or as a fictional character), we are alerted to a poetics that is non-linear and 
experimental. The “Sapphic” connotes not only transgressive female or lesbian desires (which 
Phaedrus describes as “a mistake in nature” [qtd in. Williamson 30; emphasis mine]), but also 
ruptures in the textual and archival registers. In opposition to the contained, determined, and 
stable qualities supposedly intrinsic to the archive (as well as history), “Sappho” indexes 
incompleteness, omission, and chaos. 
In the previous chapter, I continued to investigate absence, but shifted my focus from 
Sappho to the figure of Carson’s late brother, Michael. In her attempts to discover Michael’s 
history and personage, she turns to Catullus’s poem 101, an elegy written by the ancient poet 
for his own brother. Bringing together the classical genre of the elegy with the familial, 
Carson examines translation, the archive, and mourning. Keeping in mind that Carson’s 
poetics challenges the stable and the accurate, here she focuses on the overwhelming 
impossibility of an error-less, ordered, and complete mastery of language, history, and grief. 
The genre of the elegy is a summation: it totalizes both the deceased’s life and the speaker’s 
grief, giving formal expression to grief and a sense of resolution to a life. Carson, however, 
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troubles the genre and its desire for totalization and offers, instead, an archive composed of 
scraps and traces.  
Both Sappho and Michael are bodies constituted by perpetual absence. We receive 
them as arbitrary fragments and scraps. In If Not, Winter and Nox, their remnants are presented 
on the pages as surrounded by white space, indicative of what Carson calls “physical silence,” 
or the part of the text that has fallen quiet. In Nox, for example, Carson intentionally cuts up 
old photographs. This was done, on the one hand, because the backgrounds were too “full of 
truth” (Aitken). On the other hand, she notes that “the more you cut, the more story they 
gather” (King). Empty space gives way to speculation – and if Michael (as a recovered or 
reconstructed object of poetic practice) is reminiscent of Sappho, then we know that this 
speculation is ongoing and endless. There is no clear route to the “truth” of Michael; rather, 
there is simply a reconstruction, or a “re-membering” of parts. The past, as Carson 
demonstrates, is open. It is open to our interpretations and fictions, and remains open to future 
retellings and revisions. 
While I have discussed the archive in the context of translation, grief, and history, in 
this chapter I want to turn to the erotic dimension of the archive. In this regard, Carson tells us, 
“the history of a text is like a long caress” (AR 6). This line intimately combines the historical, 
textual, and amatory registers. We can theorize a textual erotics by means of Roland Barthes’s 
The Pleasure of the Text, wherein he explicates an erotics of reading: the text generates either 
pleasure or jouissance.1 For Barthes, the pleasurable text is associated with “a comfortable 
practice of reading” (PT 14) in which the reader’s relationship to language is confirmed as 
something “stable and limited” (Makaryk 607). The pleasurable text does not challenge the 
                                                
1 According to Barthes, pleasure is associated with the readerly text, whereas bliss, or jouissance, is associated with the 
writerly text. See Barthes (PT 14) in which he defines the “Text of Pleasure” and “Text of Bliss.” 
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reader; rather, the reader’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectations are confirmed. The text of 
jouissance (translated most closely to bliss or enjoyment), on the other hand, is one that 
produces discomfort, bringing loss, rupture, and crisis to the reader’s relation with language. 
Following Barthes, I want to argue that Carson’s attitude toward the archive is not one of 
pleasure (as found in the readerly text), but one of jouissance, by means of which her poetry 
“unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions” (Barthes, PT 14).  
History, textuality, and love are all at risk of fragmentation, rupture, and error. 
Carson’s deliberate intertextuality in her love narratives draws attention to the fissures of 
language, as well as to the shortcomings of love, and offers an affective orientation toward the 
archive. Love, as presented by Carson, does not simply refer to a sexual desire for the beloved, 
but rather to a broader desire for a totality that extends to the past. In fact, I propose to 
approach eros not as “love” or “feelings,” but as a site or situation of in-between-ness. 
According to Carson:  
Eros is an issue of boundaries … in the interval between reach and grasp, between 
glance and counter glance, between “I love you” and “I love you too,” the absent 
presence of desire comes alive. But the boundaries of time and glance and I love you 
are only aftershocks of the main, inevitable boundary that creates Eros: the boundary 
of flesh and self between you and me. And it is only, suddenly, at the moment when I 
would dissolve that boundary, I realize I never can. (Eros 30) 
The liminal space of the erotic is also the poetic, affective, conceptual, and linguistic  
“between” space of error that I have already outlined in Carson’s work. Eros is between “reach 
and grasp,” “glance and counter glance,” “you and me,” but also between antiquity and the 
present, Greek and English, the critical and the creative, the fragment and the whole, and one 
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literary genre and another.2 Time and distance are obstacles to continuity, coherence, and 
totalization, yet the desire persists. The impossible moment in which the boundary “dissolves” 
is the impossible moment of reciprocity and fulfillment. Eros, as a historical and traditional 
theme of poetry, sets up Carson’s procedures of error and errancy in the archive, whether 
classical, modern, literary, or familial.  
 Given the “between-ness” of eros, I want to return briefly to Derrida’s model of the 
archive. At the outset of Archive Fever, Derrida argues that the archive is to be understood not 
as a collection of documents, but rather as any “founding” and sustaining myth of 
commencement (absolute origin) and commandment (the law of the father). As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the Greek ἀρχή [arkhē] “names at once the commencement and the commandment” 
(Derrida, AF 1). Ideologically, the archive is configured as ordered, self-enclosed, and total:  
the ontological principle of the archive, or its guarantee of the coherence of the subject within 
a nation or a tradition, inheres in the trans-historical phenomena of repetition, citation, and 
ritual. For Derrida, the function of the archive is to laminate the present to the past, and thus to 
guarantee a certain futurity. Essentially a theory of the temporality of the subject, the archive 
inheres in the archival event – in that moment when the tradition is invoked. How then does 
eros suggest a destabilizing of the regulatory logics of the archive? How do we conceive of a 
law-less archive – one without a stable point of origin? To respond to this problem, we must 
turn to the figure of the father. 
The demented father, who appears in a number of Carson’s works, gives us a way to 
understand her fragmentary poetics. While much of Carson’s writing is autobiographical (and 
her father did, indeed, suffer from dementia), I suggest that we read the father figure in her 
                                                
2 This “between space” is very important to Carson. As she once stated in a lecture, “Nothing to me is more interesting than 
the spaces between languages” (qtd. in D’Agata, “Review: Men in the Off Hours”). 
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oeuvre structurally, as the Lacanian nom/non du père, signalling both authority (or the Law) 
and prohibition.3 Tanis MacDonald, in her reading of “The Anthropology of Water,” argues 
that the father-daughter relationship parallels that of the relationship between pilgrim and saint, 
and that his “indecipherable speech suggests paternal knowledge codified by divinity as well 
as disease” (68). In this chapter, I will provide an alternative reading of the father-daughter 
relationship as one that focuses on both archival and erotic desires as error. The father’s 
dementia (which emerges as “indecipherable speech”) encodes the impossibility of these 
desires. If the father is sick and his ordering function compromised, what does that mean for 
the archive? More to the point, it raises the question of the situation of the daughter, of the 
daughter who writes, in relation to that archive. 
The demented father indexes a fractured, inconsistent archive, no longer superintended 
by a phallocentric authority. Thus, the archive is not a patri-archive; rather, it becomes 
something alternative, or Sapphic. My use of “Sapphic” does not simply refer to a binary 
opposition, but a resistance to the commandment and commencement of the archive. The 
freedom to err means a movement toward the inconclusive, as perceived in the fragment. The 
Sapphic rupture disturbs and destabilizes the notion of a fixed origin, or order. A Sapphic 
archive, thus, is one that refrains from stability, containment, and continuity. There are, as 
Carson carefully shows us in her explorations of history, grief, and love, things that manage to 
escape (what I have already termed “leakage”): “Water is something you cannot hold. Like 
men. I have tried. Father, brother, lover, true friends, hungry ghosts and God, one by one all 
                                                
3 Lacan plays with homonyms “nom” and “non” to emphasize the symbolic element that is operative in the paternal (or 
authority) figure: “the Father’s name (le nom du père) and the father’s no-saying (le non du père)” (Fink, The Lacanian 
Subject 57). For more, see Fink (The Lacanian Subject 106): “Despite the infinite permutations allowed by language in the 
constitution of desire, man can be seen as bounded or finite with respect to the symbolic register. Translated in terms of desire, 
the boundary is the father and his incest taboo: man’s desire never goes beyond the incestuous wish, impossible to realize, as 
that would involve overstepping the father’s boundaries, and thus uprooting the very ‘anchoring point’ of neurosis: le nom du 
père, the father’s name, but also le non du père, the father’s ‘No!’” 
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took themselves out of my hands” (PW 117). The demented father also signals a rupture of 
concepts traditionally regarded as phallocentric. The weakened father is thus a useful model 
when considering alternative models of both the archive and its amatory dimension.  
I will begin by linking love, as conceptualized by Lacan in Seminar XX, with the 
archive, both of which are informed by the desire for wholeness and totality. I will then 
demonstrate that the demented father, a recurring figure in Carson’s work, is an apposite trope 
for both the “demented” archive – one that is not stable or closed – and erroneous love – one 
that does not fulfill the fantasy of “oneness.” Carson’s use of intertextuality is indicative of 
both the fractured mind of the father and the openness of an archive no longer governed by the 
patriarchal order. I will turn finally to The Beauty of the Husband, a long poem which makes 
use of Keats and the classical archive in its telling of a failed marriage. The temporal 
difference in this text is the very matrix of Carson’s re-membering of a history of erotic 
intimacy. If the erotic discourse in the individual text or line is an expression of that desire 
across distance, then the erotic, as a history of an error, is the “errant” in engagement with the 
archive and its literary allusions. By bringing together erotic desire and Derrida’s archive fever, 
I want to demonstrate that if desire is always the desire to make whole, then the experience of 
the archive is erotic. To lose oneself in love is to lose oneself in the archive. 
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Eros: The One is Not 
“Eros is a verb.” 
 –Anne Carson (Eros 17) 
 
“Consider incompleteness as a verb.” 
 –Anne Carson (PW 16) 
 
 
According to Sharon Wahl, what makes Carson’s melding of classical scholarship and poetry 
so compelling is “a third obsession, her study of the longing for, and loss of, romantic love” 
(180). Chris Jennings, too, notes the importance of this “obsession” and suggests that Eros the 
Bittersweet constitutes the groundwork for Carson’s writing. The triangular structure that 
Carson explores in Sappho’s fragment 31 “provides a figure for eros that illuminates a 
recurring pattern in [Carson’s] own poetics” (Jennings 923). The relationship of love to the 
archive is, I argue, one that finds its commonality in desire. While I have discussed desire in 
its many manifestations, such as the desire for a fixed point of origin, the desire for textual 
wholeness, and the desire for a “lock against oblivion” (N 3.3), here I want to turn to desire in 
its most quintessentially Sapphic form: desire as eros.  
Carson, whose doctoral research focused on what the ancient Greek poets mean by 
eros, continues to explore erotic experience in her poetic work. In line with my earlier 
discussion of the desire for totality, there is, perhaps, no other experience more preoccupied 
with wholeness or “consummation” in its etymological sense: to be “together” (con-) as a 
“sum” (summa) or “total.” Inherent in love is an expectation of “oneness.” As Alistair 
Blanshard puts it, “When love is reciprocated it means that one has found one’s other half … 
Love helps make us whole” (106).  
And yet the wholeness we think we can find through love, according to the Lacanian 
critique, is just a delusive fantasy, an imaginary reconstruction of a mythical “pre-symbolic” 
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state, prior to the fall into division, language, and lack. Love is an imaginary means to fill the 
hole that is created when we are amputated from the Parent by the scalpel of the signifier.4 To 
be a subject is to be a fragment, but the most primal insistence of fantasy is that love can make 
up for what was lost. Bruce Fink makes clear that this fantasy has long presided over popular 
conceptions of love, and harks back to antiquity: 
The fantasy of harmony between the sexes has a long and distinguished lineage, 
insofar as we can trace it back to at least Plato’s Symposium, where we see 
Aristophanes put forward the view that once we were all spherical beings lacking in 
nothing, but Zeus split us in two, and now we are all in search of our other half. We 
divided beings yearn to be grafted back together, failing which we at least find relief in 
each other’s arms (thanks to Zeus having taken pity on us, turning our private parts 
around to the inside). As Aristophanes says, “Love thus seeks to refind our early estate, 
endeavouring to combine two into one and heal the human sore” (Loeb edition, 1967, 
141). Love is what can make good the primordial split, and harmony can be achieved 
thereby.5 (“Knowledge and Jouissance” 29) 
Here Aristophanes illustrates what Lacan describes as “fantasy” – that love will “heal” the 
split we experienced when separated from the mother and will thus return us to a state of 
primordial completion. 6  However, Lacan argues that there is no putting together two 
                                                
4 There are innumerable references of this fantasy found in our culture. The lyrics in a Cyndi Lauper song (“This hole in my 
heart that goes all the way to China / You gotta fill it up with love before I fall inside”) suggest just that. Take, as another 
example, the line uttered by Tom Cruise’s character to his beloved in Jerry Maguire (1996): “You complete me.” 
5 See Sigmund Freud (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 51) in which he discusses Aristophanes: “…science has so little to tell 
us about the origin of sexuality that we can liken the problem to a darkness into which not so much as a ray of a hypothesis 
has penetrated. In quite a different region, it is true, we do meet with such a hypothesis; but it is of so fantastic a kind – a myth 
rather than a scientific explanation – that I should not venture to produce it here, were it not that it fulfills precisely the one 
condition whose fulfillment we desire. For it traces the origin of an instinct to a need to restore an earlier state of things. 
What I have in mind is, of course, the theory which Plato put into the mouth of Aristophanes in the Symposium.” 
6 As Lacan states, “‘We are but one.’ Everyone knows, of course, that two have never become but one, but nevertheless, ‘we 
are but one.’ The idea of love begins with that” (Lacan, XX 47). 
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fragments to become a “one.” Our entrance into the symbolic order, whereby we become 
subjects of language (an “I”), results in a loss. We are thus necessarily and irremediably 
fragmented. This process, termed “castration,” leaves a phantom object behind, called the 
objet petit autre, the object-cause of desire. The object functions like a hole that can never be 
filled and its unique shape causes our singular desires, dictating the means by which we 
attempt to make up for what is forever lost.7 Love is the fantasy that urges us to believe that 
we can return to a primordial state of oneness by means of an erotic reconciliation.  
Love, however, is an ongoing search for the soulmate, or “the one.”8 Fulfillment 
remains always in the future. As Carson understands it, “Eros is a verb” (Eros 17). The 
opening quotations of this section, which I’ve placed together to highlight their similar syntax, 
work together to demonstrate that we desire and move from lover to lover in an attempt to fuse 
into one, but our unfruitful pursuits are perpetuated by our being irrevocably incomplete. Thus, 
the line, “Consider incompleteness as a verb” (PW 16), gains another layer of meaning: 
“incompleteness” not only refers to the papyrus fragments that comprise the classical archive, 
as I have used earlier, but also the fragmentary (or castrated) state of the Lacanian subject. We 
desire, but we desire because we lack. Eros and incompleteness work mutually as verbs in an 
ongoing search for fulfillment and wholeness.9 
                                                
7 Carson makes a similar observation in Eros the Bittersweet: “If we follow the trajectory of eros we consistently find it 
tracing out this same route: it moves out from the lover toward the beloved, then ricochets back to the lover himself and the 
hole in him, unnoticed before. Who is the real subject of most love poems? Not the beloved. It is that hole” (30). 
8 The “ongoing” search I mention here is associated with Lacan’s model of the drive. To put something very complex very 
simply, we could say that drive is the objet petit a in its naked form – the traumatic Thing that insists beneath the fantasy and 
that is initially produced by the signifier. We reach the level of drive, as opposed to desire, when we confront directly the 
remainder of the lost, mythical unity. Drive is what “aims” at the lost object but never reaches it, just pulsating around a hole 
endlessly and meaninglessly. This pulsation is the utterly meaningless consequence of our castration by the signifier.  
9 The search is ongoing because, unfortunately, once that which is desirable is attained, it is no longer desirable because it is 
no longer prohibited. Carson, also, touches on this dilemma in her description of eros: 
The Greek word eros denotes ‘want,’ ‘lack,’ ‘ desire for that which is missing.’ The lover wants what he does not 
have. It is by definition impossible for him to have what he wants if, as soon as it is had, it is no longer wanting. 
(Eros 10) 
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Carson draws our attention to the impossible pursuits found in language and history, as 
I pointed out, via her use of Sappho, her penchant for philological mistakes, as well as her 
archival documentation in Nox. Love is also an impossible pursuit of totality, or oneness. As 
Lacan asserts, “Eros is defined as the fusion that makes one from two, as what is supposed to 
gradually tend in the direction of making but one from an immense multitude – not only do 
not make one, but have no chance of pulling that off” (XX 66). This “fusion” or “making a 
One” is never achieved. Rather, the love event is, to borrow the term used by Carson in Nox, 
an ongoing “prowl” in which a lover expects to achieve a sense of wholeness when joined with 
the beloved. Carson’s prowl for her brother is echoed in the Lacanian search for the beloved 
who will complete us. I want to be cautious and not simply superimpose the Heideggerian 
concept of “overtakelessness” onto Lacanian psychoanalysis, but there are commonalities 
worth pointing out. Both are processes of pursuit with no end point. Indeed, Carson’s 
definition of “overtakelessness,” as “that which cannot be got round. Cannot be avoided or 
seen to the back of” (N 1.3), lends itself as an apt description of the unfillable hole that we, as 
Lacanian subjects, possess.10 Carson’s prowl, which “does not end,” is also exhibited in her 
narratives of unsuccessful love. Presumably, if there is, in fact, unification with the One, if 
something can be gotten around or seen to the back of, we would reach an end point and these 
narratives would cease. Carson, however, is highly self-referential and reflexive, often quoting 
herself and recycling phrases.11 The repetition and ongoing return to amorous unhappiness is a 
                                                                                                                                                    
Our desire is dependent on our not getting what we want. As Carson states, “What does the desirer want from desire? 
Candidly, he wants to keep on desiring” (Eros 136). 
10 In French, “to fulfill,” is combler. The verb means also, literally, “to fill a hole.” 
11 There are a number of instances in Carson’s oeuvre in which she reuses her own lines. A relevant example is the line, “Not 
enough spin on it,” which is uttered by the lover in “The Glass Essay” (GIG 1) and picked up again in another poem, “New 
Rule” (MOH 12). 
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poetic prowl for a closure that does not come.12 In fact, I would argue that Carson’s continual 
return to tales about unfulfilling relationships is indicative of poetry’s own necessary failure 
when it engages with what Carson describes as “the human custom / of wrong love” (AR 75). 
There can’t be poetry about achieving “oneness,” due to language’s own condition of failure, 
error, and contingency. It is language, after all, that generates the primal lack. We write poetry 
to make up for, to provide a supplement for, the very impossible desire that poetry engenders. 
That is why the Ovidian Apollo, remarkably unsuccessful where love is concerned, takes the 
laurel in the place of Daphne. The dilemma of eros is the dilemma of poetry – something both 
Carson and Sappho understand well.  
“The human custom / of wrong love” (AR 75; emphasis mine) is reminiscent of the 
sense of “wrongness” that exists in Carson’s approach to history and translation, as she works 
against traditional conceptions and clichéd expectations. Her poetics of error is characterized 
by play, omission, obscurity, and, more importantly, contingency. Contingency is also 
important in Lacan’s conception of love and desire. There are two kinds of love, as Lacan 
makes clear. One is based on necessity, in which the lover seeks out the other (his or her 
“destiny”) in order to be made whole. This is the endlessly popular conception of love 
functioning as a delusive fantasy. The other love, however, is not love as necessity, but as 
contingency. In this case, the lover loves all the while knowing that the beloved does not 
complete him or her. The other, in fact, has nothing to do with the lover. There is no “other 
half,” “right” person, or “soulmate” in which we may find meaning in ourselves. Love is not 
meaningful; rather, love is meaningless.  
                                                
12 The recurrence of love in Carson’s oeuvre has not gone unnoticed amongst critics. Wahl lists Plainwater and Glass, Irony 
and God as a continued “erotic investigation” (181) following Eros the Bittersweet. Subsequently, The Beauty of the Husband, 
a long poem documenting a failed marriage, more overtly takes on the “ever more insistent discernment of Carson’s prior 
writing – the ‘dilemma of desire’” (Merkin). 
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 The desire for meaning and fulfillment puts pressure on “the end,” an imaginary 
culmination in which we are finally satisfied. Barthes, too, asks (and answers) a relevant 
question: “How does a love end? … To tell the truth, no one – except for the others – ever 
knows anything about it” (LD 101). His term “amorous errancy” aptly encapsulates the 
ongoing nature of the Lacanian phenomenon as described above:  
Though each love is experienced as unique and though the subject rejects the notion of 
repeating it elsewhere later on, he sometimes discovers in himself a kind of diffusion 
of amorous desire; he then realizes he is doomed to wander until he dies, from love to 
love. (LD 101) 
Barthes’s metaphor for such errancy is in his chapter title, “The Ghost Ship.” The continual 
search for the “end” of love and fulfilment is likened to the Flying Dutchman, which, as the 
myth goes, is doomed to sail the oceans forever. We, too, are “doomed to wander … from love 
to love.” According to Barthes, desire  
leads me to say ‘I love you’ in one port of call after another, until some other receives 
this phrase and gives it back to me; but no one can assume the impossible reply (of an 
insupportable fulfillment), and my wandering, my errantry continues. (LD 102)  
Barthes’s metaphor is echoed neatly in The Beauty of the Husband when the wife spies her 
husband with another woman:  
The wife positions herself in an enclosed veranda across the street. 
Watches the dark woman  
reach out to touch his temple as if filtering something onto it. 
Watches him bend slightly toward the woman then back. They are both serious. 
Their seriousness wracks her. 
… 
A cold ship 
 
moves out of harbor somewhere way inside the wife 
and slides off toward the flat gray horizon, 
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not a bird not a breath in sight (111) 
 
The husband, dissatisfied with his wife, discovers another “port” in the other woman. 
Reminiscent of the Flying Dutchman, he wanders and vacillates between his wife and his 
lovers. In this moment described by Carson, the shift in the husband’s desires is felt by the 
wife as “a cold ship / mov[ing] out of harbor.” The husband (and wife) recognizes the error in 
his desire as he leaves her for another woman. What Barthes terms as “amorous errantry” is 
not only an endless wandering, but also an erring.13 
Lacan, Barthes, and Carson continually come up against notions of totality and 
fulfilment in their conceptions of love. Wholeness, or totality, is also at the crux of what 
Derrida calls “archive fever.” Archive fever is a desire for the neat and contained packaging of 
the past as it seeks out a fixed point of origin. The archive attempts to master history. Carson’s 
struggle in Nox for “an account that makes sense” (N 3.3) is a desire that history, and the 
archive, cannot satisfy. Such clarity and cohesion is impossible. “We want other people to 
have a centre” (3.3), she writes of her brother, Michael. Indeed, her desire for an imaginary, 
central, and fundamental core that functions as a “key” against the “lock of oblivion” (3.3) is a 
desire for mastery over someone else. A similar desire is also found in The Beauty of the 
Husband when the husband wonders, “How do people get power over one another?” (38).  
 Both the archive and love share similar configurations and attempt to satisfy the same 
longing: totality, cohesion, and mastery. Strikingly, Carson’s narratives of erotic experience 
often describe love that is ending or has ended. Love, as presented by Carson, is neither 
fulfilling nor satisfactory. For example, “The Glass Essay” (GIG 1) is a long poem 
                                                
13 In French, errer means “to wander.” The secondary meaning (“to err”) is seldom used in French, which uses se tromper 
instead. Yet the dual meanings of wandering and mistake are laminated to the word. 
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documenting the aftermath of a relationship. The Beauty of the Husband, too, is a series of 
twenty-nine poems (which Carson calls “tangos”) that tell the story of a failed marriage. “Just 
for the Thrill” and “Kinds of Water” are a series of prose poems that record, respectively, a 
pilgrimage and a camping trip with a lover.14 Both accounts, of course, end with the speaker 
alone. In these narratives, Carson highlights the impossibility of becoming a One with the 
beloved. Instead, what we encounter is a kind of error, that is, love as error, mistake, or 
contingency (Lacan XX). How then, does Carson account for this rupture, that is, the break 
from love’s satisfaction? Furthermore, how does this relate to her inability to tell a 
(successful) love story? 
 The experience of love and, consequently, the telling and re-telling of love, orients the 
lover toward the past. There is not only a desire to be joined with the beloved (inherent in the 
experience of love itself), but also a desire to find meaning in the event that has passed. The 
aims of totalization are both erotic as well as archival. Furthermore, the historicizing (and 
fictionalizing) of love puts pressure on language. Carson makes this connection explicit in 
“Just for the Thrill” when the speaker states: “What is love like for you? is a question that 
concerns also language” (PW 204). The speaker is also an avid archivist and record-keeper: “I 
don’t like romance and have no talent for lyrical outpourings – yet I found myself during the 
days of my love affair filling many notebooks with data” (190). 
 But language is as slippery as love. According to Carson, the writer and the lover 
occupy analogous positions and serve similar functions: both reach out to ideal and 
imaginative spaces that are, in the end, unreachable. We may recall my earlier discussion 
about Carson’s use of the indexical entry in which one may search for a precise and final 
                                                
14 These two narratives are found in the section “The Anthropology of Water” in Plainwater. 
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“bedrock” of meaning; however, such a meaning can never be found. Indeed, the perfect union 
between writer and reader, and lover and beloved is a fantasy and an impossible ideal: 
As the vowels and consonants of an alphabet interact symbolically to make a certain 
written word, so writer and reader bring together two halves of one meaning, so lover 
and beloved are matched together like two sides of one knucklebone.15 An intimate 
collusion occurs. The meaning composed is private and true and makes permanent, 
perfect sense. Ideally speaking, at least, that is the case. In fact, neither reader nor 
writer nor lover achieves such consummation. The words we read and the words we 
write never say exactly what we mean. The people we love are never just as we desire 
them. The two symbola never perfectly match. Eros is in between. (Eros 108-9) 
Language, like love, is an ongoing prowl in which no end is attained. In the same way that 
there is no perfect other half for each person, as Aristophanes proposes, there is no meaning 
that is “private,” “true,” “permanent,” or “perfect.”16 “Symbola,” or “symbol,” is also used by 
Aristophanes in his myth of “the broken original whole of primal selves” (Desmond 217). 
Symbols refer to “broken wholes that image the original whole; they partake of the original 
whole, for they are broken from it” (217). The “broken” and “original whole” is important to 
keep in mind as they come up again for Carson.  
A critical subplot in Carson’s narratives of amorous unhappiness that illustrates the 
“broken” and the lost “original whole” is the declining mental state of the father. Afflicted 
with dementia, the father’s diminishing grasp on language touches on the dilemma put forth 
by Carson – that is, the question of love as being at once a question of language. Eros – as a 
                                                
15 Carson reiterates this image in “Just for the Thrill” when she describes the lovers: “We lie side by side in the dark, two 
halves of a knucklebone – the same knucklebone?” (PW 199). 
16 As the speaker in Prufrock puts it: “It is impossible to say just what I mean!” (Eliot 485). 
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site of rupture, error, and inconsistency – effectively adjoins the broken state of the 
relationship with the father’s broken speech. The weakened father participates in the errancy 
of eros as well as provides a useful model for the archive and is representative of Carson’s 
work: the instability and disruption of the self-contained text. 
 
The Law of the Father 
The Lacanian father is either powerful or impotent. The strong father anchors the desires of 
the speaker and enforces prohibitions and installs fantasmatic desires, ensuring that the 
(neurotic) subject always knows what and how to want; the impotent father can no longer 
anchor desire, leading to the subject’s anxious confrontation with the Real, the meaningless 
object that language can never master. Recalling Carson’s statement that “eros is an issue of 
boundaries” (Eros 30), in this section, I want to explore Carson’s traumatic shift from the 
strong coherent father to the weak incoherent father. As we soon see, the division between 
these two roles is not distinct because the symbolic order is always at risk of breaking down. 
In Carson’s words: “[dementia] is continuous with sanity” (PW 121).  
 Both the mother and father play peripheral but important roles in Carson’s narratives 
and can be understood as representatives of the law by which the speaker’s desires abide. In 
The Beauty of the Husband, for example, her mother warns the speaker very early on about the 
husband: 
Glancing  
 
at a book I’d brought home from school with his name inscribed on the flyleaf 
she said 
I wouldn’t trust anyone who calls himself X – and 
something exposed itself in her voice, 
a Babel 
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thrust between us at that instant which we would never  
learn to construe (BH 23) 
 
Her parents try to convince her to “change high schools” (BH 37) but when she refuses, they 
move to another town. The distance they try desperately to force between the wife and the 
husband is critical in solidifying her desire for him. As the speaker points out: “My mother ran 
counter to him as production to seduction” (37). What is prohibited becomes desirable, and 
what is vigorously prohibited, becomes even more so: “Opposition of friends or family merely 
toughens it” (23). In the above passage, what the speaker detects in her mother’s voice, “a 
Babel / thrust between [them],” can be understood as the law that is “arbitrarily and absolutely 
imposed, thereby instituting the reign of patriarchal law” (Gallop 39). In the instance that the 
mother voices her doubt (“I wouldn’t trust anyone who calls himself X”) and, by extension, 
disapproval, she has instructed her daughter not to enjoy (le non/nom du père), thereby setting 
her up to do the exact opposite.  
 The father in “Just for the Thrill,” also imposes a law on the speaker. The love 
relationship between the speaker and her lover (“the emperor”) is prefaced with a meditation 
on language, particularly the language used by the father. In the text’s introduction, Carson 
opens:  
Surely the world is full of simple truths that can be obtained by asking clear questions 
and noting the answers. “Who is that woman?” I overheard my father ask my mother 
one night when I was coming down the stairs to the kitchen. It took me a moment to 
realize he was asking about me – not because I did not know by then that he was losing 
his mind, which was obvious in other ways, but because he used the word woman.  
I was not “woman” to him. I stopped halfway down the stairs. It reminded me 
of a night when I was twelve or thirteen. Coming down the same stairs, I heard him in 
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the kitchen talking to my mother. “Oh, she won’t be like them,” he was saying with a 
sort of glow in his voice. (PW 188) 
Here is an example where, as Carson puts it, words “never say exactly what we mean” (Eros 
108). In this passage, it is not so much that her father no longer recognizes her that is startling, 
but that suddenly she is signified by the word “woman.” The moment of overhearing him 
superimposes itself on an earlier moment of overhearing her father speak while “coming down 
the same stairs.”17 Location and language adjoin these two instances in which the father 
speaks about and signifies his daughter. “Oh, she won’t be like them,” he states, thus pitching 
her against an anonymous “them” – a collective term for the desiring (and liberated) “woman.” 
While there are no typographic markers, the reader can detect a tone of disgust tainting the 
final word “them.” A similar scenario is echoed later: 
I remember on the eve of my thirteenth birthday, I overheard my aunts talking to 
Father about young girls and the dangerous age. “But she isn’t going to be one of them,” 
I heard Father say firmly. I was filled with pride, which smells like rubies. (PW 235) 
In both nearly identical scenes, the adolescent speaker unintentionally overhears her father 
speaking about her. The father’s words have significant effects on the speakers, and it is no 
surprise that these two texts, which focus primarily on broken relationships, recall these 
memories. The father, representative of the symbolic order and arbiter of the law, projects and 
enforces an idea of femininity for the daughter. The synesthetic response of the speaker’s 
pride as “smell[ing] like rubies” fittingly alludes to the biblical measure of a righteous woman 
(“Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies” [Proverbs 31:10]).  
                                                
17 The placement of these two separate but similar scenes recalls Carson’s description of time after losing Law in “The Glass 
Essay”: “I can feel that other day running underneath this one / like an old videotape (GIG 8). 
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The father’s disapproval of “them” necessarily shapes the daughter’s desires and her 
anticipation of gender identity. Lacan tells us, “the function of the Father … is fundamentally 
to unite (and not to oppose) a desire to the Law” (Écrits 698). The main issue revolves around 
an identity that will meet the father’s approval: “Who will I be instead? is a question I never 
got around to asking Father” (PW 236). Such a question is not merely self-reflexive and 
internalized, but is at once a question posed to the Big Other: Che Vuoi?18 What does the other 
want? What is it that Father wants me to be? This question of identity haunts the speaker in 
“Just for the Thrill.” The father’s words become a marker for her sexual development. As she 
states:  
I am not a person who feels easy talking about blood or desire. I rarely use the word 
woman myself. But such things are the natural facts of what we are, I suppose we have 
to follow out these signs in the endless struggle against forgetting. The truth is, I lived 
out my adolescence mainly in default of my father’s favour. But I perceived that I 
could trouble him less if I had no gender. Anger tired him so. I made my body as hard 
and flat as the armour of Athena. No secrets under my skin, no telltale drops on the 
threshold. And eventually I found – a discovery due, in fact, to the austerities of 
pilgrimage – that I could suppress the natural facts of “woman” altogether. (PW 189) 
The speaker conducts herself according to her father’s law, or “favour,” that is, as an 
individual with “no gender.” (Carson’s speaker in the introduction of “Kinds of Water” repeats 
this sentiment when she states: “I was a young, strong, stingy person of no particular gender” 
[PW 123].) In this passage she compares herself to the warrior Greek goddess, Athena, whose 
                                                
18 According to Lacan, the infant poses this question – Che Vuoi?, or What do you want? – to the (m)Other as a means to 
determining his own position in the signifying chain. The question of desire, or what the Other wants, is echoed in Carson. 
Later in “Just for the Thrill,” Carson repeats the question again, this time in relation to the lover: “What is it men want? They 
talk of pleasure, they go wild, then limp, then fall asleep. Is there something I’m not getting?” (PW 200). 
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one of many epithets include parthenos, or “virgin.” She makes her body “hard and flat” as 
Athena’s armour, resisting the sensuality and voluptuousness that is more befitting of 
Aphrodite. She grows only to suppress her womanhood altogether. The daughter wants to 
conform to her father’s desire by embodying a form that will repel his desire. As Jane Gallop 
states: “the law of the father protects him and patriarchy from the potential havoc of the 
daughter’s desirability” (76). However, the denial and repression of her gender and sexuality 
is eventually met with rupture. The speaker in “Just for the Thrill” experiences this in the form 
of love, as is the case with the female speakers in “The Glass Essay,” “Kinds of Water,” and 
The Beauty of the Husband: 
  I lived alone for a long time. 
 What happened to me after that takes the form of a love story, not so different 
from other love stories, except better documented. Love is, as you know, a harrowing 
event. I believed in taking an anthropological approach to that. 
Even now it is hard to admit how love knocked me over. I had lived a life 
protected from all surprise, now suddenly I was a wheel running downhill, a light 
thrown against a wall, paper blown flat in the ditch. I was outside my own language 
and customs.19 (PW 189) 
Love, which Carson describes as a “harrowing event,” is the moment of rupture that severs the 
speaker from her original desexualized and virginal position, provided by the father. Her life, 
which was once “protected from all surprise,” bursts open. Carson further describes the 
harrowing experience of love in metaphors marked by uncontrolled acceleration (“a wheel 
running downhill”), chance and transformation (“paper blown flat in the ditch”), and exquisite 
                                                
19 As usual, Carson recycles words, phrases, and scenes within her oeuvre. The speaker in “The Glass Essay” also uses an 
identical comparison when discussing love: “I had not been in love before. / It was like a wheel rolling downhill” (GIG 3). 
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force (“a light thrown against a wall”). Wrenched (or “knocked … over”) from her secure 
position prescribed by the Father, the speaker finds herself suddenly “outside [her] own 
language and customs.” The language of love, she discovers, is not the language of her father, 
which had set up her desires in relation to him. The event of love allows the speaker to 
formulate her own language and customs in relation to the beloved. As the speaker in “The 
Glass Essay” describes a night with Law: “we lay on top of the covers … / caressing and 
singing to one another in our made-up language / like the children we used to be” (GIG 12). 
However, once the beloved is gone, the speaker, now changed, has to form a new 
relationship to language. The language of the father and the language of the beloved have 
failed her in that they no longer function as a strong or effective symbolic register. Desires 
framed by both men are suddenly freed up and confronted by the speaker. In “The Glass 
Essay,” for instance, the mother and the speaker engage in a heated debate about women, 
which echoes the father’s overheard speech from “Just for the Thrill”: 
Those women! says my mother with an exasperated rasp. 
Mother has chosen random channel. 
Women? 
 
Complaining about rape all the time –  
I see she is tapping one furious finger on yesterday’s newspaper 
lying beside the grape jam. 
 
The front page has a small feature 
about a rally for International Women’s Day – 
have you had a look at the Sears Summer catalogue? 
 
Nope. 
Why, it’s a disgrace! Those bathing suits –  
cut way up to here! (she points) No wonder! 
 
You’re saying women deserve to get raped 
because Sears bathing suit ads 
have high-cut legs? Ma, are you serious? 
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Well someone has to be responsible. 
Why should women be responsible for male desire? My voice is high. 
Oh I see you’re one of Them. 
 
One of Whom? My voice is very high. (GIG 23) 
 
In this passage, we don’t have the father voicing disdain for “them”; rather, we have the 
mother. A primary difference in this scene from the previous two is that this time, the speaker 
is older. She is an active participant in the discourse, and not simply an adolescent 
eavesdropper. More importantly, she is someone who has experienced the “harrowing event” 
of love. Desire and the question of desire between men and women are suddenly lived 
experience. 20  Furthermore, “women”/“them” are implicated in a complex sociocultural 
network (attire, International Women’s Day) to which the now older speaker is privy, as 
evidenced by her rebuttal. The father’s language, which had its influence prior to the love 
event, is now problematic and complicated: “One of Whom?” she asks. 
 The father at this point does not occupy the same position as he did prior to the love 
event. The breakups experienced by Carson’s speakers signal a removal from language, or the 
symbolic order, as the fantasy of love breaks down. The trauma of the failed fantasy coincides, 
fittingly, with the father’s dementia and his own slackening grasp on language.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 In contrast to the inexperienced, passive adolescent, Carson’s speaker is now an experienced lover, aware of this ancient 
question about gender differences and desire: “Man is this and woman is that, men do this and women do different things, 
woman wants one thing and man wants something else and nobody down the centuries appears to understand how this should 
work” (PW 191).  
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The Demented Father 
“Desire doubled is love and love doubled is madness.” 
 –Anne Carson (BH 38) 
 
 
We can understand the disintegration of the love fantasy as the weakening of Lacan’s “Big 
Other” (qua symbolic order) by which the fantasy is installed. The “Big Other” refers to 
overarching, anonymous, and socio-linguistic entities of power or knowledge such as “God,” 
“History,” “Government,” and “Nature.” (We can already sense an echo of my earlier 
discussion about how Western tradition has regarded the archive and defined the “Classical.”)  
 Carson’s typical approach is to undermine concepts that fall under the rubric of what is 
commonly understood as the patriarchy. It is worth noting that Carson’s speakers are involved 
with men who are deliberately and explicitly denominated to reflect patriarchal order. For 
example, the lover in “The Glass Essay” is named Law, which, as Ian Rae notes, “aligns the 
lover with the rule of the father” (“Verglas” 174). In addition, the love interest in “Just for the 
Thrill” is referred to as “the emperor of China” (PW 193). Indeed, these men occupy the realm 
of the symbolic and anchor the speakers’ desires. Once they are gone romantically, as is 
always the case, we see what I wish to argue is a “rupture” in the symbolic order, a weakening 
of the closure of fantasy. 
In line with the patriarchal titles taken up by the lovers, the father is also positioned in 
the realm of masculine authority and was once an airman during World War II. He, in addition 
to being “Father,” takes on a role of power and machismo. The speaker even praises his 
position: “my tall proud father, former World War II navigator!” (GIG 24).21 The speaker 
describes him as, at one time, “a big man, over six feet tall and strong” (26). In a photograph, 
                                                
21 See also “Just for the Thrill”: “during the war my father was a navigator and flew low over France dropping parcels for 
spies” (PW 209). 
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“the shadowless light makes him look immortal” (27). The powerful and god-like stature of 
the father attests to his ability to enforce laws and rules, which, as Carson details, are abided 
by the daughter. In this regard, Gallop notes: “Patriarchy is grounded in the uprightness of the 
father. If he were devious and unreliable, he could not have the power to legislate” (75). The 
father provides an anchor for the neurotic subject’s desires. If the father is unreliable or 
inconsistent, the subject becomes anxious. It is appropriate that in Carson’s narratives of love, 
the trauma of breakup coincides with the subplot of the father’s dementia, when he no longer 
has legislative ability. Desires, as a result, are disordered, a situation fraught with anxiety, but 
also opportunity. 
The association between the father and the lover no doubt possesses Freudian 
undertones, but it is the weakened father that strikes me as germane in Carson’s poetics. The 
father’s dementia, which lurks in the background of so many of her texts, marks Carson’s 
attempt to seek out an alternative conceptual mode that is not governed by the stability of the 
patriarchal logos. In lieu of order, Carson presents madness. Madness extends to both love and 
textuality, or the open and “ruptured” text. 
Madness, or mania, takes on a significant role in Carson’s study of love. In Eros the 
Bittersweet, Carson states: “The facts are that eros changes you so drastically you seem to 
become a different person. In conventional thinking, such changes are best categorized as 
madness” (154). Recalling Sappho’s fragment 31, the lover experiences a “mad” disorder 
within her body. Two Greek fragments offered by Carson also illustrate something similar: 
I don’t know what I should do: two states of mind in me … 
 –Sappho, fragment 51 
 
 
 
 
   208 
I’m in love! I’m not in love! 
I’m crazy! I’m not crazy! 
 –Anakreon  (qtd. in Carson, Eros 8) 
 
The overlap between eros and mania in Eros the Bittersweet is reproduced in Carson’s own 
narratives, which are intimately constructed around the father. The symbolic breakdown in her 
narratives is manifested in both the lovers’ abandonment, as well as the weakened father. The 
role of dementia, I argue, is two-fold. In psychoanalytic terms, the father’s state alludes to the 
fragile fabric of fantasy; that is, he no longer occupies the role of the consistent father who 
orients the speaker’s desires. More broadly, dementia is also an effective illustration of the 
past and the archive. The nonsense uttered by the father signals the nonsense of history. The 
“sens” in the French “nonsens” refers to both “meaning” and “direction.” The archive, 
operating as a master signifier, is essentially nonsense, and thus provides neither meaning nor 
direction. 
The dwindling physical and mental health of the father signals a shift from patriarchal 
order to disorder, or madness.22 The father is no longer described in terms of masculine 
strength, but child-like vulnerability. His face is compared to that “of a fledgling bird,” and 
“clear as a child’s” (PW 191, 120). This simile is echoed again in “Father’s Old Blue 
Cardigan,” which can be read as an elegy to Carson’s father: 
 His laws were a secret. 
But I remember the moment at which I knew 
he was going mad inside his laws. 
 
He was standing at the turn of the driveway when I arrived. 
He had on the blue cardigan with the buttons done up all the way to the top. 
Not only because it was a hot July afternoon 
 
but the look on his face – 
                                                
22 As the speaker in “Just for the Thrill” explicitly notes: “Father had always disliked disorder. Now he spent all day bent over 
scraps of paper, writing notes to himself which he hid in books or his clothing and at once forgot” (PW 121). 
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as a small child who had been dressed by some aunt early in the morning 
for a long trip (MOH 47) 
 
Madness in this excerpt is aligned with infancy, as if the patriarchal model could be 
regenerated, and an alternative configuration of the archive invented. Whatever “laws” the 
father had once enforced are unable to contain even himself: “he was going mad inside his 
laws.”23 Beneath the semblance of order the reader senses rupture. The sturdy father is no 
longer capable of keeping himself upright. As “The Glass Essay” illustrates: “Father sits 
strapped in a chair which is tied to the wall” (GIG 25). The “uprightness of the father” (Gallop 
75) is literally compromised. The weakened body of the father, which “has shrunk to the 
merest bone house,” recalls the Nudes in “The Glass Essay,” in particular the final nude of a 
body “trying to stand against winds so terrible that the flesh was blowing off / the bones” 
(GIG 26, 38). The abject body in both poems is indicative of a move away from order, 
language, and the symbolic to madness, body, and the semiotic. 
 While the father’s physical deterioration is illustrated in detail, it is his loss of language 
that is especially pertinent for Carson. I want to return to the question Carson poses: “What is 
love like for you? is a question that concerns also language” (PW 204). One way by which 
Carson elucidates what love is like is via her father’s relationship to language. Logos, as I 
mentioned earlier, is consonant with eros. Indeed, the father’s decline, which accompanies 
these love narratives, provides a vehicle to explore eros, language, and narrative. What is it 
about dementia that reveals Carson’s discoveries about love?  
 Love is, as I pointed out, the most nostalgic of experiences. To write about love is, 
ultimately, to establish meaning as we attempt to make sense of the past. What does it mean 
                                                
23 This line uttered by the speaker echoes Derrida’s point of law and madness (discussed in Chapter 2): “The law is mad. The 
law is mad, is madness; but madness is not the predicate of law. There is no madness without the law; madness cannot be 
conceived before its relation to law (“The Law of Genre” 81). 
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then to go back and construct the perfect memory of love with remembered and archived 
exchanges between lovers? A strong father attests to the ideal situation (for the neurotic) in 
which there are directions, instructions, coordinates, and a code. A demented father, on the 
other hand, reveals the flaws in the system. There is no true fixed meaning; rather, the past is 
nonsensical. Carson’s explorations of love are, fittingly, written retrospectively. While the 
speakers recall and revisit the language of their lovers, their words remain ambiguous, cryptic, 
and inconclusive. As Barthes argues: 
To try to write love is to confront the muck of language: that region of hysteria where 
language is both too much and too little, excessive (by the limitless expansion of the 
ego, by emotive submersion) and impoverished (by the codes on which love 
diminishes and levels it). (LD 99) 
The father’s mad ramblings (“excessive” in its content, but “impoverished” in its sense), thus, 
becomes a suitable analogy for the lover’s discourse – the “muck” or Babel/babble of the 
Other’s desire that can never be figured out or known. When the speaker recalls love, its 
meaning, its history, there is a “wall of language” (Lacan, Écrits 316) that resists sense, much 
like the incoherent sounds of the demented father. The speaker in “Just for the Thrill” 
describes her attempt to make sense of her father’s babble, which proves to be a deadlock: 
When he speaks the words are not for me. “Death is a fifty-fifty thing, maybe forty-
forty,” he says in a flat voice.  
 … 
I watch the sentence come clawing into me like a lost tribe. That’s the way it is with 
dementia. There are a number of simple questions I could ask. Like, Father what do 
you mean? Or, Father what about the other twenty percent? (PW 120) 
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In his babble, the father corrects himself with a computational error: “maybe forty-forty.” The 
error does not go unnoticed by the speaker who notes that this is not a perfect total and 
wonders about “the other twenty percent.” The error here is reminiscent of the computational 
error in Alkman’s fragment (qtd. in Carson, MOH 32) when counting the seasons. In that case, 
Carson expresses pleasure in the error and loss found in classical transmission. The father, too, 
represents something similar: language as a vehicle for transmitting the past is also imperfect. 
There is lack and deficit within the system. The sentence, as Carson describes, is not a neutral 
linguistic structure; rather, it takes on animal quality as it “claws” toward the speaker. The 
words are dangerous and threatening. 
Carson’s description of the relationship between language and love can also deepen 
our understanding of her use of intertexts. Consider, for example, the following passage in 
which Carson deliberately adjoins the father with the experience of love by way of language: 
I found the kinship between a man and a woman can be a steep, whole, 
excellent thing and full of languages. Yet it may have no speech. Does that make 
sense? 
One night – it was the first winter my father began to have trouble with his 
mind – I was sitting at the kitchen table wrapping Christmas presents. I saw him 
coming down the stairs very slowly, holding his hands in front of him. In his hands 
were language and speech, decoupled, and when he started to talk, they dropped and 
ran all over the floor like a bag of bell clappers. “What happened to you to I who to? 
There was a deer. That’s not what I. How many were? No. How? What did you do 
with the things you dripped no not dripped how? You had an account and one flew off. 
That’s not. No? I. No. How? How?” (PW 191) 
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In this passage, written after the love affair, Carson aligns the experience of love to that of her 
demented father. According to Carson, the kinship between lovers is “full of languages” but 
“no speech.” That is, we have language, but no grammatical structures in place to shape the 
sounds. The father’s condition aptly illustrates this scenario: language and speech are 
decoupled in his hands. The father’s utterances are unformed, nonsensical sentences. He 
speaks in non-sequiturs and interrupts himself with disparate and unconnected thoughts. How 
does this illustration compare with the experience of the text?  
 A productive entry into Carson’s description of the “decoupling” of language is 
through Kristevan concepts of the symbolic and the semiotic. I return to these concepts (from 
Chapter 2) as here we witness not only the weakened father, but also the weakened paternal 
and masculine dimension of language. What Carson means by “speech” can be understood as 
Kristeva’s symbolic, which governs the grammar, syntax, and order of expression. We are 
thus left with the semiotic (the counterpart that Carson terms “language”), evidenced by the 
disordered drives and affects released by the father. Indeed, his utterances are never likened to 
“real” speech. In “The Glass Essay,” for example, the father doesn’t form sentences; rather, 
“he issues a stream of vehemence at the air” (GIG 25). The father does not effectively 
communicate; he “uses a language known only to himself, / made of snarls and syllables and 
sudden wild appeals” (26). His mad murmurings resist sense, order, rule, and containment. 
Carson’s metaphor of leakage for textual rupture and border transgression is also echoed in the 
following description of the father’s speech: 
From his lips comes a stream of syllables. He was all his life a silent man. But 
dementia has released some spring inside him, he babbles constantly in a language 
neurologists call “word salad.” (PW 120) 
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There is fluidity in the father’s utterances, as suggested by “stream,” “spring,” and “babble” 
(this time not as “Babel” but as in a “babbling brook”). The father no longer has control to 
remain “a silent man”; instead, words erupt, flow, and spill in a constant and uncontrollable 
stream. 
 How can we link the father’s madness and erotic mania to what I call the text’s 
“madness”? The text, too, resists containment. Barthes makes a distinction between the work 
and the text, stating that while “the work is held in the hand, the text is held in language” (RL 
57). The literary text is not a stable, self-contained, unique, and autonomous entity; rather, it is 
plural, open to and traversed by meaning, and “entirely woven of quotations, references, 
echoes” (60). The text, we could say, is mad. My description of the mad text is in line with my 
earlier uses of the word. In Chapter 2, I used madness to describe the “documentary technique” 
that Carson detects in Longinus. I have also used madness in relation to Nox and what Derrida 
sees as the madness that is intrinsic to the law of genre. Echoing Carson’s conception of eros, 
madness, too, is an issue of boundaries. Madness describes that which cannot be contained and 
which troubles or ruptures “set” borders and categories.  
For the purpose of this chapter, I want to highlight and expand on what I call madness 
to also include that which does not have a centre, or a stable origin – in short, that which lacks 
a fixed and overarching governing principle. The disordered state of the father is an apposite 
analogy of Barthes’s conception of “the text” (versus “the work”) and the “text of jouissance” 
(versus “the pleasurable text”). The father’s failure to act in accordance with grammar 
suggests that there is no governing principle. Moreover, there is no kernel of meaning to the 
father’s utterances (what Barthes has described as the pit of the fruit); rather, his discourse is 
diffuse and uncontained. Comparably, psychosis for Lacan refers to that which does not have a 
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master signifier, or a point de capiton, to anchor it to the symbolic order.24 Reminiscent of the 
demented father, the text also lacks a “centre” to anchor or fix it in place. There is “no 
‘grammar’ of the text,” as every text is itself “an intertext of another text” (Barthes, RL 60). 
 We can unite Barthes conception of the work with Derrida’s critique of the archive via 
filiation and inheritance. “The work is caught up in a process of filiation (RL 61),” Barthes 
states. Indeed, the tracing back of a work to its author (or father) vis-à-vis a lineage is 
comparable to the desire we have of the archive to have an origin that is accessible, traceable, 
and delineated.25 The text, on the other hand, does not function like the work or the patri-
archive. There is no order or clear genealogy. While the author is considered the father of his 
work, the text “is read without the Father’s inscription” (Barthes, RL 61). The father/author is 
no longer privileged; instead, the text “can be read without its father’s guarantee” (61). 
Barthes, as we can see, provides a literary conception in which the father no longer occupies a 
strong, upright, and governing position.  
Bearing in mind the demented father as a trope for textual and archival madness, in the 
following section, I will turn to The Beauty of the Husband, a text about a failed marriage, and 
argue that Carson’s use of intertextuality demonstrates the fissures of love, as well as the 
fractured lines of the text. Eros is not only significant in terms of the book’s subject, but 
presents a site and opportunity for explorations of history (specifically the re-membering of a 
love affair) and literary and archival ruptures.  
 
 
                                                
24 See Lacan, Seminar III. See also Fink (The Lacanian Subject 55): “Psychosis, according to Lacan, results from a child’s 
failure to assimilate a “primordial” signifier which could otherwise structure the child’s symbolic universe, the failure leaving 
the child unanchored in language, without a compass reading on the basis of which to adopt an orientation.” 
25 The example Derrida opens with in Archive Fever is Freud’s father’s father. 
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Misstepping the Tango 
“I’d like to add a piece of wisdom from Gertrude Stein: ‘act so there is no use in a center.’” 
 –Anne Carson (Aitken) 
 
 
Following Carson’s other works, particularly love narratives such as “The Glass Essay” 
(which interweaves Wuthering Heights) and “The Anthropology of Water” (which makes use 
of Chinese scholarship and Cantar de Mio Cid), The Beauty of the Husband is a text 
complicated by a number of literary and cultural intertexts. Daphne Merkin asserts that 
Carson’s diverse influences in The Beauty of Husband make her “one of the great pasticheurs.” 
Priscilla Long also notes that Carson “moves easily from Duchamp to Degas to Demeter” and 
that her “intense and synthesizing erudition, here brought to bear on the subject of desire, is 
partly what makes her such a thrilling read” (14). However, after the book was awarded the T. 
S. Eliot Prize, Robert Potts criticized it as being a “self-pitying account of marital 
unhappiness.” Potts finds fault with Carson’s poetic execution and reads her intertextuality as 
“an almost artless grafting-on of academic materials.”  
 Focusing on The Beauty of the Husband, I argue that what Potts calls “artless grafting” 
encapsulates the fragmentation of fantasy, history, and poetry. Indeed, the Barthesian 
jouissance, or “thrill,” that Long experiences is due to Carson’s “artlessness,” or errant poetics. 
Eros lends itself as both a subject and a creative approach – an artlessness that resists generic 
and narrative boundaries, or order. The textual madness that Carson presents is integral to the 
erotic madness of the marriage. 
Merkin’s labelling Carson a “pasticheur” calls to mind similar praise she received for 
Nox in regards to her collage-like approach. While the visual and tactile presentation is not 
foregrounded in The Beauty of the Husband, the text is no less fragmented and diverse. The 
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cover, or “packaging,” anticipates the varied content within. The book is described on the back 
cover as “an essay on Keats’s idea that beauty is truth, and is also the story of a marriage. It is 
told in twenty-nine tangos.” Immediately, we encounter a generic dilemma, reminiscent of the 
one in Nox, a self-described epitaph. This book, too, folds in many genres and forms, not all of 
which are literary: it is a “fictional essay” (as the front cover reiterates) and a tango, but also a 
long poem containing snippets of letters, telegrams, phone conversations, overheard dialogue, 
and lyrics. Interspersed among the poems are quotations from Keats, and within the poems 
themselves are references to Kafka, Duchamp, Aristotle, Plato, and Parmenides among others. 
A “Notes” section is also included in the back, listing these references. Generically and 
textually, the book spills and overflows its own description.26  
Furthermore, the book is “wrapped” in images not produced by Carson nor created 
with the intention for the book’s publication. The back of the book is designed with a detailed 
reproduction of a letter written by Keats. The front cover is designed with a cropped image 
from “Portrait of Jean-Baptiste Desdeban” (1810), painted by Ingres. Carson immediately 
embeds her text within other intertexts as she reaches out to nineteenth-century artefacts.  
In addition, Carson plays with paratext, specifically, the poems’ titles. The titles are 
varied, sometimes taking up one line, but are more often long and run-on. The type, written in 
capital letters, is larger in size and is often void of punctuation. Carson does not use titles 
conventionally; rather, she uses the space to draw attention to the book object itself (for 
example, the title of Poem I begins, “I DEDICATE THIS BOOK TO KEATS…”), to mark 
time and place in the narrative (“XX. SO THE HALL DOOR SHUTS AGAIN AND ALL 
THE NOISE IS GONE”), or to introduce yet another reference (Socrates, Degas, Plato). At 
                                                
26 I discuss a similar phenomenon in Chapter 2 when I talk about Decreation and its description on the front cover: “Poetry, 
Essays, Opera.” 
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times, a title is rich enough to be read on its own as if it were its own poem, such as the title to 
Poem XVIII: “DO YOU SEE IT AS A ROOM OR A SPONGE OR A CARELESS SLEEVE 
WIPING OUT HALF THE BLACKBOARD BY MISTAKE OR A BURGUNDY MARK 
STAMPED ON THE BOTTLES OF OUR MINDS WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE 
DANCE CALLED MEMORY” (79).27 Carson’s titles are startling, cryptic, and loosely fitted 
to the primary narrative. Indeed, their arcane tone recalls the ramblings of the demented father. 
The shifts in tone and typographical presentation add to the fragmented reading of the book. 
Carson’s point is clear: her story cannot be read alone nor effortlessly, as if the book were 
linear, self-contained, and autonomous; rather, it must be read in relation to innumerable 
intertexts, including her own inscriptions. 
 Carson labels The Beauty of the Husband a “tango,” which many critics have remarked 
upon. As per Carson’s creative process, her decision to bring together tango music and poetry 
came about by accident. Carson recounts: 
Before I left here for Berkeley [where Carson wrote The Beauty of the Husband while 
teaching at the University of California] a guy broke in the back door and took all my 
CDs, so when I went to Berkeley I just had one that somebody had given me for 
Christmas, and it was a tango. I played it every day and I got tango in my head, as one 
will. I started to think how tangos work and what they are, and I just got fascinated 
with them, and so I thought, “I’ll try to write some and see how that would be.” 
(Gannon) 
                                                
27 This title, seemingly self-contained, in fact makes reference to a letter John Keats had written to Benjamin Bailey, March 
13, 1819. See pg. 291 in The Complete Poetical Works and Letters of John Keats (1899). 
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The event of the burglary recalls the thieving husband who, as detailed in Poem XXVI, steals 
“53 wirebound notebooks” (BH 125) containing 5820 elegiacs that the wife had written.28 In 
this case, the burglary also makes an impact on Carson’s poetics as she is stuck with repeating 
the CD. Despite the accidental event that brings the two together, tango, music, and poetry are 
not so disparate as narrative forms. In short, both the song and the serial poem rely on time for 
the unfolding of events. The tango has been likened to the telling of a story: “There is the 
introduction of the characters, the connection, the pressure, the playing out, a tense moment 
and then the release near the end … The old tangueros describe the dance as telling a story” 
(Lechtenberg). Furthermore, the tango, a piece of music written intended for tango dance, is an 
appropriate model for a love story.  
However, the predetermined form of the tango is particularly relevant to Carson and 
her exploration of love and marriage. To learn the dance is to learn a set of prescribed steps. 
Indeed, the idea of this “fixed” template anticipates the idea of the love fantasy, which Carson 
notes: 
I don’t really think much about rhythm, and I don’t know much about music. But I did 
like the idea of the tango as I was using it, the idea of how it works as an emotional 
history, and it seems like it’s a form—just like marriage—where there’s a prescription 
to the steps, and once you get into the dance you have to dance it to the end. There’s no 
way out. There’s no way to change the steps. It’s set. I shouldn't say that every 
marriage is like that, but romantic expectations are like that. (Gannon) 
                                                
28 Poem XXVI (BH 123) reveals that the wife had written a short talk (“On Defloration”), which was stolen and published by 
the husband. In typical Carsonian flair, she references her first book, Short Talks, in which one of the pieces is entitled “Short 
Talk On Defloration.” The wife’s stolen notebooks also recall the stolen fascicles belonging to the speaker in Short Talks, of 
which there are also 53: “In 53 fascicles I copied out everything that was said, things vast distances apart. I read the fascicles 
each day at the same time, until yesterday men came and took up the fascicles. Put them in a crate. Locked it” (11). 
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Romantic expectations, or fantasy, and history seemingly follow the steps of the dance in that 
they are, in Carson’s words, “set” and “unchangeable.” A perfect marriage, similarly, would 
be like a tango. However, the marriage between the husband and the wife does not conform to 
this model. The cycles of their relationship are tumultuous. The husband’s inability to remain 
faithful (his cheating as a sign of dissatisfaction in his marriage), and the wife’s distress as she 
cannot fulfill his desire, ensure that eros continues to move. (I would even argue that eros is 
not limited to the erotic, but moves in the between-spaces set up by Carson, be they temporal 
or generic.) Together, the husband and wife deviate from the prescribed steps until their 
marriage leads to divorce. So, too, does the book as it evades its given labels (“fictional essay,” 
“tango,” or, more perceptibly, verse).  
Carson’s description of the book as “twenty-nine tangos” is problematic in that she 
pretends to have achieved perfection when the marriage is clearly less than perfect.29 Carson’s 
assertion that “once you get into the dance you have to dance it to the end,” evokes my earlier 
discussions of “endings,” or the definitive culmination that resides at the point we call “the 
end.” The perfect translation, the end of grief, the piecing together a whole, and the writing of 
history are examples of what Steedman calls “an Ending” but not “an End” (167). Carson 
continues to play with this point of conclusion.30 The book, in fact, subverts the prescribed 
steps of the tango, in that there exists one extra “step” in the collection. There are, as it 
happens, not twenty-nine but thirty poems in total. Carson’s failure to mention this extra poem 
                                                
29 Only divisible by one and itself, twenty-nine is, of course, a prime number, refusing division into complementary parts.  
30 What Carson thinks about endings can be summed up in the afterword to her long poem, “Canicula di Anna.” The 
afterword is a contemplation of the story, its end, and its telling: 
After a story is told there are some moments of silence. Then words begin again. Because you would always like to 
know a little more. Not exactly more story. Not necessarily, on the other hand, an exegesis. Just something to go on 
with … Perhaps it is something about me you would like to know – not that you have any specific questions, but 
still, that would be better than nothing. (PW 88) 
Carson’s argument that “eros is a verb” can also be applied to narrative. Even when the reader reaches the “end” of the story, 
she desires more, “just something to go on with.” 
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is deliberate. The husband, who interrupts his wife’s voice now and then, provides the last 
word in the final, unnumbered poem. The extra poem signals an excess, or a remainder which 
the tango cannot account for or contain. The story of their marriage not only breaks from the 
tango form, but engages and contends with another detail: beauty, more particularly, Keats’s 
idea that “beauty is truth.”  
 The well-known line in Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” 
is pivotal to Carson’s own study of beauty and its significance in the story of the marriage. 
Carson admits to not knowing anything about beauty and when writing the book, thought of 
Keats: 
I’ve never understood that sentence, “Truth is beauty, beauty truth.” And I thought, 
“Maybe I should just put that in and see if I can get inside it by having it in there.” So I 
put it in mentally; I thought of it as being the centre of the concept of the work. As I 
was working through it again it seemed that it needed more Keats, so I read all the 
strange, lost, bad Keats from when he was nine years old or whenever he started 
writing that stuff.31 It is pretty bad, a lot of it, but nice in excerpt. I just took some bits 
here and there, and I think it helped me work that concept through. (Gannon) 
As with the tango, beauty and truth are a couplet intimately and chiastically related. Yet 
Carson admits to never understanding the sentence. Indeed, the line proves to be suspiciously 
pat. Keats’s line has a totalizing effect; it inserts a tolerable distance between his speaker and 
the “unravish’d bride of quietness,” as if to isolate the speaker from the impossible paradoxes 
of erotic love, “Silence and slow Time.”  
                                                
31 The cover design, similarly, is also one of Ingres’s obscure and less well-known portraits. While it is still puzzling to me as 
to why this specific image was chosen, Carson’s choosing an uncommon piece by Ingres is in line with her use of Keats’s 
own obscure texts. 
   221 
But Carson, as I have suggested, is likely not as interested in the totalizing and 
isolating effect of Keats’s line as she is in what Barthes’s calls “the muck of language.” When 
asked how beauty speaks of truth, Carson responds: “I don’t think it does. I think that’s all a 
big mistake, but there’s so much power in believing it” (Wachtel). The power of believing that 
“who’s beautiful is also true and the feelings that come from beauty leads you to truth” 
(Wachtel) is a fantasy of a perfect and ideal love. Furthermore, to be “led to” truth implies that 
there is some culminating end point.32  
Another understanding of Carson’s confusion over Keats’s “truth” is through Lacan, 
who characterizes truth as he characterizes love: that is, truth is the ultimate jouissance.33 
Truth is the fulfillment of the One, or communion with the divine. It indicates completion, or 
“the all.” The alternative conception of love and truth (which jibes with Carson’s poetics) is 
that rather than “all,” they are irremediably “not all.” Given her renewed narratives of “the 
human custom / of wrong love” (AR 75), it is unsurprising that Carson admits to never 
understanding Keats’s line.   
What about the counterpart of Keats’s chiastic line: beauty? The reader quickly learns 
in Poem VII that the husband, praised for his beauty, is far from truthful. As the wife puts it, 
he “uses[s] language / in the way that Homer says the gods do / … They flip the switch at will” 
(BH 33). Carson, similarly, flips the switch on Keats’s line. How, then, can we read “beauty” 
in The Beauty of the Husband? The title itself is slippery as the genitive case is always 
ambiguous: does beauty refer to the husband’s beauty? Or is beauty a reference to the wife? Is 
beauty simply sensual pleasure? Does Carson’s “beauty” defy Keats’s “beauty,” in that it is 
                                                
32 Where is the end point in Keats’s own poem? Many would argue that despite the famous chiastic line, “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn” ends vaguely and inconclusively: “that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.” 
33 See Lacan, Seminar XX. 
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resists Truth? Indeed, beauty, for Carson, is a complex term. More appropriately, I would 
argue that The Beauty of the Husband is better identified as Carson’s story of beauty (or 
desire) as likened to “a big mistake.” As she writes in Poem XXIX: 
 To say Beauty is Truth and stop. 
Rather than to eat it. 
Rather than to want to eat it. This was my pure early thought. (BH 139) 
 
Carson is not satisfied at stopping at “Truth.” Instead, she deviates, errs, “eats” Keats’s words, 
and explodes the “truth” of love, history, and the text. 
 
Intertextuality in The Beauty of the Husband 
Carson interweaves Keats throughout her book in such a way that a brief excerpt appears 
before each poem. While the back cover of the book makes reference to Keats’s most well 
known lines of poetry, Carson draws directly from his less well known poetry and drama, such 
as “I had a dove and the sweet dove died,” “To the Ladies Who Saw me Crown’d,” “Ode on 
Indolence,” Otho the Great, and The Jealousies (which was to be published under the name 
Lucy Vaughan Lloyd). She also cites secondary texts such as Keats’s letters, his editorial notes 
on his own work, and scribbled marginalia in his copy of Paradise Lost. The textual web, 
evidently, is complex as Carson provides direct references, but also double references, 
accessing Milton through Keats, and masked references, using the feigned authorship of Lucy 
Vaughan Lloyd. These obscure fragments Carson plays with no doubt derives from the Greek 
fragments that she has also, on occasion, manipulated. 
 Keats mediates Carson’s relationship to the literary past, as well as to the classical 
archive (“Ode on a Grecian Urn” is a prime example) in The Beauty of the Husband. What 
Carson demonstrates in composing a history of a marriage is that there is no direct, seamless, 
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or resistance-less access to the past. The textual insertion of Keats illustrates just that: Carson 
cannot write a new narrative without somehow writing alongside other narratives. Keats 
(among others) regularly interrupts Carson’s text so the story becomes “mad.” The text is not 
one of Barthesian pleasure, but of jouissance, or bliss. The earlier mention of “Babel” in The 
Beauty of the Husband, can also be understood in the context of Barthes who compares Babel 
to bliss: “the confusion of tongues is no longer a punishment, the subject gains access to bliss 
by the cohabitation of languages working side by side” (PT 4). The “babelian” cohabitation of 
languages in Carson’s use of Keats is reminiscent of her use of Catullus in Nox. Both Keats 
and Catullus provide a necessary poetic and allusive distance from which Carson works. 
Rather than confront her subjects directly, Carson uses this allusive distance, which is 
necessary for setting up the process of poetic errancy, or wandering, within the literary and 
classical archive. In this section, I will analyze select examples from The Beauty of the 
Husband in order to demonstrate how Carson plays off Keats and how he, in turn, augments 
and shapes Carson’s narrative of desire. 
 A useful quotation that gives insight into Carson’s process is borrowed from Keats’s 
notes on his copy of Paradise Lost: “[O]ne of the most mysterious of semi-speculations is, one 
would suppose, that of one Mind’s imagining into another” (BH 21). Keats makes reference to 
Book I, lines 59-94, which detail Satan’s banishment to Hell. The passage ends with Satan’s 
admission to Beelzebub that God was indeed stronger than he expected: “so much the stronger 
prov’d / He with his Thunder: and till then who knew / The force of those dire Arms?” (lines 
92-94). 
The reader accesses Paradise Lost and Milton through Keats, who is himself framed 
by Carson. Indeed, we are distanced from the “original” text – what we receive is merely 
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Keats’s commentary. But his comment is manifold and is applicable to all these frames of 
reference. Speculation as “one Mind’s imagining into another” suggests that there is no 
thinking within a vacuum; rather, one thinks into and through another. In the case of Paradise 
Lost, the dangerous thought of Satan “infects” others, such as Beelzebub, who becomes his 
follower and is allotted the same fate of eternity in Hell. Carson thinks through Keats, who 
thinks through Milton. I would argue that Carson’s entire poetic process involves “one Mind’s 
imagining into another.” Minds are always already infiltrated by other minds; texts are always 
already infiltrated by other texts in a babelian superposition.  
 More interesting are the traces of Milton in Carson’s Poem V, which follows Keats’s 
quotation. Milton’s passage is one of sin, betrayal, power, and disillusionment. Indeed, 
Paradise Lost summons God, Satan, and the fall. A possible reading of the marriage in 
Carson’s text is via the terms set up by Milton. Does the husband, for example, play the role of 
God? As Carson begins Poem V: “Like many a wife I boosted the husband up to Godhood and 
held him there” (BH 23). Or is the husband, who is exposed as someone who “lied about 
everything” (33), more suitably the deceptive demon? The complexity of truth and beauty 
implies, of course, a less decisive reading. 
We have a sense of Carson’s poem functioning as a hall of mirrors, in which Milton is 
reflected, enlarged, or distorted. “What is strength?” (BH 23) the wife asks in the second line, 
echoing Milton’s Satan who comments on the strength of God in the cited passage. There is 
even a play between Keats’s marginalia in his copy of Paradise Lost and the mother who finds 
the husband’s name “inscribed on the flyleaf” (23) of her daughter’s book. The husband’s 
marginal scribbles forces the mother to speculate and prophesize: 
I wouldn’t trust anyone who calls himself X – and 
something exposed itself in her voice 
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… 
taste of iron. 
Prophetic. Her prophecies all came true although she didn’t 
mean them to. (BH 23) 
 
I referenced this passage earlier in terms of the mother as prohibiting her daughter’s desires 
and thereby fostering them. Indeed, we may recall God’s instructions to Adam and Eve not to 
eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge. The daughter, similarly, does not pay heed to her 
mother (who, at this point in the poem, occupies the position of God), resulting in what can be 
interpreted as a “fall,” or the doomed state of love. The mother’s wariness is “prophetic” – we 
learn later in Poem X that she is “unsurprised / when [the husband does] not appear for the 
wedding” (BH 45). The wife’s “fall” is unavoidable and inevitable. Despite all protest and 
“opposition of friends or family” (23), she begins the dangerous pursuit of the lover, leading to 
a long and passionate but equally tumultuous marriage.  
Hindsight plays an important role for the wife, as it does for Satan. If the strength of 
God is “so much the stronger prov’d,” why not repent? If the husband is “loyal to nothing” 
(BH 9), why return to him? The wife, in Poem II, reveals explicitly to the reader the reason for 
her desire: 
So why did I love him from early girlhood to late middle age 
and the divorce decree came in the mail? 
Beauty. No great secret. Not ashamed to say I loved him for his beauty. 
As I would again 
if he came near. Beauty convinces. (BH 9) 
 
Beauty drives her to the husband. His effect, even afterward as she recounts their relationship, 
is inescapably seductive: “I would again / if he came near.” Despite everything, the wife 
knows that she would succumb to the husband’s beauty. Interestingly, we find a similar 
sentiment in Milton’s Satan, who, despite God’s strength, refuses to repent or change. Though 
Carson only makes reference to Book 1, lines 59 to 94, it is what Satan continues to say after 
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acknowledging God’s strength that finds its echo in the wife: “yet not for those, / Nor what the 
Potent Victor in his rage / Can else inflict, do I repent or change” (lines 94-96). 
 At the end of Poem V, Carson illustrates the infidelity of the husband. This time, the 
husband assumes the role of the fallen angel who betrays God: 
 Less than a year after our marriage 
my husband began to receive calls from [a woman] late at night. 
If I answered [she] 
hung up. My ears grew hoarse. 
 
How are you. 
- 
No. 
- 
Maybe. Eight. Can you. 
- 
The white oh yes. 
- 
Yes.  
 
What is so ecstatic unknowable cutthroat glad as the walls 
of the flesh 
of the voice of betrayal – yet all the while lapped in talk more dull 
than the tick of a clock (BH 24-5) 
 
This excerpt reveals the husband’s infidelity to his wife and his betrayal of the sanctity of his 
marriage. While the wife’s surrender to her husband’s seduction can be considered “a fall,” 
this, too, is a fall as he succumbs to the seduction of the other woman. He secures his place as 
“the king of hell” (BH 62), as the wife later calls him. The wife, on the other hand, learns to 
become cautious and compares herself to an innocent animal: “A puppy / learns to listen this 
way” (25).  
In this passage, we eavesdrop alongside the wife and are forced to hear the 
conversation from her perspective. We, too, have to extrapolate, speculate, and fill in the gaps. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, we have to confront the mystery of what it is that the 
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other desires. What does the other want? What is it that this mistress can satisfy that the wife 
cannot? His response, “The white oh yes,” hints at something, but remains ambiguous and 
unexplained. Four simple words (“talk more dull / than the tick of a clock”) become a possible 
opening, or answer, to the big question of the husband’s desires. The wife, who agonizes over 
the “ecstatic unknowable,” would no doubt wish to have her mind “imagine into” the mind of 
her husband. 
 Keats’s marginalia, in his copy of Paradise Lost, expresses a fascination with how a 
mind “imagine[s] into another.” His commentary on Milton’s process engenders Carson’s own 
imagining. Milton animates Poem V as the wife, husband, and mother trade the roles of God 
and Satan. Carson approaches their relationship with the aid of the terms set up by Milton and 
borrows from his verse, thus opening her narrative to other narratives. Carson’s excerption 
highlights the borders between herself, Keats, and Milton. As Barthes describes it, “the seam 
of the two edges, the interstice of bliss, occurs in the volume of the languages” (PT 13). While 
I have read Carson’s poem through Milton, by way of Keats, the adjacency of the texts is at 
times more direct. Consider, for example, the poem that follows. 
 Poem VI begins with a quotation from Keats’s drama, Otho the Great. The play, which 
has been considered “undervalued” (Roe xix) and was never performed, was written in 
collaboration with his friend, Charles Armitage Brown. Set in tenth-century Germany, the play 
tells the story of an arranged marriage between Otho’s son, Ludolph, and the duke’s daughter, 
Auranthe. After the wedding, it is revealed that Auranthe has a lover, which drives Ludolph 
mad. Already, we can detect the parallel themes between Otho the Great and The Beauty of 
the Husband: marriage, infidelity, and tragedy.  
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The excerpt Carson provides is from the final scene of the play when Ludolph, 
bedridden and deranged, contemplates which wine to drink to his deceitful wife: “purple 
slaughter-house where Bacchus’ self / Pricked his own swollen veins!” (5. 5. 123-125). 
Keats’s fictional Otho is a tenth-century Roman emperor and conjures up the medieval past. 
(Carson, later in Poem XI, makes reference to the actual Roman emperor Marcus Salvius Otho 
Caesar Augustus.) The mention of Bacchus solidifies the connection of Carson’s poem to 
antiquity. The full passage from Keats is as follows: 
I thirst to pledge my lovely bride 
In a deep goblet: let me see – what wine? 
The strong Iberian juice, or mellow Greek? 
Or pale Calabrian? Or the Tuscan grape? 
Or of old Ætna’s pulpy wine-presses, 
Black stain’d with the fat vintage, as it were 
The purple slaughter-house, where Bacchus’ self 
Prick’d his own swollen veins? (5.5.118-25) 
 
The reference to Bacchus immediately brings up wine, madness, and ecstasy.34 In the longer 
passage above, we can see how Bacchus is embedded in Ludolph’s ramblings about wine. The 
image of the grape is continued in Carson’s poem following the quotation. The title of Poem 
VI is: TO CLEAN YOUR HOOVES HERE IS A DANCE IN HONOR OF THE GRAPE 
WHICH THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAS BEEN A SYMBOL OF REVELRY AND JOY 
NOT TO SAY ANALOGY FOR THE BRIDE AS UNCUT BLOSSOM (BH 29). Carson’s 
title brings together many things at once: metonymically, we have the satyrs (“hooves”), who 
are the traditional companions of Bacchus, Bacchanalia (“dance,” “revelry and joy”), wine 
(“grape”), and virginity (“the bride as uncut blossom”). Poem VI takes the coordinates 
provided by Keats and re-imagined by Carson to relay an early sexual experience between the 
wife and husband during their adolescence: 
                                                
34 The passage also alludes to the more familiar reference to Bacchus in the “Ode to a Nightingale.” 
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Smell 
I will never forget. 
Out behind the vineyard. 
Stone place maybe a shed or an icehouse no longer in use. 
October, a little cold. Hay on the floor. We had gone to his grandfather’s farm to help 
 
crush  
the grapes for wine. 
… 
Naked in the stone place it was true, sticky stains, skin, I lay on the hay 
 
and he licked. 
Licked it off. 
Ran out and got more dregs in his hands and smeared 
it on my knees belly licking. Plucking. Diving. 
Tongue is the smell of October to me. (BH 30) 
 
In this vivid, primal, and erotic scene, eros locates itself in the temporality of memory, its 
distance, separation, and reconstruction. This memory, written “in honour of the grape,” 
overwhelms the senses, particularly smell, which the first line emphasizes. The wife 
remembers the smell of the cold October, hay, crushed grapes, tongue. Later in the poem, she 
mentions the “smell / of turned earth and cold plants and night coming on” (30). “Lick,” 
repeated three times, brings together the erotic act, as well as the liquidity and sensuality of 
squeezed grapes. The grapes, setting the scene for their sexual encounter, is indeed a symbol 
of “revelry and joy,” and the “crushed” grape suggests the loss of virginity, or the now cut 
blossom of the bride.  
The sensuality of the memory, however, takes a turn in the next stanza. The wife, 
mirroring Ludolph in his state of derangement, contemplates different varietals of grapes in 
the final stanzas of the poem: 
 Stamens on him 
and as Kafka said in the end 
my swimming was of no use to me you know I cannot swim after all. 
 Well it so happens more than 90% of all cultivated grapes are varieties of 
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Vitis vinifera 
the Old World or European grape, 
while native American grapes derive 
from certain wild species of Vitis and differ in their “foxy” odor 
as well as the fact that their skins slip so liquidly from the pulp. 
 
An ideal wine grape 
is one that is easily crushed.  
Such things I learned from the grandfather (BH 30) 
 
The sudden segue to Kafka is surprising. Kafka suffered conflict over being Jewish: “[h]is 
biographers record how Kafka attempted to alter his body through sports of all types, 
including swimming. But he could not avert his destiny, which was to become – his father and 
all that his father represented – the ill Dreyfus, the diseased Jew” (Gilman 91). This allusion 
signals the inevitability of the wife’s “destiny,” that is, her tangled marriage with the husband. 
Beauty, as she said already, “convinces.” Carson repeats the word “crush,” but this time, the 
word takes on a more ominous meaning. The word “crush” has a ring of dramatic irony when 
read in hindsight. Is it suggested by the grandfather that the wife, too, is “easily crushed?” 
Keats’s quotation compares the winepress to “the purple slaughter-house,” and there is a sense 
that, by losing her virginity to the husband, the wife is like a lamb led to the slaughterhouse. 
The shed behind the vineyard where they crush grapes is called the “stone place,” which the 
wife repeats twice in the poem. Later in Poem XXVII, the husband recounts skinning rabbits 
with his grandfather behind the shed: “Satiny red entrails. Clear splash of blood on white 
porcelain” (BH 129). The space, used for crushing grapes, is also a place of gutting. The loss 
of virginity is a “death.” When read against Keats’s lines, Carson effectively foreshadows the 
tragic finale. As Roger Gilbert describes The Beauty of The Husband, “The book traces the 
course of their marriage from its first Dionysian consummation while crushing grapes … to its 
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last gasp in an Athenian hotel room, blood streaming from the husband’s nose like a parody of 
the grape juice that first seduced them.” 
The grape brings up a number of striking dyads in the above passage: European and 
American, old and new, ideal and imperfect. By extension, we also have the wife and Ludolph, 
and Carson and Keats – both of whom write of failed love. Both the wife and Ludolph have 
been deceived very early on in their marriages (Ludolph cries, “I was the fool, / She was the 
cheater!” [5.5.104-5]). Keats’s passage and Carson’s poem find their commonality in the 
metonymic overlap of grape, wine, and Bacchus, who also represents chaos and disorder. 
While Ludolph turns to Bacchus at the end of his (short-lived) relationship with Auranthe, 
wine for Carson marks the beginning of a long and tumultuous relationship with the husband. 
The husband, a young man in this memory, is even described by the grandfather as “tragikos,” 
a Greek word which Carson defines as “a country word meaning either tragic or goat” (BH 30). 
Indeed, “goat” alludes to the satyr, thus likening the husband to the lustful and drunken hybrid, 
which, in the course of his marriage, he proves to be. But “tragikos” also contains other 
resonances such as Keats’s tragic play, the tragic story of marriage, and the current tragedy 
that Carson is sharing with the reader. As the husband writes in his letter to the wife after their 
divorce: “This is a tragedy” (133). 
Carson continually tampers with narrative frames within her poetry and in conjunction 
with Keats. At times, she uses Keats indirectly, borrowing an affect or sense that then “spills” 
and colours her poetry. Allusions, like the stain of crushed grapes, dye and blend with the new 
text. Barthes also provides an analogy of such “leakage”: “The brio of the text … is its will to 
bliss: just where it exceeds the demand, transcends prattle, and whereby it attempts to 
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overflow, to break through” (PT 13-14). In Poem IX, Carson demonstrates such an “overflow” 
with both Keats and Homer. 
Poem IX is coloured by Keats and The Homeric Hymn to Demeter. Carson’s poem is 
preceded by an excerpt from Keats’s 10-line poem, “I had a dove and the sweet dove died”: 
“its feet were tied / With a silken thread of my own hand’s weaving” (BH 39). Keats’s speaker 
mourns for a dove that has died while in his care. 
Its feet were tied 
With a silken thread of my own hand’s weaving: 
Sweet little red feet! Why would you die? 
Why would you leave me, sweet bird, why? 
You liv’d alone on the forest tree, 
Why, pretty thing, could you not live with me? 
I kiss’d you oft, and gave you white pease; 
Why not live sweetly as in the green trees? (lines 3-10) 
 
Grief is at the centre of this poem, but, more curiously, the speaker is baffled by why the bird 
dies. If the bird could live alone in the forest, why could it not live together with the speaker? 
The speaker mourns the bird, but also mourns that which entirely escapes him. Despite his 
aims to detain the bird (“Its feet were tied”), the bird, in death, still manages to get away. 
Although Keats’s poem does not make direct reference to the Homeric hymn, the 
speaker’s loss identifies with the loss felt by Demeter. Hades’s abduction of Persephone is 
also the cause of Demeter’s anguish. While Poem V provides a Christian model of heaven and 
hell, Poem IX offers a classical interpretation of the underworld.  
Carson yokes the wife’s story with that of Persephone when one day, unexplainably, 
the husband (then young man) shows up at her new school: 
Word that overnight 
showed up on all the walls of my life inscribed simpliciter no explanation. 
What is the power of the unexplained. 
There he was one day (new town) in a hayfield outside my school standing 
under a black umbrella 
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in a raw picking wind. 
I never asked 
how he got there a distance maybe 300 miles. 
To ask 
 
would break some rule. 
Have you ever read The Homeric Hymn to Demeter? (BH 41) 
 
Carson inserts the Latin word “simpliciter,” an adverb meaning “simply,” or “plainly.” (Latin, 
as we learn in Poem XI, is particularly charged as the wife and husband had first met in Latin 
class when they were fifteen.) To explain her story simply is, in fact, to recall the Greek myth. 
The struggle, as Carson makes clear, is providing an explanation to the mother (and to 
Demeter). The wife-speaker cuts to the story of Demeter: 
 Remember how Hades rides out of the daylight 
 on his immortal horses swathed in pandemonium. 
Takes the girl down to a cold room below 
while her mother walks the world and damages every living thing. 
Homer tells it 
as a story of the crime against the mother. 
For a daughter’s crime is to accept Hades’ rules 
 
which she knows she can never explain 
and so breezing in she says 
to Demeter: 
“Mother here is the whole story. 
Slyly he placed  
in my hands a pomegranate seed sweet as honey. 
Then by force and against my will he made me eat. 
I tell you this truth though it grieves me.”  
Made her eat how? (BH 41) 
 
Despite her changing schools, the husband shows up unexpectedly and unannounced, much 
like Hades who rides out of the earth in his chariot. Their romance, once again, comes up 
against the mother, this time aligned with Demeter who “walks the world and damages every 
living thing.” The striking part about the story of Persephone is her explanation to her mother: 
“Then by force and against my will he made me eat.” The ambiguity as to how Persephone 
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consumed the seed (by force, or with consent) has been attached to this Homeric hymn.35 The 
wife, in her italicized question, suggests that she doubts this version of Persephone’s story. 
Perhaps Persephone, too, was swayed by Hades’s beauty? An explanation for Persephone’s 
betrayal, or “the crime against the mother,” thus proves difficult. The mother’s goal, as Carson 
states, is “to abolish seduction” (BH 42). Reminiscent of the speaker in Keats’s poem, both the 
mother and Demeter try to keep their daughters innocent and contained. Just as the dove does 
not provide an answer to Keats’s speaker, Persephone cannot offer an explanation. Carson’s 
line, “she knows she can never explain,” laminates the situation of Persephone to that of the 
wife. The inability to explain is not simply narrative, but formal: eros occupies the liminal 
space where there is no language for desire.  
 Carson adapts the story of Demeter and Persephone as an aid for the wife to explain 
that which has “[simply] no explanation.” More problematic than the seduction and beauty of 
the husband is the “crime against the mother.” Indeed the mother in The Beauty of the 
Husband senses trouble:  
From my mother  
emanated a fragrance, fear. 
And from me 
(I knew by her face at the table) 
smell of sweet seed. (42) 
 
The “smell of sweet seed” recalls the split fruit of both the crushed grapes as well as the 
infamous pomegranate seed that Hades gives Persephone to eat. As a result, Persephone is 
doomed to return to Hades for a part of each year because she has consumed food from the 
underworld; her return signals the coming of winter. Accordingly, the wife’s loss of virginity 
in Poem VI is set in October. The pomegranate seed is steeped in symbolism, and has been 
                                                
35 See Faraone: “Finally it is interesting to note that two versions of the pomegranate seed in the Hymn to Demeter diverge on 
this very question, i.e., to what degree did Persephone offer her consent?” (238). 
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interpreted as blood and death, or marriage and fertility (Penglase 121). The seed has also 
been considered a “love-charm” and that its purpose is “to induce the loved one to reciprocate 
… Hades gives [Persephone] the seed as a charm to induce her to love him, to reciprocate his 
love and desire for her” (Penglase 132). The wife, too, receives a love-charm and is 
interrogated by her mother: 
Roses in your room’d he send you those? 
 
Yes.  
What’s the occasion? 
No occasion. 
What’s going on with the color. 
Color. 
Ten white one red what’s that mean. 
Guess they ran out of white. (BH 42) 
 
The wife, by accepting the roses, anticipates the same retribution as Persephone, much to the 
mother’s dismay. Both daughters descend to their respective underworlds. Just as the 
pomegranate seed determines the fate of Persephone, the red rose (which the wife admits to 
keeping, “dried to a powder now” [BH 42]) is also mixed in its meaning. On the one hand, it 
functions as the love-charm that unites the lovers. On the other hand, it also signals the 
mother’s loss. To explain the pomegranate seed and its consequences, thus, proves difficult 
when confronted by the mother.  
Furthermore, the red rose in the bouquet crystallizes and affirms the erotic. Its colour 
taints the purity of the white flowers – in much the same way that the stain of crushed grapes 
colours the wife’s early erotic memory, and the classical allusion of Persephone and Hades 
pigments the wife’s recount to her mother. Purity of memories, texts, and history is, as the 
image of the bouquet suggests, impossible. Eros “flout[s] the edges of things” (Eros 35), 
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colouring, staining, and blending with what is at the “centre.” Eros resides in the liminal space 
separating the wife from the memory, as well as the reader from the text. 
How does Persephone attempt to explain things to her mother? When faced with 
Demeter, she shifts the onus and tells a story that lays blame on Hades. In Poem XI, we can 
read Carson’s description of her own “descent” in the same light: 
 I turned in my seat 
and there he was. 
You know how they say a Zen butcher makes one correct cut and the whole ox 
falls apart 
like a puzzle. Yes a cliché 
 
and I do not apologize because as I say I was not to blame, I was unshielded 
in the face of existence 
and existence depends on beauty.  
In the end. 
Existence will not stop 
until it gets to beauty and then there follow all the consequences that lead to the end. 
(BH 49) 
 
The wife in this passage, like Persephone, is “unshielded” and vulnerable. Both Hades and the 
husband are overpowering in their beauty. But, as Gilbert observes, “For Carson of course 
beauty is not merely aesthetic but erotic, and therefore prone to catastrophe.” Indeed, “the end” 
that Carson alludes to is not the fulfillment that seemingly satisfies the lover’s desire; rather, 
an erotic fulfillment of fantasy is ultimately catastrophic, or the “down turning” of what is 
expected. The marriage, as Carson demonstrates, is not a happy one. In their final encounter in 
Athens, “joys and leaves of earlier times flowed through the husband and disappeared” (BH 
100).  
 The final example I want to look at is Poem XXIX, the last tango. Unlike the previous 
excerpts, which draw on Keats’s primary texts, the poem opens with his notes on his long 
unfinished poem, “The Jealousies: A Faery Tale.” Like Otho the Great, “The Jealousies” 
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revolves around the arranged marriage between Emperor Elfinan and Princess Bellanaine. The 
marriage, as expected, does not work out: it is revealed that both Elfinan and Bellanaine are, in 
fact, in love with other people. Keats’s notes, excerpted by Carson, are as follows: 
{Not for the glance itse} 
{Not for the fiery glance itself perhaps} 
{Nor at the glance itsef} (BH 137) 
 
Keats’s edits are written above lines 68-69 of his poem in which Bellanaine’s nurse, Coralline, 
is silenced by her mistress. Coralline warns Bellanaine not to whisper too loudly about her 
lover for fear that Crafticant (Elfinan’s “great state-spy militant” [line 61]) would overhear: 
“Ah, beauteous mortal!” “Hush!” quoth Coralline, 
“Really you must not talk of him, indeed.” 
“You hush!” replied the mistress, with a shine 
Of anger in her eyes, enough to breed 
In stouter hearts than nurse’s fear and dread: 
‘Twas not the glance itself made nursey flinch, 
But of its threat she took the utmost heed; 
Not liking in her heart an hour-long pinch, 
Or a sharp needle run into her back an inch. (lines 64-72) 
 
Keats’s edits play with the phrasing in line 69, “’Twas not the glance itself,” and offer other 
variations. While the glance of Bellanaine is one of anger, taken on its own, Keats’s edits befit 
the “fiery glance” of lovers. Indeed, it is the wife’s sighting of the husband in their high school 
Latin class that sets their relationship in motion. (The importance of the gaze is also evoked in 
Sappho’s fragment 31: “when I look at you, a moment, then no speaking / is left in me.”) 
More importantly, the list of possible phrasings provided by Keats draws attention to 
the act of writing and re-writing. The wife in the preceding poem in the book states: “So you 
see / I work at correcting the past” (BH 135). This excerpt from Keats, thus, is not necessarily 
relevant for the primary text which he edits, but for the act of editing itself. Consider also the 
quotations preceding Poem X and Poem XXIII, respectively: 
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19 thine own altered in pencil possibly by Keats to  some small (BH 43) 
 
 
a sort of Delphic Abstraction a beautiful thing made more 
 beautiful by being reflected and put in a Mist 
[there is a faint mark after beautiful read by one editor as a dash, by another as a slip of 
the pen, while a third does not print it] (BH 103) 
 
Carson highlights the creative and editorial “mistakes” of the past. They are not only Keats’s 
own corrections for himself, but also the various readings that occur in the transmission of a 
text. A “faint mark” becomes “a dash,” “a slip of the pen,” and, in the last case, negligible. 
While I have elucidated a few examples in which Carson’s poems can be read alongside other 
intertexts, what Carson is emphasizing, by using Keats’s secondary texts, is the plurality of 
reading, writing, and transmission. Even Keats’s unfinished poem errs, strays, and finds itself 
under various editorial eyes, and rejuvenated alongside new texts. His scribbles, repeated and 
slightly different each time, signal an excess, or leakage. It is part of the text, and yet remains 
outside of it. 
 Poem XXIX also opens with excess, or a remainder of words. The wife contemplates 
all the things she was never able to utter to the husband during their marriage: 
To get them out of her the wife tries making a list of words she never got to say. 
How have you been. 
Fancy seeing you here. 
I had given up hope I grew desperate why did you take so long. 
Bloodless monster! had I never 
seen or known your 
kindness what 
might I 
have been. (BH 139) 
 
These words take on a toxic quality that must be expelled from the body (“To get them out of 
her”). Divorced, there is no longer an opportune time to say these things to her husband. 
However, Carson suggests that the exercise of “making a list of words she never got to say” is 
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not a solution. In the next line, Carson states: “words are a strange docile wheat” (BH 139). 
They “bend to the ground” (139) and have a quality of malleability to them. Words do not 
simply disappear from the wife when written down, but remain and survive.36 Her words 
participate in their own kind of archive, or collection.  
In an attempt to finish the story, Carson summarizes: 
 
let’s just finish it. 
Not because, like Persephone, I needed to cool my cheek on death. 
Not, with Keats, to buy time. 
Not, as the tango, out of sheer wantonness. 
But oh it seemed sweet. 
 
To say Beauty is Truth and stop. 
Rather than to eat it. 
Rather than to want to eat it. This was my pure early thought. 
I overlooked one thing. 
That the beautiful when I encountered it would turn out to be 
prior – inside my own heart, 
already eaten. 
Not out there with purposiveness, with temples, with God. 
Inside. He was already me.  
Condition of me. (BH 139-40) 
 
The wife in the passage addresses the reader, drawing awareness to her own intertextuality. 
Borrowing the form of Keats’s notes, she edits herself and tells the reader that she will finish 
her story – not with Persephone, Keats, or the tango, which she had carefully woven into her 
narrative – but with her own admission: that the beautiful was not “out there” but already 
inside her – “eaten.”  
Most striking in this passage is the temporal difference of the verbs “to eat” and 
“already eaten.” In the former case, the wife’s “pure early thought” (that is, “to eat [beauty]”) 
                                                
36 The survival of this “residue” conforms to what Derrida calls the “trace.” The wife’s expulsion of her words does not result 
in a complete purge, as if the “list of words” (BH 139) is a neatly packaged body text. On the contrary, Derrida defines the 
text as “no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a 
fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces” (“Living On” 84). The 
intertextual poetics of Carson is above all a play with the trace and the trace of the archive. 
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suggests a hypothetical future that has already past. The latter, upon her discovery when 
writing and remembering, is the pluperfect (“[I had] already eaten”). The difference between 
the verb forms is the site of eros: the erotic, the experiential, the archival, and the textual. Eros 
enfolds the husband (from boyhood to the present), the process of re-membering their 
marriage, and the words of Keats, Milton, Homer, and others. What has been eaten? The 
answer is “beauty,” that is, language, memory, experience, and that which leaves traces or 
residue and which stains the future present. 
Carson’s beauty does not follow Keats’s romantic idea of beauty, in which there is 
something “out there” like a Grecian urn. Beauty is not spiritual and divine, residing in 
temples and God. Furthermore, beauty is not universal or whole. The beauty Carson proposes 
is one that is flawed, “eaten,” internalized, recognized, and reflected in the husband: “He was 
already me” (BH 140). While Keats’s “beauty” is found in the subject-object nexus, Carson’s 
“beauty” is in the subject, in the subject’s desire for beauty, and in the traces of her readings 
leading up to her vague idea, or expression, of beauty. I return to the title, once again, which 
aptly reflects the wife’s realization. While the reader is led to believe that “The Beauty” in the 
title indicates beauty possessed by the husband, beauty, in fact, belongs foremost to the wife. 
The story is as much about the wife as it is about the husband: 
Words, wheat, conditions, gold, more than thirty years of it fizzing around in me –  
there 
I lay it to rest. (BH 140) 
 
These lines signal an “end,” or a neat conclusion. Despite these lines, it is suggested that the 
speaker here is also uncertain of her ability to “lay it to rest.” The wife addresses the doubting 
reader: 
You smile. I think 
you are going to mention again 
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those illuminated manuscripts from medieval times where the scribe 
has made an error in copying 
so the illuminator encloses the error 
in a circlet of roses and flames 
 
which a saucy little devil is trying to tug off the side of the page. 
After all the heart is not a small stone 
to be rolled this way and that. 
The mind is not a box to be shut fast. 
And yet it is! 
It is! (BH 140-1) 
 
The poem takes a noteworthy turn here. We return, once again, to error – but this time, the 
illuminator attempts to enclose error, which seemingly goes against Carson’s overall poetic 
processes of rupture and spillage. Despite the circlet and the attempt to “tug [it] off the side of 
the page,” the error remains visible, occupying the spaces of the margins. We can liken this act 
of enclosure to the archival process, which attempts to enclose, or “shut fast,” that which 
cannot be confined (like Keats’s dove). Here, too, is a suggestion of the impossibility of 
bounded containment. 
This passage is not the first instance in which the wife addresses an anonymous “you.” 
Carson explains that it is not a particular “You”:  
It’s the generalized You of lyric poetry. Catullus invented this, I think, for the Romans, 
and the You is sometimes unnamed, a persona who forms as the poem forms, a sort of 
ideal listener. … He used it extensively. Probably took it from Sappho. (Wachtel) 
However, this use of “you” is striking due to the fact that the wife appears to engage with a 
particular “you” about her own story. Somewhere, the wife, in telling her story, has erred and 
she anticipates the “you”/reader to point out her mistake. I would argue that the reader could 
likely be Carson herself who, eruditely, would mention how medieval scribes make mistakes 
only to transform them creatively into something new. Indeed, Carson can even be aligned 
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with the scribe who makes mistakes in copying, or transmitting, and who transforms the errors 
of the process into something novel. The lines here offer a striking two-way mirror prefigured 
in the wife’s earlier admission. It is as if Carson, who writes the wife, has the wife break out of 
the literary frame to address Carson. Carson would agree that the heart is not like a “small 
stone,” and the mind not a shut “box” – metaphors that exemplify self-containment and 
enclosure. The wife, in this passage, however, protests: “And yet it is!”  
 A problem set up by the wife and the “you” is how the story ends. The wife, who 
wants to “lay it to rest,” appears to come up against the “you’s” acknowledgement of a 
mistake. Her final lines advise the reader to “hold. / Hold beauty” (BH 141). The wife’s 
ending seemingly contradicts her notion of beauty as something that is containable. Can 
beauty be “held” or contained in the mind, described as “a box to be shut fast”?  
 The wife, as we soon see, cannot get away with a neat ending. Recalling Barthes who 
states, “How does a love end? … To tell the truth, no one – except for the others – ever knows 
anything about it” (LD 101), Carson does not give the last word to the wife, but to the husband. 
Carson includes one last, unnumbered poem, which participates as part of the collection, but is 
not included as one of the twenty-nine tangos. The poem represents excess, or a remainder, 
that resists containment and conclusiveness. 
 Hurts to be here. 
“You are the one who has escaped.” 
To tell a story by not telling it –  
dear shadow, I wrote this slowly. 
Her starts! 
My ends. 
But it all comes round to a blue June moon 
and a sullied night as poets say. 
Some tangos pretend to be about women but look at this. 
Who is it you see reflected small  
in each of her tears. 
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Watch me fold this page now so you think it is you. (BH 145) 
 
The last poem throws ambiguity on the book as a whole: who is the writer of the story? The 
husband claims that he “wrote this slowly.” Who can we trust? His lines, “Her starts! / My 
ends,” echoes the wife’s words from Poem II:  
You know I was married years ago and when he left my husband took my notebooks. 
Wirebound notebooks. 
You know that cool sly verb write. He liked writing, disliked having to start each 
thought himself. 
Used my starts to various ends (BH 9)  
 
The wife hints to the reader very early on that writing is a “cool sly verb.” Both the wife and 
the husband collaborate in much the same way that Carson borrows, or steals, from other texts. 
Writing is “sly,” “sullied,” and full of pretence (“tangos pretend” [BH 145]). Desire itself 
remains up in the air between the husband and wife; the line, “You are the one who escaped,” 
is not designated to a speaker and remains ambiguous as to whether the husband or the wife 
accuses the other of this. 
Indeed, the final poem denies The Beauty of the Husband an author, or auctoritas and 
problematizes the archival “commencement.” There is no single origin; rather, the marriage is 
refracted through the intertexts, which disperses the “origin” among Keats, Milton, and the 
classical corpus. There is no single authorial voice, but a confluence of voices. The last line, 
“Watch me fold this page now so you think it is you,” breaks the literary frame one last time 
as the husband commands the reader to “watch.” The story “leaks” from the book, so even the 
final gesture of the reader (folding the page over) is questioned and uncertain. 
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Conclusion 
“[E]nlightenment is useless.” 
 –Anne Carson (PW 240) 
 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Carson’s narratives of erotic experience lend themselves to a 
broader understanding of her poetics of error. I argue that the desire for “oneness” in love is 
akin to desires previously discussed, such as the desire for origin, and the desire for totality. 
Carson’s depiction of Love follows the same paradigm as History and the Archive in that they 
all purport to provide the “total sum” with a defined and fixed origin. At the crux of Carson’s 
work, however, is error. The person we think who will complete us proves inadequate. The 
history we turn to for meaning turns out to be meaningless. The archive, which aims to 
command the past, is in constant flux. Language, too, is flawed in that it can never quite 
express what we mean to say.  
 Crucial to this chapter is Carson’s assertion that eros is that which is “in between” the 
lover and the beloved. The erotic liminal space that prevents the complete unification between 
lovers is also, by extension, what divides us from the “perfect” translation, the “complete” 
transmission, and the “accurate” account of history. The overarching belief that we can 
achieve oneness, or “pure presence,” is a fantasmatic desire. Eros, thus, is a necessary form of 
error: to love is to err – both to wander (from lover to lover) and to make mistakes. Moreover, 
eros is that intervening space born of various distances in relation to error: temporal, 
translational, archival, and generic.  
Carson confronts the fantasmatic desire for oneness by way of the sick father, a 
recurring figure in her work, who demonstrates what happens when the symbolic, or fantasy, 
breaks down. His madness is a useful trope in representing a number of things, such as the 
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ineffable trauma of loss, the babble between subjects, and the lack of meaning when it comes 
to the beloved. More importantly, the demented father is a productive way of conceptualizing 
the mad text, that is, the text that is open and traversed by other words, meanings, and systems. 
Poetry is not self-enclosed; rather, it is plural, various, surprising, and deviant. My analysis of 
The Beauty of the Husband demonstrates how Carson, in narrating the history of erotic 
experience, illustrates the fractured lines of love by way of the fragmented text. Keats 
continually mediates, interrupts, and rejuvenates her poetry. His fragments become nodes at 
which Carson intersects with the literary/Keatsian archive, as well as the classical archive. 
Erotic desire, thus, is tethered to an archival and textual desire for wholeness. These desires, 
however, are resisted. Much like Nox, The Beauty of the Husband uses fragmentation and 
adjacency to complicate the acts of loving, reading, narrating, and historicizing. Eros is not 
limited to its subject, or poetic theme, but becomes a vital site for Carson’s procedures of error.  
  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
“Use a distant brush” 
 
 
“Because when you write an essay you’re giving a gift,  
it seems to me. You’re giving this grace, as the ancients would say.  
A gift shouldn’t turn back into the self and stop there.”  
–Anne Carson (D’Agata, “A___” 17) 
 
 
“To sum up. Honestly, I am not very good at summing up.  
The best I can do is offer a final splatter of white paint.” 
 –Anne Carson (Nay 32) 
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Two years after the publication of Nox, Carson published a poem entitled “Powerless 
Structures Fig. 11” in New Republic. The poem concerns the death of a nameless “she,” who 
turns out to be Michael’s wife. It opens: 
HER FUNERAL 
is in Sankt Johannes nine years after his. 
 
THAT GOLDSMUGGLER 
she fell in love with in Amsterdam is how he appears in her eulogy.  
 
… 
 
I FIRST 
met her on the telephone you don’t know me she said but your brother has 
just died in my bathroom. 
 
APPARENTLY THEY’D 
been married 17 years. 
 
The wife’s death evokes Michael’s death and what little was known of Carson’s brother. The 
poem borrows and recycles phrases from Nox, such as “what’s that / sound,” and “most people 
/ blush before death.” New details of their marriage, as well as further details of Michael not 
revealed in Nox (such as his dying in the bathroom), also emerge. “Powerless Structures” can 
be read as an addendum to Nox; the wife’s death follows the death of Michael, which follows 
the death of the mother, and so on. In a typical Carsonian manoeuvre, Carson draws from her 
own poetic archive, as she repeats and renews her words. The poem is published in a magazine 
(it should be noted that New Republic is not strictly a literary journal), thus giving the poem 
limited exposure, as well as an understated – and even overlooked – position.  
 The following year, New Republic published another poem by Carson, “Short Talk on 
the Withness of the Body.” Much like “Powerless Structures,” this poem is self-consciously 
and reflexively allusive. The title immediately aligns the text with Carson’s first collection, 
Short Talks. The format echoes the “racing stripe” text in Red Doc> (published earlier that 
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year). Finally, the third part of the poem derives directly from “Town of My Farewell to You” 
(PW 111) in Plainwater.  
These two recent poems by Carson are not necessarily novel in their technique of self-
reference; indeed, self-referentiality occurs throughout her oeuvre. 1  Carson returns to, 
continues, and adds to her work in an ongoing process of “friskes, skips and jumps.” What 
does her technique of self-reference imply in terms of time? I would argue that, for Carson, 
her works are not simply finished and fixed in the past, but can be resurrected, brought forth 
into the present, renewed, and rejuvenated in new works. Just as she produces from within the 
gulf between present and antiquity, she also finds the gaps within her own chronology to be 
opportune for her creative production. The second part of “Short Talk on the Withness of the 
Body” illustrates the fertile gaps, ebbs, and flows, in history as it relates to art:  
What departs at death is 19 
grams (= 7/8 ounce) of you 
shedding a soft blue light. What 
remains behind is various. 
Within a year of the passing of 
Emily Dickinson’s dog Carlo 
(1848-1866) there were 5 other 
Carlos in Amherst and 2 in 
novels. Some centuries later 
workers digging the Athens 
metro unearthed the grave of a 
dog, small paws still folded, 
collar studded witha row of 
blue beads. Use a distant brush 
to paint thesethings. Do not 
redip.2  
Carson’s premise that “what remains behind is various” is represented by the recurrence of the 
dog throughout time in varying literary, temporal, and archeological situations. She begins 
                                                
1 I have drawn attention to Carson’s self-references in my thesis. Ward, too, notes: “[Carson] also publishes purportedly 
successive drafts of poems, creating her own archive of palimpsests and reifying her instabilities” (14). 
2 The typos in this passage are also in the original publication. 
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with Emily Dickinson’s dog, Carlo, who, after his death, left behind traces (specifically, “5 
other Carlos in Amherst and 2 in novels”). The death also anticipates the excavation of a dog 
grave “centuries later” – an event that, in fact, reaches back to antiquity. What “remains 
behind” (which Carson describes curiously as “19 grams” of “a soft blue light”) is not only 
various, but is refracted through time. What do we do with these remnants?  
The speaker in the poem instructs: “Use a distant brush to paint thesethings [sic]. Do 
not redip.” But what is a “distant brush”? The emphasis given to the brush intimately adjoins 
distance and art. Indeed, a series of temporal relations is established with each appearance of 
the dog, but also a physical distance, such as that between Amherst and Athens. Perhaps a 
better question to pose is: from where does the distant brush come? Is it the past bearing on the 
future? Or vice versa? The final instruction, “Do not redip,” recalls the speaker in 
“Introduction to Kinds of Water,” who concludes with: “the only rule of travel is, Don’t come 
back the way you went. Come a new way” (PW 123).  
What is most important for Carson is that there is distance – whether temporal, spatial, 
linguistic, or affective. This distance, as I have discussed in my dissertation, is imperative for 
her poetics of error and entails the mistakes, misreadings, mistranslations, and loss that are 
inherent and inevitable in classical transmission. Furthermore, Carson discourages 
“redip[ping].” Reminiscent of her use of Sappho, Carson here is not interested in repeatability 
associated with sameness; rather, she seeks out “a new way.” The (careless?) typos included in 
this section (“witha” and “thesethings”) are also striking as they draw attention to error. 
Perhaps the title, too, is a deliberate oversight. The “withness” of the body is to be 
prepositionally in proximity to the body. The more-correct “witness” of the body, on the other 
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hand, requires some necessary distance.3 The error in this typo resides in the tensile opposition 
between words. In Carson’s words, “my pear, your winter” (PW 93). 
The Erring Archive in Anne Carson investigates Carson’s use of “a distant brush” with 
antiquity. I discussed Carson’s responsiveness to the classical archive in terms of the critical, 
the sapphic, the elegiac, and the erotic. Each of these aspects demonstrates the impossibility of 
totality, or wholeness; a resistance to categorical entrapments; and the linguistic, affective, and 
temporal interstices from which Carson writes.  
By opening with Carson’s reception, I wanted to establish a Carsonian poetics that 
both addresses and emerges from the ambivalent reactions from readers and critics. One 
response to this mixed readership is Helen Guri’s playful essay, “Latches of Being: A User’s 
Guide to Anne Carson.” The “handy Carson how-to guide” includes book recommendations, 
as well as a three-step program to engaging with the poet’s work. Strikingly, Guri appears to 
address not the fans of Carson, but those who are put off by Carson’s erudition, genre-
breaking tendencies, and absurdity. Guri notes: 
In all likelihood, they put the book straight down … They did not become fans of Anne 
Carson. Today, these people constitute the majority of the population. Maybe you are 
among them. This isn’t necessarily shameful.  
Guri is likely being tongue-in-cheek. Indeed, the richness of Carson’s work cannot be 
contained in a brief guide, but the attempt to win over the non-enthusiasts is pointed. As Guri 
writes, “Carson, more than high modernism, cafeteria food, or even tumultuous relationships, 
is a lifelong pursuit.” 
                                                
3 Of course, other corrections for “withness” may include “wetness” and “wittiness.” Indeed, this error falls neatly within my 
discussion of “leakage” (see Chapter 2), as well as the playful “wittiness” characteristic of Carson, respectively. 
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 My dissertation is limited to Carson’s engagement with the classical archive. But, as 
Derrida remarks, “The archivist produces more archive, and that is why the archive is never 
closed” (AF 68). Carson is a readerly writer – she never works alone. Beyond the scope of my 
project were the other archives and fields of study that are undoubtedly important for Carson. 
These include visual art (Edward Hopper, Hokusai, Betty Goodwin, her own art – Carson 
often talks about her beginnings in drawing); modern literature (Samuel Beckett, Gertrude 
Stein, Virginia Woolf); cinema (Artaud, Antonioni, Monica Vitti, Catherine Deneuve); music 
(Guillermo), philosophy (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Simone Weil); and biblical scripture. The 
terms that I have put forth in relation to Carson’s encounter with the classical archive can, I 
hope, be useful for future Carsonian scholarship. 
 In addition, Carson’s relationship with Robert Currie has produced a number of 
experimental collaborations (including Nox and Antigonick). It is apparent that Carson’s work 
is moving off the page and into the realms of visual art, theatre, and performance art.4 No 
doubt, this shift in media will enrich her growing body of work. The issue, as I foresee, may 
no longer be limited to the division between scholar and poet, but also include the overlaps 
with Carson-as-visual-artist, Carson-as-performance-artist, and so on. Reminiscent of the 
speaker in Short Talks, Carson works hard at keeping us surprised – and she is never boring. 
I emphasize this. I will do anything to avoid boredom. It is the task of a lifetime. You 
can never know enough, never work enough, never use the infinitives and participles 
oddly enough, never impede the movement harshly enough, never leave the mind 
quickly enough. (ST 9) 
                                                
4 See Andrew David King (“Unwriting the Books of the Dead: Anne Carson and Robert Currie on Translation, Collaboration, 
and History”) and Megan Berkobien (“An Interview with Anne Carson and Robert Currie”). 
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